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Governance and policy-making in Thailand: A study of poverty alleviation policy since 1997

Amornsak Kitthananan

**A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with
the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Social Science (Policy Studies) in
the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law**

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Abstract

One of the stimulating theoretical discussions of the last decade involves the concept of governance and its linkage to public policy. However, many substantive studies on governance transformation and how it has affected policy-making processes have drawn on the experience of western developed countries, with little has been done in the context of developing societies. This research, therefore, responds to the need for a greater understanding of the increasing complexity of contemporary governance and its nexus with policy-making in developing countries. It explores the nature of Thailand's governance configuration in the making and delivery of anti-poverty policy since the 1997 crisis. The research also investigates this nexus in the context of globalisation which the roles and influences of globalised agents are asserted. The research findings suggest some dynamic patterns in the relationship between various actors involved in the governance of anti-poverty policy since the crisis. Instead of the Thai state turning into a weak and less powerful actor in shaping policy and service delivery, the state was able to use different governing approaches and strategies to maintain its power to steer society, to influence other actors, and ultimately to align all other domestic and international non-state actors with its purposes. The governance configuration of Thailand's anti-poverty policy appeared to shift from a *society-guided, state-governed governance* toward a *state-guided, state-governed governance*. This case supports a position arguing that the power of states is not yet diminished as promoted in the western literature; on the contrary, the state has readjusted itself in response to the dynamic, growing complexity of the contemporary governing process. The Thai state seeks coherent strategies for maintaining its influence over domestic policy-making and engaging itself with new policy conditions.

For Dad, Mom, and Nun

*The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,
and knowledge of the Holy One is understanding.*
Proverbs 9:10

*Then you will understand what is right and
just and fair - every good path.
For wisdom will enter your heart,
and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul.
Discretion will protect you,
and understanding will guard you.*
Proverbs 2: 9-11

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
Above all, I am so grateful to my Lord, in Whom I faithfully trust, Who gave me wisdom, knowledge, and strength to complete this journey. He, Who began my journey, has been with me at every single point of time along this long adventure until it ended. He shall lead me home and help me begin the next chapter of my life journey. This work is dedicated to His glory.

All mistakes are my own. Credits for any achievement are given to all above.

Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. M. Smith', is written over the dotted line for the signature.

DATE: 22nd April 2007

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

BIBF	Bangkok International Banking Facility
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CDP-PAM	Country Development Partnership on Poverty Analysis and Monitoring
CODE	Committee on Development Effectiveness
CODI	Community Organisations Development Institute
CSCS	Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for Poverty Alleviation
EU	European Union
GSB	Government Saving Bank
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
LDI	Local Development Institute
NCPE	National Centre for Poverty Eradication
NESDB	National Economic and Social Development Board
NESDP	National Economic and Social Development Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NGO-COD	NGO Co-ordinating Committee for Development
NSPC	National Social Policy Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIUs	Project Implementation Units
PNCU	<i>Pracharat</i> Network coordination Unit
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSC	Policy Steering Committee
RUDF	Regional Urban Development Fund
SC	Steering Committee

SIF	Social Investment Fund
Thailand-UNCAP	Thailand-United Nations Collaborative Action Plan
TRT	Thai Rak Thai Party
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VURF	National Village and Urban Revolving Fund
VURFO	National Village and Urban Revolving Fund Office
WHO	World Health Organisation

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. Rationale of the study

During the past two decades, states across the globe, especially in industrialised countries, have experienced some pressures that demanded a reorientation of their role and position in the governing process. During the 1980s, economic and fiscal constraints signalled a changing perspective of what states were expected to do (Damgaard *et al.*, 1989). Many governments turned away from the ideology of the 1960s and 1970s that valued a key role for the state in planning, redistributing, and providing basic human needs (Leftwich, 2000) and began to favour the neo-liberal policy that emphasised the role of market mechanisms. Optimism about the pivotal role and capacity of states to solve social problems began to decline, and this heightened the demand for a fundamental rethinking of governing arrangements (Pierre, 2000). It was argued that, rather than decisively intervening in the society, states should allow market mechanisms to govern the economy and to direct welfare distribution within society. The capacity of the state to make and implement policy, or in other words to 'steer' society to achieve collective interests, was seriously challenged by the market as an alternative governing mechanism (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

During the 1990s, globalisation emerged to become one of key themes in the analysis of the changing role of the state in policy-making (Holton, 1998; Hudson and Lowe, 2004). The globalisation process had a critical role in reconfiguring the nature of the state and its relations with other actors in the policy-making process. Pressures from international forces began to be viewed as threats to the sovereignty and political control of states over their domestic policy agendas (Camilleri and Falk, 1992; Deacon *et al.*, 1997). In many countries, the capacity and power of governments to manage their society was dispersed upward to international institutions and downward to sub-national governments (Strange, 1996). The influence and role of international and domestic non-state actors in the

process of policy-making and implementation increased noticeably (Held, 1991). Several emerging models of governance were introduced. They drew on new ideas about what ought to be the new forms and functions of the state in relation to society. Governing through community and networks received high attention as alternative governing approaches (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Tam, 1998). Both approaches viewed the state more as a differentiated entity (Rhodes, 1997) and just another component of the complex patterns of interaction in policy-making process.

Principal questions have emerged from what has happened to the state over the past decades. These questions have centred around the extent to which the state continues to have an unrivalled position in society and has been able to maintain its position as the key locus of political power and authority in the making and delivery of policy; or whether the state has become increasingly dependent on other actors in directing society towards desired ends. One critical area of examination that could help to answer these questions is the investigation of the shift in perspective towards state-society relationships in the governing process (Pierre and Peters, 2005). Some scholars argue that the state has reoriented its role among an increasing range of institutions and actors involved in the policy-making process (Jessop, 2002; Waters, 2001). Other authors contend that the power of the state is not diminished, but is being readjusted and reconstituted to displace traditional conceptions of statehood as an absolute, indivisible, territorially exclusive, and zero-sum form of power in response to the growing complexity of society in a more interconnected world (Held, 1991; Held *et al.*, 1991; Rosenau, 1997). The central concerns of these scholars remain focused on the changing role of the state and its capacity to pursue collective interests under dynamic external and internal conditions. To them, the pressures being imposing on the state do not necessarily lead to the end or decline of the state, but instead the transformation and adaptation of the state to the society in which it is embedded (Pierre and Peter, 2000).

However, most of the literature has drawn on the experience of industrialised societies and is largely based on the Anglo-centric interpretation of the changing role of the state. A question that remains important probes the extent to which the argument of state reorientation/transformation is relevant to what has been happening in other parts of the world, especially in developing countries. Researching this issue in the context of non-western and developing countries as well as those societies in transition is still less explored. This dissertation therefore aims to investigate the case of Thailand, a developing country in Asia, to discover if any change in the role, power, capacity, and strategy of the Thai state vis-à-vis non-state actors in the governing process could be observed on the same basis as the literature has proposed. Has there been any change with regard to state-society relationships and dependencies in response to the demands and pressures imposed by internal and external forces? Thus, this case study of a developing country in a non-western context has the potential to provide a fresh contribution to academic debates on the nexus of globalisation, governance, and policy-making.

2. Purpose of the study and research approach

The Thai state has experienced critical challenges pressured by the financial crisis and globalisation since the late 1980s. The pressure became more intense in the 1990s and especially after the 1997 financial crisis. The crisis initiated many critical changes to Thailand's socio-political milieu, governance, and policy-making. Domestic political arrangements were shaken by the crisis, new political forces arose, and non-state actors began to gain a more important role in policy-making (Hewison, 1997, 2000, 2001). At the same time, issues of the appropriate role and relationship between state and society, suitable public policies, and institutional reform for national recovery from crisis were the major topics of wide public discussions and debate. Governance reform and building a 'good' governing process have become prime policy agendas since then (Orlandini, 2003). Furthermore, a new constitution was promulgated in 1997 with specific aims to shift Thailand from a highly centralised state whose politics had often

been dominated by a narrow set of political, bureaucratic, and economic elites to a decentralised structure in which government institutions at all levels would operate in a more participatory, transparent, accountable, and responsive fashion (Klein, 1998; Niyom, 2003). In 2001, a significant change in Thai governance arrangements and policy directions occurred when a new government came to power. New policies based on a pro-poor, pro-rural, and pro-Thailand platform were introduced to realign the state with coherent governing strategies in the post-crisis milieu.

These changes continue to transform Thai governance and policy-making, but the changes have left ambiguity and confusion concerning the present configuration of governance in Thailand. Specific study is needed to gain a better perspective of the Thai governance. This dissertation therefore aims to explore the configuration of Thai governance by examining the roles and interactions of key state actors vis-à-vis domestic and international non-state actors involved in the governing process. It is necessary that the investigation be grounded on a specific policy area so that the roles and interactions of all actors could be empirically examined. Anti-poverty policy is selected for reasons explained in Chapter 2. So this research further explores how this governance configuration affects the making and delivery of anti-poverty policy and considers if there are any significant changes in governance to be observed. If so, in which way have these changes developed? Who has shaped these changes and how? The issue of power relations, the politics of policy formulation, and the implementation processes are also considered. Underling themes of this research are concerned with the evolving interactions between state and societal actors in the governing process of anti-poverty policy and the extent to which the Thai state has reoriented its roles to remain engaged in steering society on the same basis as what has been described in the Anglo-governance literature.

This research draws mainly upon the theoretical frameworks of governance, power, and institutionalism. It uses these frameworks to guide a theoretically informed analysis of the case being investigated. The governance framework

seeks to explain a whole series of arrangements of state-society relationships and offers a range of exploratory perspectives to promote an understanding of governance configuration. The framework embraces not only the actions of government or state apparatus but also includes a wide range of institutions/actors and practices of these actors in the governing processes. So it facilitates an attempt to examine the ways in which key relationships between government, domestic non-state sectors, and international organisations are evolving and being reshaped.

A qualitative case study approach is employed in this research with a single case design focused on poverty alleviation policy in Thailand. This approach offers rich, detailed information about actors involved in the governing activities and the development of policy within a specific context. The research is based on various sources including documentary sources, semi-structured interviews, and observation. The information was analysed thematically using some key properties drawn from the theoretical frameworks. Empirical findings are presented in a historical narrative form.

3. Structure of the dissertation

This research is presented in two main parts (Figure 1). Following the Introduction, the first part of this dissertation addresses the theme of research inquiry, the theoretically informed frameworks used to facilitate the case study analysis, and the methodological approach adopted to direct the investigation. The second part provides insight into the background of the case study, its empirical findings, its analysis, and a discussion. Due to the enormous contextual details of this case, findings are divided into three main chapters for clarity of analysis and presented in a narrative form with key themes highlighted. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the interactions between the Thai state and societal actors in the process of governing. Chapter 7 examines the interactions between the Thai state and globalised forces with particular emphasis on the World Bank. Discussions and

analyses are integrated into the presentation of each chapter. Brief descriptions of the chapters are presented below.

Chapter 2 sets out the themes of the study in the context of development and the challenges of governance transition in Thailand. These are linked to the debates about governance and policy-making in the global policy milieu. This chapter also considers the limitations of current studies on Thai governance and policy-making before addressing the rationale for selecting anti-poverty policy for investigation. It also introduces the conceptual frameworks being employed to guide this theoretically informed research.

Chapter 3 provides a rationale for adopting a case study research approach. It considers methodological issues, research validity and reliability, and processes of data collection and analysis for this study.


Chapter 4 sets the background for the case study with reference to the relationship between state, societal actors, and globalised forces prior to the 1997 crisis. It then goes on to consider the impacts of the crisis and emerging governance challenges. It finally provides an explanation for the emergence of anti-poverty policy.

Chapters 5 and 6 present key empirical findings and discussions obtained from fieldwork based on in-depth analysis of interactions between state and domestic societal actors involved in anti-poverty policy. The chapters are divided historically, with 2001 representing a turning point when considerable changes in the governance configuration were observed.

Chapter 7 discusses key empirical findings and analyses of the development and the change in the relationship between the Thai state and globalised forces. The World Bank's engagement in anti-poverty policy is examined for the period before and after the new government came to power in 2001.

Chapter 8 concludes the research with discussion and analysis of the major findings about the Thai governance emerging in previous chapters. These are also discussed with reference to the debates about globalisation, governance, and policy-making.

Figure 1: Summary of the dissertation structure



Chapter 2

The Research Agenda and Frameworks

1. Introduction

One of the stimulating theoretical discussions of the last decade involves the concept of governance and its linkage to public policy. The governance notion offers a perspective with regard to state-society relationships and dependencies. The notion suggests that the state evolves from an actor who controls some powers to enforce public policy, to become an actor who is increasingly dependent on other societal actors in the governing process. Further, the political milieu has indeed become increasingly complex because of the influence globalised forces and some changes they impose on the domestic governing institutions. Although there are now some substantive studies on governance transformation and how it has affected policy processes, little has been done in the context of developing countries, especially countries in Asia and Thailand in particular. This research, therefore, explores the nature of governance and social policy-making in Thailand with reference to recent anti-poverty policy in order to respond to the need for a greater understanding of the increasing complexity of contemporary governance and policy arena in developing countries. Moreover, governance study is a highly relevant issue in the study of globalisation that is not only closely associated with the exchanges of international trade, finance, and information but also encompasses profound social and political transformation.

This chapter presents the research agenda and analytical framework exercised thematically throughout this research. The first section outlines the themes to be studied pertaining to the debates about governance transition and policy-making in Thailand. It also discusses some limitations of existing studies before addressing the rationale for selecting anti-poverty policy as a focus. Another section presents the conceptual frameworks being utilised to guide this theoretically informed research.

2. Research inquiry

2.1 Themes of study

Some scholars view the relationship between Thai society and the Thai state as static. They hold that the modern Thai state has remained strong and highly influential over society since the Thai nation-state was instituted a hundred years ago, and they expect this condition to remain into the future (Baker and Pasuk, 2005). The majority of academics, however, see the relationship between state and society in Thailand as dynamic and interactive. Seksan (1995) argues that during its pre-modern (or ancient) period, the Thai state had a very limited role in public policy-making and was well integrated in society. Once the modern (bureaucratic) state was developed in response to the pressure of colonisation, however, it began to set itself above society and to exercise downward pressure upon society, enforcing changes through various kinds of policies (Seksan, 2005). But this relationship later inverted when societal forces were able to lobby for state transformation.

Eventually, the development of societal forces, such as labour, business, and interest groups, began to challenge the power of the state beginning in the late 1970s. These forces were able to influence policy development in relevant areas of interest from the early 1980s (Anek, 1992; Bidhya, 1997; Girling, 1981; Patcharee, 1985). Up to the beginning of the 1990s, scholars observed a situation in which NGOs expanded and became actively involved in the process of policy-making (Amara, 2002; Jaturong and Gawin, 1995; Juree, 2003, 2003a). During the early 1990s, many analysts argued that the state had receded from its prime role in policy-making and saw the development of other societal forces that challenged the state's power over the governing process. Thirayuth predicted that Thailand would experience 'a transfer of power and legitimacy from the state to society...from bureaucrats to businessmen, technocrats, and the middle class...Society would change from narrow nationalism to greater acceptance of internationalism...' (1993: 56). Chai-Anan also argued:

... Globalisation and internationalisation of capital have made the state a less important actor in the world where spatial and temporal dimensions had shrunk... the nation-state was being bypassed by the potent forces of information and communications... The Thai state was finding its authority being undermined by several significant developments in society and in the region... (1997: 54)

A few years later, he even argued that there was a likelihood that the Thai state would transform into a 'market-based state' (Chai-Anan, 2001).

Economic crisis in 1997 gave political urgency to introducing governance reform and reframing the roles of state and society in the policy-making process. The state was criticised for leading the country into crisis. Serious debates on the appropriate role and interaction of the state, the private sector, and civil society reached the peak of attention in Thailand from the beginning of the crisis onwards, as well as the debates about public policies and institutional reforms to further national development. Civil society and community-based developments were promoted as alternative paradigms to state-led, economic-oriented development and were a part of a localist and populist reaction to the increasingly globalised economy (McCargo, 2001). A special emphasis was placed on changing state-society relations, which were leaning towards greater participation and more liberal politics (Ukrist, 2001). Interest in community-led governance, based on the ideas of community empowerment, became one of the foci for reform. The state's power was attacked as being too overbearing, while societal actors proclaimed their need for greater influence over the policy-making process to balance the state's power.

These developments reflected a shift in the way the Thai state was increasingly involved in more complex interactions with other players in recent decades. This dynamism seems to fit recent observations made by western academia on the changing nature of the state and governing process. During the past few years, issues related to the transformation of governance have gained increased attention from academics, development practitioners, and policy-makers in the developed worlds. The number of academic articles on governance produced over the last few years has exceeded those produced in the preceding decade (Kjaer, 2004). A

key reason for the recent popularity of this concept is probably ‘its capacity – unlike that of the narrow term government – to cover the whole range of institutions and relations involved in the process of governing’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 1). Many international organisations have invested considerable effort in promoting *good governance* and hold it as a critical determinant for solving social issues such as sustainable development, poverty reduction, social injustice, etc. (for example DFID, 2006; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1992).

However, most of the debates on governance have drawn on a rather western-centric or even Anglo-centric experience or interpretation of the state and the changing relations between state and society (Marinetto, 2003). Thus, this research inquiry not only examines the nature of governance configuration in the policy-making process, but it also examines the extent to which the concept of governance developed in the western world provides an appropriate theoretical framework for interpreting or explaining the emerging dynamic relationship between the state and other actors in the policy-making process in developing societies. The research employs the concept of governance and its various theoretical approaches to analyse the nature of Thai governance. It examines Thailand’s governance by situating state-society interactions within one specific social policy context.

Further, within the context of globalisation and the internationalisation of policy, one main argument highlights the nexus between globalised forces and domestic institutions. Some argue that globalisation becomes a vital context in which all policy processes must be read (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). Another argument claims that public policies are no longer confined to the domestic sphere or to governmental mandates; instead, it asserts that public policy is engaged to a greater extent with transnational conditions (Yeates, 2001). Globalisation can be read from a variety of perspectives, but one way to interpret it is to consider the role that international actors play globally and locally (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). Some authors argue that not only has the number of domestic players participating in policy development multiplied, but the role of international policy

actors has also increased significantly in shaping domestic policy (Deacon *et al.*, 1997; Yeates, 2001). Deacon *et al.* (1997) comment that social policies of a country are no longer entirely shaped by the politics of one national government. They are increasingly shaped by implicit and explicit social policies of numerous supranational agencies ranging from global institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF), supranational bodies (such as the OECD), and international non-government agencies (Oxfam for example). These global players have done more than contribute to discussions about social policy; they have played an active role in social regulation and provision in domestic affairs of a country, both directly and indirectly.

In Thailand, international development agencies, particularly the World Bank, have been actively involved in the Thai policy-making process since the beginning of the development era which began in the 1960s. In fact, the Bank was the key initiator of Thailand's first national development plan, launched in 1961. Subsequent plans caused the country to become more intensively engaged with the global economy as governments generally accepted the Bank's growth strategies (Rangsan, 1996). Although the involvement of international agencies in domestic policy began to decline during the 'boom' period of the late 1980s, their involvement became prominent again when Thailand was hit by economic crisis in 1997. The 1997 Asian crisis initiated significant challenges to Thailand's socio-political milieu, governance, and policy-making. As discussed in later chapters, the crisis raised the issue of poverty as the top priority of the government's policy agenda. Between 1997 and 2001, the Thai government worked closely with international organisations to tackle poverty.

After reading through such developments, some might agree with Strange (1996) who suggests there has been a dramatic shift in structural power and authority away from the state towards non-state agencies and from national political systems to global systems. In other words, traditional functions and policy competencies have been redistributed upward to the supranational level, downward to lower-level state institutions, and sideward to other non-state actors

such as civil society. States are gradually ‘hollowing out’ of their locus in an age of globalisation or are in decline because local and international players provide an alternative focus for political commitment and tend to deny the legitimacy of the state as the focus of political action (Horseman and Marshall, 1994; Ohmae, 1990 and 1995; Reich, 1992). States are viewed as having retreated, their power eroded.

Nonetheless, when studying developing countries, such as Thailand in which a strong state has evolved historically and traditionally, these views need to be critically re-examined. Although one would agree that public policy is no longer confined to the domestic sphere and government mandates alone, it is an overestimation to argue that the capacity of these governments to manage their economy and society has been ‘hollowed out’ by the dispersion of their powers to international markets and institutions. Globalisation debates tend to focus on the broad macro-level context in which policy is made. However, there is a danger of applying only this broad level of analysis, relying on it for answers, and assuming the logic of convergence for every country. A number of studies indicate that many states have followed a different path of development (Henderson, 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Perhaps, an important question to be asked is whether states in developing countries are losing their influence and authority to globalised forces? To what extent is their power dissipating upwards to supranational bodies, downwards to sub-national institutions, or sideways to civil society causing developing nation states to ‘hollow out’? Or do these states still have considerable autonomy in how they interpret the constraints placed on them by so-called globalised forces?

Another argument claims that global capital cannot operate without state regulation and state capacity for social reproduction (Holton, 1998). International organisations do not have local presence to implement agreements, so they indeed depend on cooperation and partnership with national and local governments to implement policies and agreements. They also depend on NGOs to monitor and supply information on the delivery of such agreements. Would this structural

dependence of international players on states and non-state actors inevitably leave room for manoeuvring by domestic politics to mediate global policy objectives? The relationship between supranational and national institutions in the setting of policy agendas is worth examining and a case study of Thailand shall contribute to the debate by focusing on the context of developing countries. This research, thus, investigates the dynamics of the relationship between the Thai state and international players in the process of anti-poverty policy-making. It further examines the extent to which the Thai state can still manoeuvre, operate, and negotiate its place in the globalised milieu and the emerging new conditions of governance. It attempts to add a critical contribution to debates on globalisation, governance, and social policy studies; areas which are under-researched in the contexts of East and Southeast Asian countries in particular (Ramesh, 2004).

2.2 Limitations of current studies on governance and policy-making in Thailand

In setting up such themes of inquiry, some limitations of current policy and governance studies on Thailand are considered. This section considers issues of the actors being investigated, the level of analysis, the approaches being employed, the policy areas being studied, and the period of study.

Although some studies have recently analysed some aspects of governance change after the 1997 crisis, most of them focus on the Prime Minister as the key actor and treat him as a representative of the state actor (McCargo, 2002; McCargo and Ukrist, 2005; Pasuk and Baker, 2004; Bidhya, 2004; Ukrist, 1998). This stance may have resulted from the premier's obvious characteristics, personality, leadership style, and especially his management orthodoxy. This emphasis could be true as he was the ultimate decision-maker in many policies. But using him as a representative of the state could distort analysis and neglect other actors in the policy realm. This research seeks alternatives to such analyses and offers different interpretation of Thailand's governance configuration by critically examining a comprehensive range of institutions and actors involved in the governing process

as well as the relationships amongst them. It centres on one particular policy as a platform for empirical examination. This is an attempt to fill the gap of current literature that focuses on macro level analysis as opposed to policy level analysis.

Research on Thai policy issues in domestic literature has usually taken the form of investigative journalism based on single-issue policy scandals, most of it having the primary objective of exposing corruption or fraud on the part of individual politicians or government officials. Few studies, however, have provided systematic or theoretical analysis of the broader framework of Thailand's policy-making (Walaya, 2003). In contrast, this research examines the governing arrangement of public policy-making process by focusing on the changing role of the state vis-à-vis society. Therefore, this approach of examination should contribute to the existing literature on public policy studies which mostly focuses on micro-themes such as organisational analysis, and leads to a tendency to gloss over broader themes of the changing nature of power of state and society in an era of new governance (Richards and Smith, 2002). On the other hand, studies focusing on macro-level analysis, such as international political studies, tend to explain all phenomena within their purview with a more general analysis (Ray, 2001) and might not be instrumental in reflecting new nature of governing practised by the state nor the changing relationships with society. In this study, therefore, the focus is at the middle level – the level of policy-making – as this is the level at which larger forces operate through actual institutions and decisions (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). It is also the level at which actor interplay occurs and power is negotiated (Hudson and Lowe, 2004).

Existing research on policy studies in Thailand have been carried out by drawing on various theories and frameworks. The predominant explanations in English literature have employed mainstream theoretical frameworks – such as bureaucratic polity (Riggs, 1966; Siffin, 1966), pluralism (Girling, 1981; Prudhisan, 1974), corporatism (Anek, 1992; Montri, 1979), formal political institutions (Hicken, 2002; Kuhonta, 2003; Samrit, 1999; Siriwan, 2001), or even the recently developed 'multiple streams' model (Dayley, 1997; Srisombat, 2003)

– to analyse the Thai governance and its policy-making processes. Furthermore, this literature seems to give little attention to trans- and supra-national actors. These studies do not consider external forces such as international organisations, multinational corporations, or international non-governmental organisations that exert influence on the policies of developing countries, including Thailand, nor the interactions between international and domestic actors in the policy-making process. Since we realise the impact that external forces have on the contemporary policy milieu, if we use these approaches to analyse the Thai case, it is likely we would be unable to capture the full ramifications of the contemporary Thai governance and policy-making process.

Although some recent policy studies on Thailand have placed attention on trans- and supra-national actors such as international organisations (Busakorn, 2002), multinational companies (Patcharee, 1985), and international NGOs (Jak, 2000), none have comprehended the socio-political changes that have occurred in Thailand since the 1997 crisis. The crisis draws our attention to the reconfiguration of governance in Thailand with reference to impact of the crisis on the policy-making process, and the way the Thai state has reoriented itself to the new domestic and international milieux. After the crisis began, some institutional change was demanded. The idea of governance reform and good governance began to be debated, a constitution that aimed to reframe the state-society relationship was promulgated, and the Eight and Ninth NESDPs that promoted partnership between state and society and empowered communities were issued. It seemed that the pressure of globalised forces had reshaped the relationship between the Thai state and society – from the state as the dominant actor towards the state in more of a partnership form of governance. We can observe that the language of partnership – joined-up, participation, community empowerment, and so on – has been included in all major policy documents since the crisis (Bidhya, 2002). This implies a change in state-society relationships in Thailand. However, policy studies covering the period after the crisis remain seriously under-explored. Thus, there is a need for comprehending the

contemporary policy-making process in Thailand from 1997 onwards. The scope of this research encompasses the period from the crisis to 2005.

2.3 Why anti-poverty policy?

Poverty eradication policy is selected to accommodate a more specific examination for many reasons. First, the literature on policy studies in Thailand has been mainly dominated by studies in the area of economic policy-making (Anek, 1992; Chai-Anan, 1990; Christensen *et. al*, 1993; Lauridsen, 2000; Medhi, 1997; Schmidt, 1994). Social policy is under-researched, and there is certainly a need for more contribution to the field.

Second, since the beginning of the 1997 crisis, the languages of poverty alleviation and empowerment for the poor began to enter the political lexicon, causing state, civil society, and international organisations to place poverty alleviation at the top of their policy agendas. Each actor has pursued different approaches to the poverty agenda and employed different means of interlacing the poor into its strategies to influence policy-making. This research considers this pursuit as the intentional strategic orientation of each actor and it worth exploring further.

Third, poverty policy has been the prime policy agenda of all governments since the crisis. Although all governments have adopted community-oriented policy initiatives and instrumentally established new agencies to implement policy, each government has pursued different policy parameters to poverty alleviation, from which we can observe significant impacts of the new parameters on the Thai governance. Thus, it is interesting to examine such changes in policy parameters and the impact they have produced upon the state-society relationship in this policy area.

Fourth, the role and involvement of international organisations in the governing process could be clearly observed in this policy area. International agencies had

been significantly involved in shaping policy content and its implementation process in response to the crisis. The role of the IMF in the policy-making process has been studied critically elsewhere (Phitthaya, 1997), but this falls into the category of economic policy. In contrast, this research concentrates on the role of the World Bank in social policy-making. The World Bank has collaborated closely with the NESDB in supporting the implementation of a poverty reduction strategy. Partnership governance under the CDP-PAM programme marked a prominent role of the Bank over other international agencies in this anti-poverty policy. CDP-PAM was expected by the Bank to become an important venue through which the Bank can be involved in domestic policy-making through a series of policy reform initiatives. Thus, this is a good opportunity to examine the response of the state to pressures influenced by international organisations in social policy-making. Furthermore, the role of the World Bank in the social policy process has been under-researched in Thailand's case.

In sum, the main focus of this research is to examine the nature of Thailand's governance configuration in the making and delivery of anti-poverty policy between 1997 and 2005. This research does not include the evaluation of policy outcomes or impacts, nor does it include a detailed investigation of the appropriateness of anti-poverty policy in solving Thailand's poverty. However, it does employ anti-poverty policy as a case to investigate the nature of governance in Thailand. The research also investigates this nexus in the context of globalisation by pondering upon the roles and influences of globalised agents. Given to the limited space of the dissertation and the defined scope of the project, it focuses only on the globalised agents involved in the poverty alleviation policy during the stated period. The next section reviews some useful frameworks that help in finding the answers.

3. Framework for analysis

This research focuses on the governance at the level of policy-making – a middle range or meso-level of analysis – because it deals with 'how policies come to be

made, who puts them on the policy agenda, and the structure of the institutional arrangements in which policy is defined and eventually implemented' (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 9). At this level, we can actually investigate interactions between the various actors involved. Several social science concepts and analytical frameworks can be applied to governance studies at the policy level. Some relevant literature is reviewed in this section, including that on governance, power, and institutions. These concepts and frameworks are used in a sense as frames to organise ideas and understanding to help construct a boundary around the matter of inquiry.

3.1 Governance

The term 'governance' is a descriptive label used to explain the role and relationships of the whole range of institutions involved in the governing process (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In particular, it sensitises us to the ever-increasing variety of actors involved in the process of policy-making (Richards and Smith, 2002). The adoption of governance concept leads to a better understanding of the role that state and non-state actors play in producing policy outcomes. Rhodes (2000) explains that concept of governance does not offer causal explanations that evoke physically necessary relationships between phenomena; instead it provides a language for re-describing the world and to challenge the dominant state-society relationship narrative of the 1980s. The value of this notion lies in its capacity to organise and provide a 'map' or framework of the changing process of governing. It applies a 'simplifying lens to a complex reality' (Stoker, 1998: 26). It identifies key trends and developments in the nature of the relationship between state and society. Furthermore, Pierre argues that the governance concept 'has tremendous potential in opening up alternative ways of looking at political institutions, domestic-global linkages, trans-national co-operation, and different forms of public-private exchange' (2000a: 241). Thus, the notion of governance contributes to the development of an analytical framework for studying the changing nature of the state and its relations with society in the policy-making process, which is a key focus of this research.

Nevertheless, there are a variety of ways in which the state-society interactions in the governing process are interpreted (see Hirst, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997).¹ The governance framework that could be applied to this research should facilitate analyses at the policy level. One analytical framework proposed by Pierre and Peters is based on a presumption that state-society interactions are embedded in the governing process. In other words, to understand governance is ‘a matter of understanding the nature of state-society relationships in the pursuit of collective interests’ (2005: 6). To understand the nature of state-society relationships, this research is framed by three key parameters: actors, processes, and modes of governing.

3.1.1 Actors

One of key propositions of governance theory is that governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also extend beyond government (Stoker, 1998). The principal actors in governance thus could be classified as state or social actors (Pierre and Peters, 2000). This research considers both sets of actors pertaining to anti-poverty policy in Thailand.

There is a tendency to treat the state as a unified actor and to view it as a single entity. Government is often equated with state, which is a misunderstanding. The notion of government implies that there is only one centre of power in a unitary state, but in reality there are many centres and diverse links between many government agencies at local, regional, national, and supranational levels (Stoker,

¹ Interpretations of governance include: 1) *New Public Management* (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000), 2) *corporate governance* (Charkham, 1994; Tricker, 1994; Williamson, 1996), 3) *good governance* (ADB, 1999a; IMF, 1997; Leftwich, 1994; Peters, 1998; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1992), 4) *global governance* (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999; Rosenau, 2000; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), 5) *institutionalised governance* (Campbell *et al.*, 1991; Hollingsworth *et al.*, 1994; Gamble, 2000; Lindberg *et al.*, 1991), 6) *interactive governance framework* (Kooiman, 1993, 2000, 2003), 7) *self-organising networks* governance (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997), and 8) governance as a rhetoric (Stoker, 1998). Kooiman (1999) points out that various definitions and applications of governance are more appropriate and useful under different circumstances. He gives an example: corporate governance appears to be more relevant at the organisational level, good governance is more relevant at the national level, and global governance is more related to the international level analysis.

1998). Thus, it is more appropriate to think of the state in a disaggregated manner. The state should encompass the government (in the narrow sense of the cabinet), the public bureaucracy, the legislature (including political parties and parliamentarians), the judiciary, quasi-governmental agencies, the legal system, coercive forces, and the incumbents of these institutions (Collier and Collier, 2002). This research concerns all state actors involved in the Thai anti-poverty policy and disaggregates them as appropriate.

A more diversified view of the societal or non-state actors must be taken. In fact, there are a series of actors who compete with each other to achieve their own interests. Policy is perceived as the product of the interactions between state and societal actors and among societal actors themselves. To understand these societal actors, there is a need to specify how they operate and the manner in which these actors play or participate in policy decision-making (Pierre and Peter, 2005). Bovaird and Loffler (2003) suggest that governance is likely to involve the following key societal actors: citizens, community organisations, non-profit and voluntary organisations, business, and the media. The perspective that a multiplication of non-state actors are involved in governance challenges the conventional assumption that government is the key player in process of governing. It also acknowledges that the formerly almost exclusive responsibilities of government are now being shared by societal actors, especially third-sector agencies² (Stoker, 1998). The actors who are most important in any policy issue vary depending on the policy area. In this research, the key societal actors in the anti-poverty policy are identified and critically examined.

International governmental and non-governmental agencies, viewed as one of globalised forces, are an important set of actors who has been neglected and need to be included in the governance analysis (Cerny, 2000; Scholte, 2004) and public policy studies (Cerny, 2002; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Yeates, 2001). There is a rationale for the inclusion of these international actors from the viewpoint of

² They may be diversely labelled as voluntary groups, non-profits, non-governmental organisations, community enterprises, co-ops, or community-based organisations.

social policy scholars. Deacon *et al.* (1997) argue that the social policy's analytical frameworks have developed from work on the advanced welfare states and tend to downplay the importance of international organisations like the IMF and World Bank. Ramesh (2004) comments that the discipline of social policy should pay attention to an analytical and political project that focuses on the globalisation of social policy. The studies should embrace the intervention of supranational agencies/bodies in national social policy. These studies suggest that supranational actors need to be given more attention in explanations of domestic social policy (Yeates, 2001). In Asia, including in Thailand, international organisations played significant roles during the few years after the financial crisis and maintained their influence over domestic policy for some years (Beeson, 2001). Thus, the role of this set of actors demands some attention in this study.

Deacon *et al.* (1997) suggest that international actors have been involved in (1) influencing the shaping of national social policies, (2) engaging in transnational social distribution and regulation, and (3) occasionally providing for citizens or at least empowering citizens when states fail them. In other words, they contribute to the shaping of national policy by establishing policy conditions on governments for the receipt of financial assistance, by redistributing resources between governments, or by establishing conventions and offering technical advice and assistance as steps towards legal social regulation. Their interventions have been done via, for example, structural adjustment funds and various social development assistance programmes. In addition, Burden (1998) observes that *policy dialogue* constitutes an important means by which international agencies attempt to foster a political climate conducive to their own interests and intervene in the domestic policy process. They use diverse channels of intervention including sponsoring research, reports and conferences; auditing government compliance to international standards; and giving criticism when domestic policies are judged to fall short of international standards (Burden, 1998). This research shall evaluate whether international agencies have performed as the literature indicates and their influence upon domestic policy-making.

3.1.2 Processes

Governance is also about the process of governing. In other words, it is concerned with the manner of interactions among the whole range of actors. In a governance relationship, the governing process is always an interactive process because no single actor has the knowledge and resources to tackle problems unilaterally although each actor influences the process to an unequal degree (Amin and Hausner, 1997). Such interactions produce outputs, so this research regards policy-making as one of the outputs that governance delivers. The process of delivering outputs includes several components: goal selection, decision-making, resource allocation, and instrument implementation (Pierre and Peters, 2005). Goal selection is similar to the process of identifying the problem and setting an agenda on the issue that is pursued by all actors. The research examines the efforts of each actor to influence anti-poverty policy. Next, the decision-making component involves the selection of instruments and the determination of a mix of public and private actions deemed most appropriate for reaching the defined agenda. Once a particular set of instruments has been adopted, necessary resources to make them work need to be identified and mobilised. Not only are financial resources important, but personnel and legitimacy are also important elements for governing.

Given the ‘strong state’ tradition in Thailand and the recent emergence of significant roles of societal actors, two ideal types presented by Pierre and Peters (2005) are given attention and used to guide the assessment governing process of Thailand’s anti-poverty policy. Key properties from each model are critically applied to evaluate the case of governance in Thailand.

First, in the *state-centric* governance model (Peters, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000), state and its apparatus remain at the centre of the process, but the state institutionalises its relationships with other actors. Thus various forms of *corporatism* and formalised state-society relationships are implemented. The corporatist perspective as described by Schmitter (1974) is applied. In this model,

goal selection remains very much in the hands of the state. Other actors may have input into the process of goal selection, but the decisions are primarily those of the state. The state has substantial powers to select other actors and to permit them to have influence. In this way, state actors gain a legitimate role in the policy decision from the involvement of other actors. However, the state is not able to make decisions entirely on its own as it needs to consider some demands of the other actors. Some forms of negotiation are thus required, and this also allows some room for manoeuvring and bargaining among the actors. Instruments are also exercised on a negotiated basis, and coercive instruments are less commonly used. Organised interests are often co-opted at the implementation stage, playing an important role in the street-level implementation (Pierre and Peters, 2005).

The second model is the *society-centric* governance (Peters, 2000).³ This model depends heavily upon the role of social networks in governing, with the state merely being one among many actors involved in the process. In this model, society may be the more powerful actor given its capacity to organise itself and to evade the power of the state. State decisions and actions reflect the interests of other actors to a greater extent, and the state apparatus is less insulated from external pressures. Functions of the state are more dependent on the support of other actors for goal setting and implementation (Kooiman, 1993). This implies some level of growing interdependence between state and non-state actors. However, it does not mean this model advocates ‘governance without government’ (Rhodes, 1997) While networks and public-private partnerships are defining features of this model, the state retains its role to some extent in establishing priorities, defining goals, and mobilising resources (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The state plays a significant role in steering and coordinating actions toward the goals and leaves the decision on how such goals are best attained to the operational levels, which are exercised by other actors. However, during the implementation stage, there tends to be cooperative arrangements involving both state and societal actors in self-regulating networks. The interdependence among

³ Pierre and Peters (2005) use the term ‘Dutch governance school’ in their models as it is advocated by the Dutch scholars, such as Kickert (1997) and Kooiman (1993, 2000, 2003), but I prefer to use the term ‘society-centric’ (Peters, 2000) to ease understanding in the comparison.

these actors creates new forms of action, negotiation, and cooperation. Such patterns of interactions abound, for example co-regulation or public-private partnerships (Kooiman, 2000, 20003).

3.1.3 Modes of governing

Various modes of governing operate differently in these two models. Five common modes of governance are briefly summarised here (Gamble, 2000; Heywood, 2000; Hollingsworth and Linberg, 1985; Hollingsworth *et al.*, 1994; Thompson *et al.*, 1991).

First, the hierarchical mode is characterised by constitutional rules over the government and bureaucracy that operate through top-down authority systems. This is essentially governance by law, and the control mechanism is carried out by using hierarchy and rules (Jorgensen, 1993). This mode of governing perceives state as the representative of the collective interest; thus, it is distinctly separated from the rest of society but governs society by the imposition of law and other forms of regulation. Other institutions in society enjoy some degree of autonomy, but the state never surrenders its legal authority over these institutions.⁴

Second, the market mode governs the voluntary exchange activities of multiple parties through price mechanisms that function as coordination devices in society (Thompson *et al.*, 1991). The market is believed to be the most efficient and just mechanism for allocating resources because it empowers citizens when they exercise their power of choice. It does not allow for politics to allocate resources in inefficient ways. Instead of having elected politicians make decisions about what goods and services the state should provide and at what price, market mechanisms allow people to choose the things they want on their own, and the mechanism is believed to distribute and use resources in an efficient way.

⁴ This model still plays a major role in the political and institutional organisation of a large number of national and institutional contexts, even in advanced democracies, such as those in Britain, Germany, Japan, and Scandinavian countries (Derlien, 1995; Goldsmith and Newton, 1993; Pierre, 1995).

Third, the networks mode is the way that cooperation and trust are formed and sustained within networks. A network is characterised by informal relationships between essentially equal agents or social agencies. It coordinates through less formal, more egalitarian, and more cooperative means (Thompson *et al.*, 1991). Networks facilitate the coordination of public and private interests and resources; thus, in this respect, they enhance efficient implementation of public policy. Rhodes (2000) points out that these networks are characterised, first, by interdependence between organisations. Second, there are continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes. Last, networks have a significant degree of autonomy from the state. Some networks are said to be so sufficiently concerted and cohesive that they can resist or take over some government's activities (Stoker, 1998), or even challenge state powers (Rhodes, 1997). The relationship between these networks and the state could be described as one of mutual dependence (Kooiman, 2000).

Fourth, the governance in a partnership mode is a semi-autonomous organisational vehicle through which governmental, private, voluntary, and community sector actors engage in the process of deliberating and delivering public policy (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). It is possible to classify the partnership arrangement into three types (Stoker, 1998). The principal-agent form relies on one party (the principal) to hire or contract another (the agent) in order to undertake a particular task (Broadbent *et al.*, 1996). The inter-organisational negotiation form involves organisations that negotiate joint projects. By blending their capacities during this process, they are better able to meet their own objectives. The systematic coordination form establishes mutual understanding, a shared vision, and a joint-working capacity that leads to the establishment of a continuous mechanism/organisation.

Finally, communitarianism literature (Etzioni, 1998; Tam, 1998) and deliberative democracy literature (Bohman and Rehg, 1997) recently produced the same claim

about the capacity of people and communities to identify their own needs and to govern themselves more autonomously. In a broad perspective, the communitarian mode builds on a consensual image of the community and includes the positive involvement of the members in collective matters in a way that allows them to resolve their common problems with a minimum of state involvement (Etzioni, 1994, 1995). According to this mode, the state is believed to be too big and too bureaucratic to deal with their issues. Moreover, communitarians think that the state generates at least as many problems as it resolves. The communitarian mode seems to resolve common problems and foster a civic spirit in the community without breeding large public bureaucracies.

This framework of actors, processes, and modes of governing provides a deeper understanding of the nature and configuration of governance and enables us to identify key variables to be used in the analysis of governance in Thailand. This research focuses on the role of the state and examines how it interacts with other actors and affects the configuration of governance. It views transformations in the role of state as a key issue in the study of governance (Pierre, 2000). In less positivist language, this research looks at the state as an independent variable (Pierre and Peters, 2000) and analyses its influence on society and policy-making.

Although the governance framework is arguably a useful perspective when studying the changing contemporary relationships between state and society (such as Kooiman, 2003; Richards and Smith, 2002; Rhodes, 1997), the reader should be aware that the literature of governance has drawn largely from the experience of developed countries and is inevitably based on the Anglo-centric interpretation of the changing state-society relationship. To what extent the governance theories promoted in western literature have taken into account the different political and economic development trajectories found in the Third World remains under explored. Some assumptions of the western governance framework may prove to be limited and not applicable to the studies of state-society relations in other contexts, especially those in developing countries in which the development of non-state sector is still in its infancy and the legacy of

strong authoritarian state remains. This research considers this concern. Also, the applicability of Anglo-centric governance perspectives to other contexts is discussed in the Conclusion.

3.2 Power

According to the previous section, at the heart of the debate on governance and policy-making today involves a much more pluralistic conceptualisation of power than when the debate initially started (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). Governing from a governance perspective is always an interactive process because no single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and resource capacity to independently govern society and economy on its own (Kooiman, 1993; Loffler, 2003). As a result, governance literature identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action (Stoker, 1998). Power dependence implies that each actor has to exchange resources and negotiate rules of the exchange with other actors to accomplish the means to achieve their goals. Similar to policy literature, if policy involves the capacity to decide, to act, or to have others act on one's behalf as well as the capacity to influence the behaviour of others to achieve a desired end, then policy is always an exercise of power (Considine, 2005). Analysing power relationships must be central to an adequate understanding of governance.

Power can be broadly defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome. Sometimes it is referred to in terms of the power *to do* something. Heywood has suggested that power is 'usually thought of as a relationship; that is as the ability to influence the behaviour of others in a manner not of their choosing. It is defined as having power *over* others' (2000: 35). Power thus exists when someone can get others to do what they would not necessarily otherwise do. However, power can be exerted in various ways. This has resulted in the emergence of different dimensions of power, each viewed as the different 'faces' of power (Lukes, 1974).

First, power is understood as decision-making with conscious judgment that in some way shapes actions or influences decisions. The decision is observable and results from free competition between ideas and interests. This kind of analysis is based on the concept of classical pluralism (Dahl, 1961, 1967).

Nevertheless, power is not simply the control of observable behaviour and decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) argue that power also extends into the non-observable realm of 'non-decisions,' and this becomes the second face of power. Non-decision-making suggests that policy-makers exercise covert use of power outside the public arena to keep specific issues off the public policy agenda. Many interests are excluded from the decision-making process by this 'non-decision' mechanism. This capacity is also a function of the power and influence behind new issues. Thus, this second dimension of power may take the form of agenda setting: the ability to prevent decisions from being made. This involves the ability to prevent issues or proposals from being aired.

The third dimension of power argues that it is not people's observable behaviour that is important, but how power is exercised over them through the capture of their thought processes that is more significant. This third face of power takes the form of thought control: the ability to influence another by shaping what he or she thinks, wants, or needs. This is portrayed as the 'hidden' face of power (Lukes, 1974) or 'deep theory' (Parson, 1995) because it exposes processes of cultural and psychological control within society and, more generally, it highlights the impact of ideology. Power can be exercised through the control of information, the manipulation of mass media, the process of socialisation, or even the manipulation of myths and beliefs.

These three dimensions of power are useful concepts in analysing governance in Thailand. The framework essentially enables us to analyse the process of governing, especially in policy agenda setting and decision-making. The second dimension of power helps to explain why some proposals put forward by societal actors have not reached the policy agenda and therefore were not adopted into

anti-poverty policy. Although the third dimension is relatively difficult to observe directly as it is not explicit, evidence of its existence was observed when the idea of community empowerment was mainstreamed into the national development plan and this idea captured the mindset of key NESDB officials.

Power can also be understood through a discourse. A discourse in this sense is a larger narrative used to control 'what is said and what is understood about what is said' (Considine, 2005: 54). Action is a linguistic property and only obtained meaning by being understood as part of the structured meanings encoded in language. Power is therefore understood as the capacity to act within and on behalf of the established framework of signs and values. This relates to the argumentative approach of policy studies which focuses on decoding how discourse shapes the way we make sense of the social problems and policy solutions (Fischer and Forester, 1993). From this perspective, analysing public policy involves exploring the way which 'policy discourse' frames the arguments that form the frameworks within which problems and agendas are constructed (Parsons, 1995). The argumentative approach to policy studies, therefore, addresses what is going on when an issue is set in a particular language or discourse in which a problem is framed. In this sense, the exercise of power is an attempt for setting the discourse in which a problem is framed (Majone, 1989).

The language of policy would begin with a set of terms which first define what can be called a policy and what is excluded from this realm. This endeavour is associated with the second dimension of power. Considine (2005) argues that, according to this approach, power cannot be separated from the local syntax as well as knowledge cannot be independent of the powerful rationales which organise thinking and acting. For example, disbursing state welfare benefits to the unemployed and disabled is not simply an matter of determining the type and amount of payments made to those in need. Rather it is about the basic conditions or criteria employed by those in power to define the entitlement. Questions include: Who are deemed worthy of support and who are excluded? What social characteristics are portrayed as virtuous for both the recipients and the

programmes? These questions are related to the issue of categorising and naming, which are ways that actors construct policy. Naming policy problems is a critical means through which actors shape and prioritise problems. By labelling a problem, policy-makers signal the value attached to any given issue or problem while omitting other possibilities. This perspective directly relates to Thailand's case when the Poverty Registration Programme was initiated and the definition of the 'poor' and meaning of 'poverty' were redefined. This clearly confirms Edelman's argument (1977) that the name given to a problem immediately elicits expectations about the causes of the problem and the conditions which can be altered to bring about change.

Finally, Considine (2005) has provided a list of useful questions to be asked to identify power relationships. The questions are: Who controls the definition of policy objectives? What is the problem being named? What is omitted from this formulation? For whom is the problem becoming a problem? Which interests benefit from the prevailing definition of problems? Which actors are presumed to be part of this problem? How are the names and categories being used to direct attention to solutions? How are exclusions being explained? Which actors play the key roles in controlling service agencies? These questions shall be used to guide the analysis of power relationships in the Thailand's anti-poverty policy.

3.3 Institutions

In fact, policy-making takes place in the institutional context. Public policy is the achievement of actors making use of institutions and being shaped by them. Several authors argue that the impact of institutional arrangements cannot be ignored in understanding the process of policy-making because they constrain how decision-makers behave (Hall, 1986; Skocpol, 1985; Weaver and Rockman, 1993). Institutions divide powers and responsibilities between state organisations, they confer rights on individuals and groups, they impose obligations on state officials to consult and deliberate, and they can include and exclude other non-state actors in the decision-making process (John, 2002). March and Olsen (1989)

suggest that an explanation of how and why a given policy emerged in relation to a social problem requires an analysis of the structure, historical development, personal networks, and decisions over time of the involved institutions. Institutions also play a crucial role in shaping policy before decisions are made. Hudson and Lowe (2004) suggest that institutions set up the rules of the game that limit the range of possibilities open to policy-makers at the outset. They also suggest that institutions block off some paths of policy development before debates have even begun. Thailand's 1997 constitution and its national development plans are considered key institutions in Thailand worth examining as to how they affect governance and policy-making.

Furthermore, political institutions play a significant role in filtering pressures, such as globalisation, and force states to respond to such changes in distinctive and divergent ways (March and Olsen, 1989). Although policy is increasingly constructed in international and global terms, the power of decision-making and the capacity and will to implement policy still remain, to some extent, within the jurisdiction of nation states; thus, it is also necessary to analyse policy-making and governance within the context of the political institutions of nation states (Parsons, 1995). Hudson and Lowe (2004) argue that institutions filter change because they sit at the meso-level, operating between macro-level forces such as globalisation and micro-level forces such as individuals who make or implement policy decisions. In this sense, the institutional approach is highly relevant to this research as it enables us to deliberately consider the influence of globalised forces over domestic policy.

Institutions could be defined as the formal and informal rules, procedures, routines, norms, operating practices, and conventions that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity (Hall, 1986; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Hall (1996) argues that institutions do not exist in isolation from the wider relationship of state and society and must take account of specific historical experiences. Much of the recent institutional research has been focused around a body of work dubbed the *new institutionalism*. This approach is 'new' in

the sense that it tries to account for both agency (human actions) and structure (the role of institutions), pointing in particular to the role of institutions in structuring interaction between political actors (Lowndes, 2002). Several frameworks have been identified,⁵ but this research focuses on the *historical institutionalism* strand.

Hall and Taylor (1996) comment that historical institutionalism rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation, which are often inherited from the past. This means that because the past has a strong impact on the present, the role of history in shaping present governance needs to be strongly considered. Parsons (1995) suggests that policy-making takes place within the parameters of past policies and choices as well as inherited institutional arrangements. Policies that worked well in the past would be likely continue to be acceptable in the future and would be difficult to terminate. The argument is that once the decision to take policy down a particular route had been taken, the benefits of moving forward along the existing route tend to increase, so the costs of switching to an alternative route are likely to be politically controversial (Pierson, 1994). This argument links with the idea of *path dependency*, which holds that choices made in the past systematically constrain the choices open in the future (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hudson and Lowe, 2004). This kind of development fosters stability, biases policy towards the status quo, and encourages changes that are generally incremental and largely inert in nature (Lindblom 1959). In this sense, this framework enable us to examine how the policies adopted in Thailand just after the beginning of the 1997 crisis set the agenda for its 2001 government and provided the discourse within which poverty problems were constructed.

According to the methodological approach, historical institutionalism guides the analysis to focus on the role that institutions have played in shaping policy over the long term (Krasner, 1988). To understand the ways which policies have

⁵ They are historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996), normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, international institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and network institutionalism (Peters, 1999).

developed over time, case study approach is used to explore the complex ways which institutions have shaped the processes of policy development. Another key feature is the prominent role that asymmetrical power relations have played in the operation and development of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalism has been especially attentive to the ways in which institutions have distributed power unevenly across social groups. This approach is more likely to assume that institutions give some groups disproportionate access to the decision-making process, and it tends to stress how some groups lose while others gain. This institutional focus could be applied to governance studies, particularly when analysing the processes and modes of governing. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) suggest a number of factors that need to be explored when analysing institutions, such as the number of actors involved; who can/cannot participate; what agencies, officials, departments and political institutions can be involved; what resources they have; how institutions and actors relate to one another; and how rules and constitutional arrangements influence the strategies of actors.

Table 1 summarises key properties drawn from this review section that will be used to assess governance in Thailand.

4. Conclusion

Although the body of research on the themes of governance and policy-making within the globalised context is growing worldwide, especially in developed nations, little has been done in relation to the developing world, especially in regards to Thailand. The picture of Thai governance and its policy-making lacks continuity and is rather scattered. This research attempts to fill this gap by investigating the nature of governance in anti-poverty policy-making in Thailand between 1997 and 2005. Findings about recent changes in Thai governance, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis, could contribute significantly to the debates and theoretical development of globalisation, governance, and policy-making, in the context of developing countries, especially in an Asian context.

This chapter has highlighted the themes of study and reviewed some significant concepts and theoretical frameworks, providing a good basis for the research. These frameworks of analysis are inter-related and are linked to the changing role of the state within new policy conditions. The next chapter briefly discusses the methodological stance and methods being employed in the research. Up to this point, one may be aware that, to attain a better understanding of state-society relationships in Thailand, perhaps we should go beyond the argument of whether or not states have lost their sovereignty to globalisation, and instead take another focus: we could consider whether governance regimes have changed, that is whether states reconfigured their place and power in the new conditions.

Table 1: Key properties of state-centric and society-centric governance

Proprieties	State-centric	Society-centric
Structure of polity	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Many groups in competition but unequal access to decisions and resources.• State remains powerful.• Institutionalised structure of relationships managed by the state.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Many groups organised into clusters of interests.• Social networks become powerful and autonomous.
Goal selection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Remains primarily in the hands of the state.• Inputs from other actors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• State sets priorities and defines goals.
Decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Negotiation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Negotiation.• Operations left to non-state actors.
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• From both state and non-state inputs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• From both state and non-state inputs.
Instruments/ implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• More participative, less coercive.• Co-optation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Steering and coordination.• Public-private partnerships.
Modes of governing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hierarchy.• Partnership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Market.• Network.• Communitarianism.• Partnership.
Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Relatively open but biased in favour of insider groups through internal control.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No concentration of power.• Power interdependence.

Chapter 3 Methodology

1. Introduction

The quality of research is determined by the results it produces. A good research methodology is a key component of research strategies that yield valid and reliable findings. Coherence between research questions and methods in the design of research will generate data that can achieve credible findings. Thus, it is important to choose the most appropriate research method to address the specific research questions. This chapter outlines the methodological approach that is appropriate to accurately address the research inquiry established in the previous Chapter as well as to complement the analytical framework.

2. Research approach

Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive practices that make the world comprehensible. These practices transform the world into a series of representations such as field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recording, memos, and so on. This means that researchers study things in their natural settings and attempt to make sense of or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretive approach concerned with the understanding of meanings that people attach to phenomena within their social world. It is an 'in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by learning about their social and material circumstances, their experiences perspectives and histories' (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 3).

Studying governance, the main aim of this research, is about examining the patterns of interaction among the actors involved in Thailand's anti-poverty policy-making. This study investigates the way power is exercised by each actor. Further, it is concerned with the way decisions are made and resources allocated.

In sum, it searches for the meaning given by actors through their practices in the process of policy-making, something which can be understood by direct interaction and dialogue with key informants. A qualitative approach allows us to investigate such reality in greater depth and with more meaning than by measuring frequency, amount, or intensity.

The case study strategy is the most suitable design for this research for several reasons. First, the key research inquiry is concerned with the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. ‘What is the nature of governance in anti-poverty policy-making?’ is the initial exploratory question which requires a conduct of exploratory research. An exploratory case study appropriately fits this inquiry. Another related question ‘How has the state responded to the demands of domestic societal actors and to the interventions and pressures of globalised forces such as international organisations?’ is also exploratory in nature and points towards the case study as a preferred research strategy. Further, both questions also need a research strategy that allows the researcher to trace development over time rather than mere occurrences or incidental snapshots. The case study design also meets this need.

Second, the research inquiry emphasises an understanding of governance and policy within its wider context, and the case study approach can provide much insight into the causal processes surrounding a particular phenomenon (Yin, 2003). As mentioned, Thailand’s financial crisis, its national development plans, and its 1997 constitution serve as contexts for post-1997 Thai governance. These three factors have pointed toward the changing nature of Thai state-society relations and policy-making. It is difficult to separate an analysis of the configuration of governance in Thailand (along with its implications on policy-making) from such a context. Case study allows us to account for such conditions and discover Thailand’s governance configuration within such contexts. Another contextual consideration is the historical development of state-society relations in Thailand. It is necessary to understand the ways in which actors act, their relationships have developed, and policies have changed over time. Case study enables us to extensively explore such complexities.

A common objective of case study approaches is to consider what can be learnt from a case, rather than simply considering the extent of replication and generalisation (Stake, 1995). The aim of case study is to expand and generalise theoretical propositions (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) of populations (Yin, 2003). Instead of asking what a study tells us about the wider population or other cases, the case strategy asks what this case tells us about a specific theory. The case design helps develop, refine, or test theories. Thus, the case study approach meets an aim of this research that is to evaluate the extent to which a theoretical framework developed in the West could be used to explain what is happening in developing countries. Findings from this study contribute to debates on governance by exploring the experiences of developing countries.

The next consideration is the number of cases to be studied. A single case is appropriate because it offers a richness of information that is enough to test or refine the theoretical propositions employed in this study. Moreover, a multiple-case study to compare other policy areas would require extensive resources and time beyond researcher's capacity, something that is unlikely to take place. Due to constraints of time, financial support, and access to informants, the cross-policy or cross-country comparative study is not possible for this research.

Finally, this study relies on 'multiple sources of evidence needed to converge in a triangulating fashion' (Yin, 2003: 14). Although case study can be based on any mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence (de Vaus, 2001), this research uses much qualitative evidence. This case study is unique in using multiple qualitative evidence because the case study provides 'detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, observed behaviours; direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs and thoughts; and excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, records and case histories' (Patton, 1980: 22). When it is based on multiple sources of evidence, the case study reveals meanings that people assign to their context or, in other words, to their social life. In this way, social phenomena can be understood by examining

people's selection and interpretation of events and actions (May, 2001). The researcher's focus is therefore upon the informants' understandings and interpretations of their involvement in the governing process and their interaction with other actors.

3. Research validity and reliability

Validity and reliability need to be maximised to attain a bias-free research result. Both validity and reliability can be achieved through the selection of appropriate methodology concerns (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Internal validity concerns the extent to which the research design enables the researcher to draw unambiguous findings from the research results (de Vaus, 2001). Factors related to internal validity include accuracy of the questions to be asked, data to be collected, and explanations to be offered (Denscombe, 2002). By asking the right questions and using appropriate conceptual frameworks to capture the different aspects of the phenomenon, *content validity* is established (de Vaus, 2001). Research inquiry is formulated on the grounds that the relevant literature is extensively reviewed. Also, a comprehensive discussion with scholars and practitioners on the subject of governance and poverty alleviation policy helps the researcher to refine and justify the research inquiries.

A single source of evidence is likely to produce less reflection of reality. In order to achieve accuracy in research findings, triangulation tactics play a significant role in leveraging the degree of *construct validity*. The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, and perspectives in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry (Flick, 2002). Denzin (1989) distinguishes four types of triangulation to strengthen the construct validity,¹ and this research employs

¹ They are 1) data triangulation (to use a variety of data sources), 2) investigator triangulation (to use several different researchers or evaluators), 3) theory triangulation (to use multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data), and 4) methodological triangulation (to use multiple methods to study a single problem).

several of them. Data triangulation is applied to the rich and insightful information derived from various data sources: interview transcriptions, extensive field notes and general observations, and analysis of relevant documents and official publications. Direct observation in the meetings and interviews is employed to obtain information from multiple key informants from different but relevant agencies. It allows the researcher to investigate diverse aspects of governance issues and policy-making process to a greater depth. This also ascertains methodological triangulation. For theory triangulation, an extensive review of analytical frameworks drawn from multiple theories and concepts has set a solid basis of research inquiry and has allowed the researcher to gain a better understanding of some important concepts of governance, policy studies, power, and institutions.

Reliability refers to ‘the degree to which alternative forms of the same measure produce same or similar results’ (Cooper and Schindler, 1998: 171). In other words, it is concerned with the fact that data collection procedures can be repeated and yield same results. Yin (2003) suggests that the use of the case study protocol and a case study database could strengthen the reliability of a piece of research. The researcher has documented the research protocol that contains the research inquiry, a brief summary of the theoretical frameworks for reference, the names of sites to visit and contact persons, the data collection plan, any preparation needed prior to field visits, and the interview question guidelines tailored to each informant. A logbook of interviews and meetings in which the researcher was attended has been developed and completed in detail.

4. Data collection and sources

This research attempts to build a comprehensive understanding of the governing process of Thailand’s anti-poverty policy within its complex settings. Because this case consists of multiple components, a full understanding would be obtained if this research included information collected from a wide range of constituent elements. This is also to ensure *construct validity*. The insights gained from all

these elements might differ, but if they are taken into consideration together, they provide a more complete understanding of the whole than would a perspective provided by any particular element alone.

The field research was conducted between 7th July 2004 and 14th October 2004 and between 9th December 2004 and 17th February 2005. It terminated a few days after the 2005 general election. During both periods, the researcher visited 26 institutions (see Table 2) to collect data. Various sources of data from both printed and on-line sources were investigated and collated. Types of documents (both in Thai and English) included official records and publications, policy documents, government plans and projects, minutes of meetings, speeches and interviews of key policy-makers, research papers, conference proceedings, academic journals, statistical data, news reports, newspaper articles, magazine articles, and other related reliable publications.

Table 2: Names of the 26 institutions visited for data collection

- Chulalongkorn University Library
- Muang District Office (the City of Nakorn Pathom)
- Thammasat University Library
- The Assets Capitalization Bureau
- The Centre for Philanthropy and Civil Society (at the National Institute of Development Administration)
- The Community Development Department (Ministry of Interior)
- The Community Organizations Development Institute and its library
- The Community Resource Development Institute
- The Government Spokesman Bureau
- The Institute for Local Knowledge Management Promotion
- The King Prajadhipok Institute Library
- The Local Development Institute
- The National Institute of Development Administration Library
- The National Centre for Poverty Eradication in the Ministry of Interior
- The National Centre for Poverty Eradication
- The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDP)
- The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund Commission
- The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund
- The Office of the Prime Minister
- The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission
- The Political Economy Centre (at Chulalongkorn University)
- The Senate
- The Thailand Research Fund and its library
- The United Nations Development Program (Thailand National Office)
- The Villager Volunteer Association of Thailand
- The World Bank (Thailand Office) and its library

Table 3: Summary of meetings and seminars attended

Meetings/seminars	Date
The Promotion of a Participatory Network and Power Decentralization. A workshop organised by KPI in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bangkok.	18 Jul, 2004
The Trajectory of NGOs: Perspectives and experiences from the past to the present. A seminar organised by the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok.	19 Jul, 2004
Meeting of the Centre of Civil Society Coordination and Support for Poverty Eradication. Organised and hosted by CODI.	13 Aug, 2004
Social Capital Development in the midst of globalisation. A seminar organised by Department of Economics, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University	19 Aug, 2004
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (9 th meeting in 2004)	23 Aug, 2004
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (11 th meeting in 2004)	20 Sep, 2004
Direction of community development in Thailand over the next decade and integrated poverty and social solutions. A seminar organised by the Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior (about 60 local leaders from every region of the country were invited to attend).	27-29 Sep, 2004
Meeting of the Standing Committee on Labour and Social Welfare of the Senate (representatives from the National Poverty Eradication Centre were requested to give reports and to answer enquiries).	29 Sep, 2004
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (17 th meeting in 2004)	20 Dec, 2004
Meeting of the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for Poverty Eradication. Organised by CODI, hosted by the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives.	24 Dec, 2004
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (18 th meeting in 2004)	27 Dec, 2004
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (1 st meeting in 2005)	17 Jan, 2004
Meeting of the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for Poverty Eradication. Organised by CODI, hosted by Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior.	28 Jan, 2005
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (last meeting before the general election in February 2005).	2 Feb, 2005

For the primary sources, the researcher conducted 32 interviews, participated in 14 meetings and seminars, and conducted direct observation in one District

Office. Details are summarised in Table 3. Observation and participation are effective ways to supplement, support, or reject data obtained from documentary sources or verbal information. Field notes were taken regularly during these activities on a wide range of information such as visual or verbal actions and reactions of participants. Spontaneous reactions, including unsolicited statements, were observed during these activities and such accounts provided useful insights.

Semi-structured interviews were used because they enabled the researcher to gain ‘communicative validation’ (Robson, 2003) and to follow some divergent themes emerging from the interviews (Mason, 2002). This method is useful as it helps ‘to know the experience of the participants through their stories... to learn from hearing and studying what the participants say’ (Seidman, 1991: 91). This method was used to motivate respondents to openly supply information that they saw as appropriate, to allow a greater flexibility for the researcher to further probe respondents, and to give the researcher opportunities to observe all non-verbal expressions of the interviewees (Punch, 1998). The content of the questions was basically expanded from the themes of inquiry but slightly modified in terms of the language to cater to each group of interviewees. The researcher refined and tailored some of the questions as the interview progressed in response to any emerging issues or to cross-validate information with other interviewees. Notably, the researcher was able to interview one former cabinet minister and several senior policy-makers who were involved in anti-poverty policy development and decision-making processes. Perspectives of other policy-makers were accessed via other documentary or archival sources.

The most appropriate and feasible sampling method for this research is neither probability sampling nor convenience sampling, but a third category, ‘purposive sampling’ (Punch, 1998).² This strategy allows the researcher to investigate particular settings, persons, or events related to the research inquiry by deliberately selecting the persons who can provide important information that cannot be adequately acquired from other sources. The initial sampling framework

was developed on the advice of a NESDB Senior Policy Analyst who was involved in the development of Eight NESDP and poverty alleviation agendas since the 1997 crisis; thus, he knew the evolution of the policy and could identify some key informants who were expected to provide insight and inside information from their experience and involvement in the anti-poverty policy process. At the beginning, the targeted informants fell into three groups:

- (i) Government officials responsible for poverty alleviation policy from each of the related government agencies,
- (ii) Parliamentarians who had longstanding experience with anti-poverty policy, and
- (iii) Key practitioners in philanthropic/non-governmental organisations who had been involved in the poverty alleviation agenda.

A fourth group was added to acquire a different perspective from those who had expertise in anti-poverty policy; these people were outside of any direct or indirect benefit from the policy. This group included experts or academics with expertise in Thailand's poverty who had been involved in the anti-poverty policy. They were also selected to give their views. The last group, officials in international organisations, was selected to assess the role and influence of international organisations in the policy-making process.

A snowball sampling method was employed by asking the initial set of selected informants to identify other persons who could provide further insightful information and critical perspectives. All informants are listed in Table 4. A majority of the informants from the list might appear to be from the elite and Bangkok-centric due to the fact that anti-poverty policy was created by senior members of related state and non-state agencies in Bangkok. Extensive exploration of rural people and non-elite accounts would be useful but not feasible for this research given the limited time resources and scope of the project. However, additional interviews with some NGO leaders and academia were taken to balance the elite viewpoints. One visit to a District Office in Nakorn Pathom

² It is also called by other titles like 'purposeful sampling' (Patton, 1990) and 'criterion-based

Province could also provide some non-Bangkok and non-elite interpretations of the policy, although these views could not be applied as generalizations in other areas. The researcher had a chance to talk to several local community leaders at a seminar organised by the Community Development Department of the Ministry of Interior in 2004. However, their names are not included in this list for reasons of confidentiality.

5. Data analysis

Because the case study design aims at achieving both descriptions and explanations from intensive analysis of many variables within the case, it employs various components of analysis. All recorded tapes from the interviews were transcribed verbatim in their original language (Thai). Each tape and transcription was given a code number to substitute the interviewee's name, thereby preserving confidentiality. The transcriptions were compared with data from archival records, other documents, or publications to validate any differences and similarities from the interviews. Transcriptions were reviewed and verified until correctness was ensured. Field notes taken from interviews and meeting participation were reviewed in the same fashion.

Next, several codes were set up according to the themes of inquiry and the analytical framework defined in Chapter 2. The data from all collected documentary resources and transcriptions were labelled, sorted, compiled, and synthesised in a thematic manner as guided by the theoretical propositions and knowledge gained from existing literature in order to generate a set of themes and concepts. The evidence then was categorised into a manageable coding system. New themes emerging from the interviews were noted and included as new categories when needed. Such a system underpins the analysis which encompasses the functions of identifying, coding, categorising, classifying, and labelling the pre-eminent patterns in the contents of the interviews, thereby enabling the researcher to determine their substantive significance (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).


selection' (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993).

Field notes were ordered and organised in the same pattern, and any content that fell into a similar category was grouped together. These codes served as templates for data analysis. Data was analysed thematically by integrating the themes, which were guided by the research frameworks and extracted from the case study. The interview guides used for the semi-structured interviews assisted in the categorisation and analysis processes.

All interviews as well as all meetings in which the researcher participated were conducted in Thai. Since Thai is the researcher's first language, there was no problem with comprehension. However, since English is the researcher's second language, some limitations were expected. Possible inaccuracy in translating from Thai into English (for necessary quotations) remained a problematic issue in some places, especially in situations where the nuances, subtexts, and culturally-loaded meanings were difficult to comprehend and translate into English. The researcher attempted to minimise this limitation by consulting with English linguistic experts who are proficient in both Thai and English. The researcher tried to maintain the original meaning given by the informants as much as possible.

6. Conclusion

This chapter presents the choice of research strategies and methods employed in this study. This research is qualitative in nature, it is based on the case study design, and it consists of documentary and archival sources, semi-structured interviews, and observation methods. These were selected to capture context-rich data and to ensure the validity and reliability of the research. The case study approach was selected because it allowed the researcher to obtain meaningful insights into the investigated issues. The research maintained several types of triangulation to strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings. The data was coded and organised systematically and the findings are presented in the Second Part of this research. Before moving on to the findings, it is necessary for the readers to gain some background knowledge of the development of governance in Thailand before the crisis as well as an understanding of some contextual



conditions that emerged after the crisis began. The next Chapter serves this purpose.

Table 4: Classification of informants interviewed

Categories (code)	Selection criteria	Institutions	Number
Government Agencies (Go)	Senior- or middle-ranked officials responsible for poverty alleviation policy from each of the related organisations	The National Economic and Social Development Board	4
		The Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior	1
		The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund	1
		The National Centre for Poverty Eradication	4
		The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission	1
Legislature (L)	Parliamentarians who had longstanding experience with poverty alleviation policy	District Office, Nakorn Pathom Province	1
		Senator	1
Philanthropic organisations/ NGOs (Ng)	Key practitioners in major local philanthropic organisations/NGOs who had been involved in/been excluded from the poverty alleviation policy agenda	Former MP and Minister	1
		The Community Organizations Development Institute	2
		The Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for Poverty Eradication	2
		The Local Development Institute	2
		The Villager Volunteer Association of Thailand	1
		The Community Resource Development Institute	1
Experts (Ac)	Who had expertise in anti-poverty policy or had directly or indirectly been involved in the poverty alleviation policy-making process	The Institute for the Promotion of Local Knowledge Management	1
		Senior academics or researchers	3
International organisations (Io)	Officials of international organisations/donor agencies and involved in poverty alleviation policy	Thailand Research Fund	1
		The World Bank	2
		The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	3
		Total	32

Chapter 4 Background

1. Introduction

This chapter sets out the background of the case study. It discusses the relationships between the Thai state, societal actors, and globalised forces before and shortly after the 1997 financial crisis. The first two sections synthesise literature from various sources and portray a broad landscape of interactions between the Thai state and non-state actors involved in policy governance. Non-state actors in this research refer to international organisations and domestic societal actors. The third section presents the impacts of the 1997 financial crisis and related governance challenges within Thailand. The final section focuses on the evolution of poverty alleviation policy before and after the crisis. This chapter provides a context for further discussions on the dynamics of governance changes in Thai anti-poverty policy after the crisis.

2. State and societal actors

Writing in late 1960s, Riggs (1966), Siffin (1966), and Wilson (1962) proposed the notion of ‘bureaucratic polity’ in their analysis of Thai governance. The heart of this notion was the weakness of extra-bureaucratic forces – whether state actors (such as the legislature and judiciary) or non-state actors (such as the business sector and NGOs) – that had little influence over the political system. Bureaucrats (civil servants and military) gained total control over politics with a small number of elites dominating an apolitical mass. During this time, Thai politics was monopolised by successive military governments or by elected governments that relied heavily on the support of the armed forces. Most premiers and cabinet members were either active or retired military or civilian bureaucrats. Major policy decisions were made by the military-bureaucratic elites who occupied political and administrative positions in government and who directed policy almost without input from non-bureaucratic groups (Girling, 1981; Likhit, 1978). Policies became pawns in the struggles among bureaucratic factions who

manoeuvred for the highest offices and for control over extra-bureaucratic groups; all in the effort to ensure that all the benefits of development served the interests of the military and the bureaucracy. Riggs (1966) attributes this type of governing process to differing development paces; while differentiation within the bureaucracy had been rapid, development outside had been much slower. This resulted in a lack of political space for other non-bureaucratic forces to initiate changes in politics and participate in policy-making.

The bureaucratic polity notion might best explain Thai governance from 1932¹ to the early 1970s. By the late 1970s, scholars had come to regard the bureaucratic polity as an inappropriate description of state-society relationships in the Thai policy-making process (Anek, 1992; Bidhya, 1997; Patcharee, 1985). The common features of alternative views included an emerging emphasis on the role of interest groups. The rise of a powerful and increasingly independent business class and various interest groups as well as the concomitant decline of military power contradicted the bureaucratic polity model. An alternative approach that offered a potential explanation for the Thailand's state-society relationship was pluralism.² In Thailand's case, pluralists tended to consider the 1973 'student coup d'état' as a turning point in Thai politics towards pluralism (Girling, 1981, 1981a; Zimmerman, 1974). Between 1973 and 1976, groups of students, labour unions, farmers, and business people played active roles in the political and policy arenas on issues that concerned them. However, a counter approach argued that this pluralist analysis was challenged by the 1976 military coup d'état and the reign of 'semi-democratic' (Chai-Anan, 1989) or 'demi-democratic' (Likhit, 1992) governments from 1980 to 1988. Despite the existence of such a counter argument, the power of state over society gradually diminished in the 1980s.

¹ This is the year when Thailand changed from being an absolute monarchy to being a democratic constitutional monarchy.

² The pluralist model of state-society interaction explains a minimal government role in encouraging or restricting the formation of societal groups, or in structuring the relations within society, or in monitoring between government and societal groups. Interest groups, usually organised into an unspecified number of voluntary, non-hierarchically ordered categories, compete for desired public policies or legislative measures as the government seldom recognises or assists any particular groups. For details, see Dahl (1961).

Starting in the early 1980s, organised businesses became an autonomous, effective extra-bureaucratic policy player with increased power over economic policies (Anek, 1992). The creation of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCC) became the centre point of government-business interactions. This mechanism enabled organised business to initiate, transform, or block major policies and legislative measures put forward by the government. Business associations called for even more official recognition and permanent advisory places in government agencies so they could play a substantial role in initiating or resisting policies and legislative measures. Sometimes they lobbied the decision-makers in cabinet and joined sides with technocrats in government agencies who shared the same agenda to press for policies they needed.³ In other words, bureaucratic polity and business had developed a new form of policy governance, in which non-state actors shared power over the policy-making process with the state. However, for some observers (such as Lauridsen, 2000), the JPPCC began to decline in its influence starting in 1988 because the state had not provided consistent incentives for business to engage systematically and collectively with the state.

From the late 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, analysts witnessed a transformation in which the role of civil society expanded significantly and the change in state-society relationship was considerable (Jaturong and Gawin, 1995). The major role of civil society groups grew to represent divergent interests and voices of concerned stakeholders in the policy and decision-making process. Although NGOs had grown immensely, their role and power were uneven and varied. Various non-governmental groups played significant roles in challenging some government policies, identifying corruption and power abuse. Some played a crucial role in executing government policies and were seen as significant partners of state agencies in philanthropic activities.

³ To some analysts, the dominance of these businesses rests on their dense network of personal and commercial relationships, as well as their political linkages (Hewison, 1989).

During the Sixth NESDP (1986-1991), the government recognised the role of NGOs, and the NGO Co-ordinating Committee for Development (NGO-COD) was established to function as a coordinating unit among NGOs. In 1994 the National Committee of Social Welfare was established, with the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare functioning as the chair. Notably, ten of the eighteen members were from NGOs (Amara, 2002). While the NGO-COD operated at the sub-regional level through its members in the civil society sector, the National Committee on Social Welfare worked at the national and provincial level through provincial governors. Provincial committees were formed in each province, and the provincial governors were the chairs of the provincial committees. At least three representatives in each provincial committee were from local NGOs. These two entities signified that NGOs gained a greater role in the policy process.

The 'Black May' political crisis in 1992 marked the end of the military era and the opening up of political space for non-state actors. Following this crisis, a shift in the political system from authoritarianism to a more democratic rule weakened the political power of the military and strengthened the activities of civil society, which contributed to policy changes in many areas. Pasuk and Baker (2002) observed that through the 1990s a multiplication of more progressive daily newspapers, new media, radical publications, public seminars, and publicly vocal intellectuals created an expanding public space for societal actors. Rural protests tapped the services of NGOs, journalists, and public intellectuals to mobilise their campaigns, articulate their demands, and bring their agenda to public attention. NGOs were active in articulating their interests whilst communicating their agendas to the authorities and policy-makers (Gohlert, 1990; Pisanu, 2003). Notably, during this period, the development of localism or communitarian advocates was highlighted (Connors, 2001; Hewison, 1999a; Reynolds, 2001). These proponents argued for a drastic decentralisation of power away from the central state and onto local communities. They wanted to rescue and enhance rural society in the belief that it enshrined social values which could serve as a counterweight to those of urban capitalism. They urged communities and local

economies to be more self-reliant rather than rushing to be absorbed or dominated by globalisation and capitalism.

Kasian (1995) characterised the standpoints of those he called the 'communitarians' by comparing them with the 'globalisers' (see also Reynolds, 2001). They both argued against the role of the state. The globalisers aggressively advocated the internationalising of the economy and claimed that the inefficient bureaucratic state lacked direction and was an obstacle to the globalising process. They wanted to see a reduction in the state power and a deregulated market that was directed by the private sector as much as possible. The communitarians agreed on the need to reduce state power but proposed a different agenda for reforming state-society relations. They wanted the state to reduce its power and empower communities by ensuring the inalienable right of communities to govern and manage their own resources themselves. They strongly believed that empowering communities would enable communities to make decisions regarding their problems on their own. They believed that the bureaucracy should take a supporting role.

It must be noted that the NGO movement developed into two streams (UNDP, 2003). The first assisted people's movements and coordinated networks and protests. The second sought to become involved in the 'inside' political realm and influence government decision-making from a centre position. Although both streams pursued different strategies, they adopted the same thinking: local communities needed to be empowered. Under the context of the wider political space and the proliferation of societal organisations, pro-community NGOs and the communitarian movements gained access and were involved in the policy-making process to influence the development agenda. Their agenda started to be written into policy documents such as the 1997 Constitution, the Eight NESDP, and decentralisation proposals. Recently, they integrated their agenda with the anti-poverty policy and argued for community empowerment as a solution for poverty. Terms such as civic assembly, community plan, community finances, and community enterprises have now entered the national policy discourse.

The next section explores developments in the relationship between the Thai state and international agencies with a focus on the role and influence of the World Bank.

3. State and international agencies⁴

Thailand was the 47th country to sign the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement on 3rd May, 1949. The World Bank's first mission to Thailand took place in December 1949, and the first loan of US\$ 25 million was approved in October 1950. Following the first mission, a report entitled *A Public Development Programme for Thailand* (World Bank, 1959) was published. It advocated a systematic, state-led programme of economic development using the National Economic Development Board⁵ as a central planning agency and a series of five-year-term national development plans (the NESDP) were instrumented starting in 1966. The first three plans were virtually written or guided by consultants from the Bank and focused on expenditure for basic economic and social infrastructures (roads, highways, dams, public health and educational facilities), mostly financed by grant aid and loans from the Bank, the US, and the governments of other developed countries (Pasuk and Isara, 2000). The Bank continued to provide funds for Thailand throughout the following decades.⁶

The Thai government has had a long and supportive relationship with the Bank since 1949. Governments generally accepted the Bank's growth strategies, particularly on both import substitution industrialisation during the 1960s and

⁴ The reason this research focuses only on the World Bank, while in fact there are other international agencies have been working in Thailand, is explained in Chapter 7.

⁵ Later it became the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).

⁶ From October 1950 to 1999, the Bank has extended 127 loans and credits amounting to about US\$ 8.4 billion, predominantly for infrastructure projects, including railways, ports, power stations, telecommunications, and highways (World Bank, 1999). The first education loan (US\$6 million) came in 1966, the first rural development loan (US\$21 million) in 1976, and the first structural adjustment loan (US\$150 million) in 1982 (World Bank, 2002a).

1970s and on export-oriented industrialisation since the mid-1980s (Rangsan, 1996; Hewison, 2002). The World Bank's advice laid the foundation for Thailand's development policy on growth strategy and began decades of Bank influence over Thailand's development paradigm. Development policy in Thailand began with import-substitution industrialisation strategy in the 1960s. Basically, the government implemented policies to protect infant industries and to tap domestic demand. This strategy was clearly represented in the first plan (1961-1966) and in subsequent plans up until the fourth plan (1977-1981).

The early 1980s saw a major flurry in the Bank's role, including a major role in the formulation of the fifth plan (1982-1986) (Rangsan, 1996). The 1979-1980 oil crises caused Thailand to ask assistance from the Bank (Pasuk and Baker, 2002). The Bank extended two Structural Adjustment Loans to Thailand: one in March 1982 and the other one year later (OED, 2000). Thailand borrowed US\$ 542 million from the Bank to cover the deterioration in its balance of payments. The loans were conditional on reforms in fiscal policy, tariffs, investment incentives, and institutional arrangements designed to direct the Thai economy towards an export-oriented strategy. The new economic orthodoxy argued for market liberalisation that would remove constraints on growth built into earlier models of state-protected, import substitution development. The Bank worked with Thai technocrats to plan the transition to an export-oriented strategy (World Bank, 1993). In mid-1980s the export-oriented strategy was established and remained the dominant strategy until the late 1990s (Hewison, 2001).

By the late 1980s, Thailand had deepened its drive towards internationalisation through foreign direct investment (FDI); export promotion and diversification; and tight budget, monetary, and fiscal discipline. The shift from import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation was accompanied by a move away from regulated to deregulated and from a state-dominated to a market-oriented economy in the early 1990s. In order for a country to capitalise on its comparative advantage, markets needed to be allowed to work efficiently to provide correct price signals that would guide the allocation of scarce resources

towards areas in which the country had a high level of international competitiveness. This involved dismantling trade barriers, liberalising financial markets, removing distortions in the price system, and making labour markets more competitive (Pasuk and Baker, 2002; Tan, 2000). Thus, by the early 1990s, controls over interest rates and capital accounts were removed, leading to increased competition, internationalisation, and heavy dependence on foreign capital inflows (Hamilton-Hart, 2000). The state seemed to lose its prime role in the economic management of the globalised economy and market forces.

This development was followed by an economic ‘boom’ that began in the late 1980s (Pasuk and Baker, 1996). The real rate of GDP growth rose to 13.3 percent in 1988 and maintained double-digit rates until the end of decade (Jansen, 1997). Economic growth averaged 7.6 percent over the two decades between 1977 and 1996 (Ammar, 2005). During the ten years between 1987 and 1996, the Thai economy was the fastest growing in the world with 9.2 real GDP growth on average (Warr, 2005). Even more remarkable than the rate of growth was the stability of its growth; not a single year of negative growth of real output per head of population was experienced over the four decades between 1958 and 1996 (Warr, 2005). Thailand’s spectacular development performance until the mid-1990s was praised by the Bank as one of the ‘high performing Asian economies’ (World Bank, 1993). Thailand was proclaimed a case where the Bank’s export-oriented industrialisation and liberalisation had been successfully implemented and economic hyper-growth was claimed as the result.

One prime policy agenda at that time was financial liberalisation. Thailand’s financial system was relatively closed until 1990; financial capital movements into and out of Thailand had been subject to extensive controls (Pasuk and Isara, 2000; Warr and Bhanupong, 1996). The baht currency was subject to exchange controls, and the domestic banking industry was relatively protected from foreign competition. The IMF advised Thailand to develop its financial system by making the baht freely convertible, by developing a stock market, and by opening up banking to free competition (Pasuk and Baker, 2000). The Bank and IMF

rationalised that mobility of capital – by financial deregulation and the elimination of capital controls – would maximise welfare benefits on a global scale. This idea resonated with economists and technocrats inside Thailand who later became influential in policy-making positions (Rangsan, 1996).

After accepting the obligations of IMF's Article VIII in 1990, subsequent governments pursued the path of financial liberalisation by lifting all controls on all foreign-exchange transactions on the current account (Ammar, 2005): the baht was made freely convertible, restrictions on foreign exchange were removed, tariffs were reduced, taxes reformed, and banks allowed to manage a broader range of financial instruments (Jansen, 1997). In 1993, the BIBF was established to enable offshore banks to lend to the domestic financial market. Liberalisation aimed to give more flexibility to financial institutions coping with economic globalisation and to develop Thailand's ability to serve as a regional financial hub (Pasuk and Baker, 2002). The liberalisation process opened up short-term financial markets through the multiplication of domestic credit institutions and gave domestic borrowers direct access to overseas financial markets. Unfortunately, a large capital inflow delivered unexpected consequences. The boom period came to a crash-landing in the 1997 economic crisis.⁷ The crisis has been linked to the liberalisation policies which the Bank urged Thailand to adopt. Further, the crisis also marked a turning point in the Bank's relationship with Thailand, as discussed in the next section and Chapter 7.

4. Financial crisis and governance reform

The flood of money released by financial liberalisation impelled financial firms to behave in a risky fashion. Much of Thailand's financing was poorly planned and invested redundantly, resulting in a rising over-capacity in certain sectors and a dramatic rise in property prices. However, export growth began to falter and the

⁷ Details and debates about the development and assumptions of the crisis from different perspectives have been extensively discussed elsewhere: see Ammar (2005); Apichat (2002); Bello *et al.* (1998); Bhanupong (1999); Hewison (2000, 2001); Hill (1999); Jomo (1998); MacIntyre (1999); Medhi, 2001; Nussara (1998); Ouatarra (1998), Pasuk and Baker (2000); Warr (1999).

current account deficit began to peak as high as 7.1 percent in 1995. This indicator signalled to international financial speculators an attack on the baht, something which happened starting in late 1996 and continuing into early 1997. Because policy-makers failed to manage the macro economic policy, they compounded the crisis by sacrificing Thailand's financial reserves in a futile attempt to defend the currency value from hedge funds. The devaluation on 2nd July, 1997 marked the end of the 'boom' and the beginning of the 'burst'. The globalised forces had led Thailand into the most severe crisis she had ever experienced in history. The case of Thailand was quoted as an example of the downsides of globalisation (Kanya, 1997; Medhi, 2002; Phitthaya, 1998). The crisis was inevitably linked to the liberalisation policies promoted by the Bank (Warr, 1999). The crisis induced many changes in Thai governance and institutions.

After the crisis hit Thailand and its impacts spread out to other countries in the region, the issue of domestic governance reform emerged as the most pressing challenge confronting the region. Countries in Asia were struggling to enhance the transparency and independence of regulatory regimes, to improve corporate governance, and to establish predictable legal frameworks. Questions of strengthening accountability and reducing corruption were examples of critical issues raised. In other words, the issues of governance reform and building a better governing regime have become the prime reform agenda in the region since then. Issues of corruption and poor institutional performance shouldered much of the blame for the crisis (Ouataru, 1998). Institutional capacity to effectively deliver resources or services to people was linked to broader governance concerns. In Thailand, serious debates on the appropriate role and interaction among the state, the private sector, and the civil society were held. Scholars also debated the public policies and institutional reforms that would most suitably further the nation's development. The argument was that Thailand could only recover from the crisis by reforming her governance and governing process. Regular seminars and workshops were organised throughout the country on the issue of improving governance. The cabinet adopted governance reform as a national agenda in May 1999, requiring all government agencies to establish a

plan to improve their work procedures according to the six ‘good governance’ principles defined by the Prime Minister’s Office (Office of the Prime Minister, 1999).

Just a year before the crisis hit Thailand, the process of drafting a new Constitution had begun and the issue of governance reform had been a prominent dimension of the proposed Constitution. The 1997 crisis was a prominent force that pressured the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution on 11th October, 1997, within the context of cries for governance reform. Experts have hailed this Constitution as a significant landmark in governance reform in Thailand’s history (ADB, 1999; Niyom, 2003). The Drafting Assembly wanted to clean up the undesirable impacts of money politics and to foster a new type of politics by instituting effective curbs on state power. It even aimed at rearranging the very mechanisms of state operation by strengthening the legislature and by making the country’s political-administrative system more accountable, transparent, and stable. The list of such measures is various, and the details of such improvements have already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.⁸

A point to make here is that the Constitution became the prime legal architecture of governance reform because one of its mandates was to establish key functions for promoting public participation in the policy-making process (Klein, 1998). Prior to 1997, the role of the societal sector in the public policy process was limited. When civic sector organisations attempted to initiate policy or to propose legislation themselves, they often met with resistance from the bureaucracy, which rigorously guarded its virtual monopoly over policy-making and the drafting of legislation. But in this Constitution, for the first time in Thai constitutional history, civic participation in public policy-making was mandated. Citizens were given the right to participate much more in public policy issues, particularly at the local level. In the Constitution, public participation was laid down as a fundamental principle in the making of public policy on political issues

⁸ See ADB (1999), Chambers (2002), Klein (1998), and Niyom (2003). For a radical observation, see Connors (2002) and McCargo (1998).

and in the preparation of economic, social, and political development plans.⁹ In sum, the concept of governance, as understood in the Constitution, is more than government. The Constitution was specifically designed to demote the power of the state while promoting the power of the societal sector and facilitate a more open, participatory, and accountable governing process (Chambers, 2002).

The crisis not only raised the issue of governance reform to the top agenda position, it also harshly impacted the poor and brought poverty to the attention of the government and NGOs. The next section gives a brief account of this development.

5. Poverty and policy


The development of poverty alleviation policies in Thailand can be traced back to its series of five-year NESDPs. The first set of five plans were drafted and implemented with a general focus on overall economic growth, more or less following standard trickle-down theories. However, anti-poverty policy was explicitly included for the first time in the fifth NESDP (1982-1986). The government identified rural development as a primary sector in which to target poverty. The plan gave priority to income distribution and regional development with a particular focus on poverty alleviation in the rural areas of 37 provinces. The National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) was set up to oversee the formulation and implement of anti-poverty policy. In the sixth NESDP, poverty reduction policy addressed income distribution and the development of rural areas. In the seventh NESDP, poverty issues were incorporated into the plan with a focus on enhancing the quality of life. During this plan, the cabinet approved the first nationwide poverty alleviation project in 1993 under the supervision of the Department of Community Development, Ministry of the Interior. The project

⁹ It is clearly defined in Article 76 that ‘the State shall promote and encourage public participation in laying down policies, making decisions on political issues, preparing economic, social and political development plans, and inspecting the use of State power at all levels’. Within this frame, civil society is expected to have gained greater recognition and voice and will be becoming a more powerful participant in the policy debate.

was allocated a total budget of 3.47 billion baht between 1993 and 1996 and encompassed 11,608 poor villages across the country. Its major activity was to lend money to the poor as an endowment for their existing businesses or initiatives.

Although we can observe that some of the issues in the anti-poverty proposal were incorporated into previous NESDPs, the anti-poverty agenda was suppressed because of the dominance of the economic development priority. Poverty alleviation did not become the prime agenda of the national plans and policies of government ministries until the financial crisis hit Thailand.

Figure 2: GDP growth rate



The financial crisis of 1997 halted the long-term trend of economic growth and caused a considerable negative impact on the economy. Short-term capital began to fly away, the financial sector shrunk, and domestic consumption seriously declined. GDP growth dropped from 5.9 percent in 1996 to -1.4 in 1997 and -10.5 in 1998 (Figure 2). Many conglomerates established during the boom were destroyed and many were transferred to foreign ownerships (Brimble and Sherman, 1999). The business collapse raised unemployment from 0.68 million (2.1 percent of the total labour force) in 1997 to 1.48 million (4.6 percent) in 1998 while the May 1999 labour force survey reported a total unemployment of 1.76

million (5.33 percent) (World Bank, 1999a). The average income of Thai citizens decreased in the first half of 1998 by 19.2 percent over the previous year. Per capita real income in the first and second half of 1998 was 2,633 and 2,402 baht per month, which compared to 2,930 in 1997 (Somsak, 1998). The poverty incidence, which had fallen rapidly since the mid 1980s to 11.4 percent in 1996, increased markedly to 12.9 percent in 1998, reached 15.9 percent in 1999, and slightly fell to 14.2 percent in 2000 (Figure 3 and Table 5). Some estimated that about 1 million people fell below the poverty line during the year after the crash. The absolute number of poor rose from 6.8 million in 1996 to 8.8 million in 2000 (Pasuk and Isara, 2000). Within one year, the crisis reversed all gains in income distribution made over the boom years.

Figure 3: Poverty incidence in Thailand, year 1981-2002




Table 5: Poverty in Thailand, 1962-2002

Year	Poverty incidence* (headcount measure, percent of population)			Poverty line (baht/month)
	Aggregate	Rural	Urban	
1962	88.3	96.4	78.5	N/A
1969	63.1	69.6	53.7	N/A
1975	48.6	57.2	25.8	N/A
1981	35.5	43.1	15.5	N/A
1986	44.9	56.3	12.1	N/A
1988	32.6	40.3	12.6	473
1990	27.2	33.8	1.6	522
1992	23.2	29.7	6.6	600
1994	16.3	21.2	4.8	636
1996	11.4	14.9	3.0	737
1998	12.9	17.2	3.4	878
1999	15.9	21.5	3.1	886
2000	14.2	19.1	3.6	882
2001	13.0	16.6	5.1	916
2002	9.8	12.6	3.8	922
Poverty share (2000)**	100	92.6	7.4	
Population share (2000)***	100	68.4	31.6	

Source: Development Evaluation Division, NESDB¹⁰; data from 1962-1986 are summarised in Medhi (1993); and the last two rows are calculated by Warr (2005).

* Poverty incidence means the number of poor within a reference population group. It is expressed as a proportion of the total population of the group. Headcount measure of aggregate poverty incidence is the percentage of the total population whose incomes fall below the poverty line and held constant over time in real terms. Rural poverty is the percentage of the rural population whose incomes fall below a poverty line and held constant over time in real terms.

** This row indicates the number of poor within a reference population group. It is expressed as a proportion of the total number of poor within the whole population.

*** This row indicates the population of a reference group expressed as a proportion as a proportion of the total population of that group.

The social impact of the crisis was highlighted and demanded state intervention. The government attempted to modify its macro plans to mitigate the impact of the crisis. In May 1998, a major policy change was to implement expansionary fiscal policy: to allow a budget deficit between 3 to 5 percent GDP in 1998-99. By this policy the government reversed its previous deflationary stringency into a policy of mild Keynesian stimulus. Monetary policy was changed to reduce interest rates. Plans to liberalise an internationalisation of the financial sector were rolled

¹⁰ NESDB calculated the figures based upon household income data collected in the Socio-economic Survey (SES). SES is the only data available covering an extended time period, since 1962.

back in favour of a balance between foreign, state, and domestic business. In late 1998, the Japanese government announced the US\$30 billion Miyazawa Scheme for promoting recovery in the Asian countries. The scheme for Thailand was announced in March 1999. It had a very definite focus on providing a fiscal stimulus and alleviating social stress. The scheme contributed 53 billion baht for stimulus spending. It was designed to pump money into the local economies on the grounds that this would bring about the most rapid multiplier effect through increased consumption (Bangkok Post, April 1, 1999). However, this attempt by the government was not very successful and, in the end, the government failed in the 2001 election.

At the same time, NGOs gained a stronger role in advocating and implementing policies related to poverty alleviation. The National Social Policy Committee (NSPC) was founded in July 1998 in response to the social impacts of the crisis and the public demand for increased coordination of social policy. NSPC was guided by a majority of members from the NGO sector. Further, the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) was the only quasi-government organisation involved in poverty alleviation projects at that time. Its task was to generate jobs and extend credit to the urban poor, enabling them to run their own enterprises and elevate their standard of living. The effects produced by UCDO over the crisis period were considerable in the sense that the majority of newly poor were white-collar workers living in Bangkok and other urban areas. Later, UCDO evolved to become the Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI). CODI became a major pedestal for NGOs in the post-crisis period. Moreover, Social Investment Project (SIP) was initiated by the Bank, but it was managed by NGO people and the funds were channelled to fund local communities. All details are discussed in the following chapters.

Another turning point came in January 2001, when the first new government elected under the 1997 Constitution came into power with a landslide victory. One important factor contributing to the victory was the new policy campaign based on pro-poor, pro-rural, and pro-nationalism policies. The new government attempted

to introduce a different platform of policy agendas from the previous government. The profile of 'fighting poverty' and populist policies were raised to the forefront of the election campaign. The policy package was based on an unprecedented platform of specific policy pledges to promote domestic-led growth and poverty alleviation from the grassroots level upward (Thaksin, 2001). The government also embarked upon the policy paradigm called a *dual track plus* development policy – a two-pronged approach that aimed to promote exports and foreign direct investment in parallel with enhancing domestic consumption (Pansak, 2003). The first track emphasised mass manufacturing stemming mainly from FDI, while the second track employed a neo-Keynesian paradigm that emphasised strengthening the domestic economy and grassroots momentum. The distinctive feature of this initiative, often dubbed *Thaksinomics*, was its emphasis on the second track in a manner that gradually shifted the Thai economy from export dependence to greater reliance on the more controllable domestic economy (Looney, 2004; Pasuk, 2004b).

Among the seven urgent policies that the Prime Minister delivered to the National Assembly in his inaugural address on 26th February 2001 (Thaksin, 2001),¹¹ two

¹¹ They were as follows: first, the **three-year debt moratorium**, in which the government granted a grace period for both interest and principal payments for 3 years to individual small farmers in order to relieve their debt burden. This was part of a comprehensive reform of the traditional farm economy, aiming at making it more viable and self sustaining in the long term. Second, the government established the **Village and Urban Revolving Fund (VURF)** to disburse one million baht to each village across the country as a loan facility available for individuals and households of each community to borrow for local investment and supplementary vocations. It aimed to promote the capacity of local communities to build fund management, to stimulate the grassroots economy, and to empower rural and urban communities. Third, the government promoted the **One Tambon [sub-district] One Product (OTOP)** project to enable each community to develop and market its own local product or products based on traditional indigenous expertise and local know-how. The government provided additional assistance in terms of appropriate modern technology and new marketing management techniques to market such local products from the villages to domestic and international outlets through a national or international retail network. Fourth, government established a **People's Bank** to ensure better and improved access to banking facilities and resources for low income citizens. The aim of this bank was to enhance their financial capacity and increase their income from self employment. Fifth, the government provided a **universal health care plan** with a low 30-baht charge per treatment at public hospitals with a view to aid people acquire healthcare services. Sixth, the **Bank for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SMEs Bank)** was set up. The collapse of the banking conglomerates and the destruction of government-protected monopolies created more open space for the growth of a new wave of SMEs. Thus, the SMEs Bank worked to promote these groups of companies by encouraging them to concentrate on activities in which Thailand has some competitive advantage. This project followed the Tuscan-Italian model and aimed to reach certain market niches with high adjustment capacity. Last, the

policies were aimed mainly at attacking poverty in rural areas – the debt moratorium and the Village and Urban Revolving Fund (VURF) – but only VURF had some implications for the realignment of state-community relationship. This was the first time poverty alleviation had become a main urgent government policy declared to the Assembly. Moreover, the policy parameter was changed in a way that strengthened local village communities. The ideas of community empowerment and state-society partnership were linked to poverty alleviation. This new policy parameter brought changes and reframed the relationship between the state and society to some extent. Notably, the government also proposed governance reform in several official policy statements that were clothed in fashionable language under the themes of good governance and new public management for example ‘smaller government that does less’, ‘a facilitator and not a direct service provider’, ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, ‘open government’, and so on (Bidhya, 2002). But one concern was whether the state had actually been realigned towards such claims. Answers are given in the following three chapters.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter, the development of state-society relationships in Thailand before the crisis is outlined. Changes included the decline of the bureaucratic state in the light of the growth of non-state power. This gave civil society groups and NGOs greater access to and influence over policy-making. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the discourse of community empowerment and the idea of communitarianism had been mainstreamed into main policy documents and the Constitution. At the same time, we see that the state had been passively influenced by the agendas of globalised forces as proposed by the World Bank. In particular, the Bank directed Thailand to embrace globalisation and a globalised economy. Accordingly, market mechanisms replaced the state-directed mode of economic development. The achievement of economic growth had been honourably

Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) was established to restructure the financial positions of debtors and improve their business viability. TAMC used 10-year bonds to purchase

acknowledged until the crisis hit the country and led it into deep trouble. The 1997 crisis brought about several changes and challenges to Thailand.

In particular, the crisis forced governance reform with the aim of reframing state-society relationships in the governing process. Parliament was pressured to pass a new Constitution in 1997 which claimed to achieve this objective. The issue of poverty was brought back onto the main policy agenda when a massive number of people fell into severe poverty conditions. Social issues now took equal priority with economic development issues. The crisis also opened a 'window of opportunity' for societal actors to incorporate their agenda with current poverty issues and press their ideas in government policy decisions. The idea of community empowerment was offered as an alternative development agenda and governing approach. The incoming government in 2001 tapped into this idea and promoted local development by emphasising the communitarian approach. The World Bank also reoriented its attention to the poverty issue and became keenly involved in the implementation of this idea. All these changes are critically examined in the following three chapters.

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Chapter 5

State and Societal Actors before 2001

1. Introduction

The development trajectory of Thailand between the 1960s and early 1990s could be characterised as growth-oriented, top-down, industry-led, and urban-biased development (Dixon, 1999). Policy was centrally governed – it was formulated by the central government and implemented through state apparatuses down to the local level. Priority was given to the urban development of each region with the assumption that the results of development would ‘trickle down’ to rural and local areas surrounding targeted cities (Parnwall, 1996). Policy management was mainly handled by government agencies with very little input and participation by the public (Sanee, 1993). Local communities were much more the ‘object’ of development and relied on the government’s direction and support (Prawase, 1997). Such direction was blamed for making communities more dependent on external forces as communities began to lose their power, values, and knowledge in managing their own lives (Anan, 2001; Chatthip, 1991).

Once the economic crisis hit Thailand, the nature of this state-controlled policy-making and governing structure was seriously challenged. The crisis opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for communitarian supporters to press home the idea of governing by community through the theme of community empowerment as it was tied to poverty alleviation. The agenda of community empowerment became the national policy and led government agencies to reorient their directions to support this agenda. Such a shift in development orientation reframed the relationship between state and society to some extent. This chapter explains such an evolution and change in the governance of anti-poverty policy after the crisis until the year 2001. The first section identifies key policy actors involved in the anti-poverty policy-making process. The next section discusses the reorientation of the national agenda towards the promotion of community empowerment and the roles of societal actors in shaping it. Further, the chapter investigates the

attempt of societal actors to reframe the state-society relationship and pursue a new form of governance. Finally, an attempt by societal actors to promote the poverty issue as the national poverty reduction strategy just before the 2001 election is briefly introduced.

2. Identifying key state and societal actors in poverty alleviation policy

The research found that only a few state actors have played a crucial role in the anti-poverty policy-making process after the crisis. The NESDB was obviously a prominent actor in policy formation. In fact some units/departments within the NESDB, as well as some figures in senior management positions who supported the social-centred approach to development as opposed to the economic-centred orthodoxy, were key players working with NGOs to promote the community empowerment agenda for poverty alleviation. The Ministry of Interior was a critical actor in implementing the policy since it controlled all provincial governors as well as maintained some degree of oversight over local governments. However, after 2001, the TRT government decided to establish several new quasi-governmental agencies under the Prime Minister's Office to implement its urgent policies. These agencies included the Village and Urban Revolving Fund Office and the National Centre for Poverty Eradication. This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Parliamentarians played a minimal role in initiating policy. Since the TRT party gained an absolute majority in the Lower House, controlling 365 of the total of 500 seats, many promises given to the electorate during the electioneering were easily put into effect, especially its pro-poor policies (see Chapter 4). The Senate did not have any mandate in policy formulation but was somewhat involved in policy monitoring. One legislator commented that

In the Thai parliamentary system, what matters to political success is the vote. The TRT controls over 70 percent of the total seats, so the government can pass any law it wishes. What we can do is just to

monitor the implementation process and give comments to the Assembly, but in fact our comments do not have much influence. (Interview L1)

Business did not take part in the anti-poverty policy-making process even though some businesses had been invited to participate in national committees. Some of them had participated at the beginning but soon thereafter began to withdraw their involvement. One reason could be *'because they had no interest in this kind of policy. Poverty dealt mainly with the poor which neither yielded benefit nor threatened their business. Why should they get involved?'* (Interview Ac3).

There was a camp of development activists and NGOs who refused to cooperate with the government and sometimes protested against government projects. They worked mainly in issues of debt, access to natural resources, and the impact of government development projects (Jaturong, 2003). An example of this was the Assembly of the Poor (Baker, 2000; Prapart, 1998). This group did not participate in the anti-poverty policy process. In addition, there was another camp that attempted to work with and influence decision-making at the core level of policy-making of either the bureaucracy or the government. Established figures in this group whose names were frequently mentioned in interviews as key players in anti-poverty policy included Prawase Wasi, Paiboon Wattanasiritham, Anek Nakabutr, and Poldej Pinprateep.

Prawase was a senior figure, who was probably the most influential proponent of the community empowerment strand. Because of his longstanding professional experience, he was able to build up formal and informal networks with some groups of NGOs, doctors, and international donor agencies (Bamber, 1997). At the same time, he worked well with various governmental agencies and bureaucrats. Thus, he was appointed to be on numerous government committees, especially on the Board of NESDB. Such positions gave him access to various levels of bureaucracy and many government agencies.

Paiboon has held many positions in almost twenty non-governmental organisations and government committees. He was highly respected by

bureaucrats and worked well with government agencies. He was the first Chairman of CODI, the first public autonomous organisation established to strengthen community organisations. Also, he was the Director of the Government Savings Bank (GSB) at the time when the crisis began.

Poldej has been the Secretary General of the Local Development Institute (LDI) since 1998. LDI had played a critical instrumental role in advancing the community empowerment agenda. Prawase was one of its founding executives and served as the President of its board. LDI was founded to be actively involved in government policy formulation and implementation. Its core belief was that 'the strength of local communities was the basis for sustainable development' (Pimjai, 2001: 12).

Anek was a longstanding social activist. He was the Secretary General of NGO-COD, the Coordinator of the Local Development Assistance Programme during 1984-1988 (former name of LDI), the LDI Secretary General (1996-1998), a member of the LDI Executive Committee (1997-present), and the Director of the Social Investment Fund (SIF).

Although these actors worked in different agencies, they became connected in a manner of informal alliance bound by a very similar agenda and were thus able to support each other. They adopted a common stance that local communities should be empowered; thus, they were somewhat able to influence and shape the content and delivery process of anti-poverty policy after the crisis. Some were allied with pro-community senior officials in the NESDB with the goal of mainstreaming the community empowerment discourse into the national development policy agenda. The alliance was able to successfully grasp this 'window of opportunity' that came with the crisis and pushed the community empowerment agenda from discourse into practice at the national policy-making level.

3. Mainstreaming the agenda

The NESDP has been instrumental in promoting Thailand's development since 1959. NESDP provided broad guidelines which government agencies translated into implementation plans. The Bureau of Budget allocated a budget to ministry implementation plans based on their consistency with the NESDP. However, the process of planning was dominated by the top-down approach with little input from the civil sector. The participatory process promoted by the NESDB mostly involved only bureaucrats, academics, and business because the plans were oriented to pro-economic development. A critical change came in the process of drafting the Eighth NESDP (1997-2001), in which societal actors began to influence the national policy agenda and to encourage a new approach for state-society collaboration.

This process of planning started just two years before the crisis. Changes in the planning approach and core concepts of the Eighth NESDP were partly due to the internal reorientation of the NESDB and the participation of the alliance. A senior NESDB official involved in the planning process reflected:

At the time we were preparing for the Eighth Plan, economic success was well recognised but social problems were seen to have increased, and we were seriously concerned about the sustainability of our previous achievements. An important turning point was initiated by the Secretary-General of the NESDB at that time, Dr Sumet, who greatly valued the idea of people-centred development with more emphasis given to the balance of economic, social, and environmental aspects of development... We think people participation was necessary to get inputs on the social concerns of people at the micro level instead of it being we the bureaucrats who drafted it according to our own specialisation. The participatory process was incorporated as a key element of the drafting process. He [Dr Sumet] then promoted and supported pro-localism senior bureaucrats to play a pivotal role in the drafting process. Our Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office was the key player in the drafting process. (Interview Go11)

The NESDB aimed to draft the plan via a consultation process in which thousands of participants from all walks of life and hundreds of NGOs could provide input

and voice their concerns. When the NESDB searched for some organisations to help organise participatory meetings, Prawaes, as a member of the NESDB Board, introduced Poldej and LDI to the NESDB management (interview Go10). This was the first time societal actors could access the core of a policy-making agency. The NESDB teamed up with LDI to hold nine regional seminars inviting a wide range of local NGOs, community leaders, social activists, development workers, academics, businessmen, bureaucrats, monks, and many other groups of people in each location, and the results were summed up in the last national seminar (Nipon *et al.*, 2002). LDI played a vital part in organising these seminars and assisting in the process of consolidating views for the draft (Pimjai, 2001). This involvement offered a great chance for the alliance to incorporate and mainstream its agenda, as an LDI official recalled that *'since we organised all seminars, most participants came from our wide network in local communities. Yes, it was selective but in this way we could easily voice our concern and scale up our agenda to the policy-makers'* (Interview Ng9).

Finally, it is observed that the agenda of promoting local communities was satisfactorily incorporated into the Eighth NESDP. A chapter in the plan was devoted to the promotion of popular participation and upgrading capabilities of communities to play active roles in local development and poverty alleviation (NESDB, 1997). It included proposals to initiate community budgets, promote community management of natural resources, create funding for NGOs to devise community-based social protection, and promote fiscal incentives for businesses to support the community. Unfortunately, the Plan was launched in 1997, the year when Thailand fell into crisis. As a result, much of the short-term policy priority was devoted to fulfilling the loan conditions of the IMF to assist in the recovery of Thailand. The crisis caused serious budget cuts across all government departments and diverted resources away from many ambitions in the Plan. The crisis induced impacts that the state was unable to handle. The government decided to devalue the baht currency, causing the business sector to fall into serious trouble because of the tremendous increase in its foreign debts. So the situation forced the state to seek and accept support from the societal sector. It gave an opportunity for the

alliance to push its agenda forward with further institutionalisation. The alliance reinterpreted the problem and tightly linked the community empowerment issue with poverty alleviation.

When the crisis occurred in Thailand, the government was incapable of handling the aftermath and asked assistance from the IMF in November 1997. The government embraced a commitment to liberalisation, smaller government, and free market as proposed by the IMF. In other words, it decided to pursue a neo-liberal development pathway on an outward-oriented, foreign capital-funded, export-driven, and modern-sector-based growth regime, with the agricultural and public sectors playing a marginal role (Choi, 2004). Such a development model reinforced the argument that the crisis weakened state capacity to guide society and neo-liberal policy restricted the Thai state from taking a decisive role in steering the economy. When the crisis raised many social problems, particularly poverty, the government decided to co-operate with societal actors by establishing the National Social Policy Committee (NSPC). This advanced an opportunity for societal actors to influence policy-making.

In 1998, government endorsed a revised Eighth NESDP to better respond to the crisis by focusing on its social impacts (World Bank, 1998a). Following a consultative meeting with key figures in civil society in March 1998, the Prime Minister emphasised the need for new policies to cope with increasing poverty and social problems. This resulted in the creation of the NSPC, chaired by the Prime Minister, in July 1998 (Spokesman Bureau, 1998). In fact, the alliance moved behind the scenes to promote this establishment according to one senior LDI official's recollection.

I and some social activists thought that impacts of the crisis were so critical. We needed a national committee to oversee and find ways to lessen them. But what was different was that 80% of the committee had to come from the societal sector in order to voice different perspectives from the bureaucrats. Prawase came to see me one week before the meeting... we also consulted several senior figures to draft the plan... we proposed the plan and the Prime Minister accepted it... then the NSPC was set up... (Interview Ng8)

The NSPC intended to develop social reform policies to meet the newly revised Eighth NESDP and respond to mounting concerns about social impact upon vulnerable groups and the poor. The NESDB was its secretariat while LDI became a part of the Committee (Pimjai, 2001). Prawase, with three other key figures from the societal sector, was on its advisory panel. The 37 members of the NSPC were government ministers responsible for social issues, NGO representatives, leaders of civic organisations, businessmen, academics, and religious leaders. It probably was the first national committee on which representatives from the non-governmental sector outnumbered bureaucrats. The NSPC became another channel that societal actors used to propel its agenda, as was evident in the policies proposed by the Committee.

In late 1998, the Committee organised a workshop aimed at developing a clear policy framework as well as a strategy and action plan for the NSPC. The civil society and NGO people advocated a greater focus on community empowerment and government reform to strengthen the decision-making capacities of local communities in solving social problems and alleviating poverty (UN Thailand, 1998). One member of NSPC recalled:

We [societal actors] tried to convince the government that during the crisis, while the business sector had collapsed, the rural communities across the country were still able to absorb those laid-off people who had returned back home. This helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis. Therefore, we proposed that community empowerment must not only be seen as an important way to mitigate the social and economic impacts on the poor but also as a key social reform strategy. (Interview Ng8)

Following this workshop, the NSPC announced two major strategies (Rodriguez, 1999). The short-term strategy aimed to address the social impacts of the crisis on vulnerable groups and the poor. The long-term one focused on public sector reforms to soften the power of the state and make it more enabling and facilitating to people. Accompanying this was a wide range of reforms addressing community level governance and legislative frameworks. This proved that societal actors

could reinterpret problems of the poor and poverty to serve the community empowerment agenda and made it a means for alleviating poverty.

The NSPC later drew up the Community Empowerment Response to Crisis Action Plan to help communities identify and prioritise issues arising from the crisis and to develop their own responses (Rodriguez, 1999). This national initiative entrusted communities with the responsibility and resources to deal with impacts of the crisis. It helped to improve communities' ability to identify appropriate solutions to their problems on their own initiative. This prompted the next step of operationalising their agenda, which provided a stepping stone toward an institutionalisation of the community empowerment agenda. This also helped to reframe the state-society relationship, as discussed in the next section.

The later NESDP (2002-2006) was prepared by a process of consultation, though less extensive than its predecessor, and LDI was again requested to help with organising the meetings (Interview Go11). The Ninth NESDP mainly focused on restoring the country after the crisis, and community empowerment became a core element of the recovery strategies, particularly in the proposals to alleviate poverty, improve environmental management, and generate sustainable rural development (NESDB, 2002). This NESDP stressed the importance of developing the capacity of local communities to manage their own economic and social development in partnership with the public and private sectors. It aimed to support community enterprises, to strengthen communities' capacity to manage revolving funds and small credit schemes, to foster participative community planning, and to expand networking between community organisations. This signified an important change in the thinking of the core planning agency, as well as the influence of societal actors, as observed in the views of some key NESDB officials:

We were convinced that a poverty alleviation strategy must be taken more broadly than just an effort to increase the income of the poor. Lack of power, capability, and freedom in managing their own lives became essential roots of their poverty. Empowerment of the poor should be

given a priority and supporting them as a collective entity in the community had to be emphasised. (Interview Go8)

We learned many things from the consultation and many successful cases of communities that became stronger when they were given opportunities and support. We realised the power of the poor and communities. Not only the way to measure poverty needed to change but also the approach to poverty alleviation. Community had to become central instead of having the state manage everything for them. (Interview Go9)

4. The reframing of state-society relations in the governing process

Not only did the alliance influence the content of the national plans, it attempted to push forward its agenda into practice by rearranging the state-society relationship in the anti-poverty policy governing process. This section considers some evidence for this assertion. First, the alliance put effort into institutionalising agencies that promoted community empowerment under the rubric of poverty alleviation. It utilised the social fund provided by the World Bank and the establishment of CODI for this purpose. Second, the alliance proposed a partnership structure between state and society to reframe the policy governing process.

After the crisis, the Bank partly reoriented its policy position to focus on the social impact of the crisis. It decided to implement the social investment concept in Thailand (see Chapter 7). The Bank drew upon evidence from reforms in Latin America and made its loan conditional on the government giving more choices and voices to communities (Manuelyan and Walton, 1998). There was more evidence that the funds performed best when there was genuine participation of local communities because measures to foster the genuine participation of communities in the choice, design, implementation, and evaluation of projects would guarantee the success of crisis mitigation (Narayan and Kattrinka, 1997). SIF, an initiative proposed by the Bank, was designed to strengthen communities

and grassroots level cooperation and networks in order to alleviate poverty and hardship in the long-term. It was created as a long-term social safety net mechanism to empower the grassroots. The Bank's project document stated that SIF aimed to 'improve the access of the poor and unemployed to basic social and economic infrastructure, services, and employment opportunities' (World Bank, 1998: 7).

The alliance had been extensively involved in the development of SIF. Before it was officially launched in 1998, the Bank had consulted policy-makers in the government, the NESDB, the Ministry of Finance, and some senior figures in civil society for advice about the formulation of the Fund. Prawase, Paiboon, and Anek closely participated at this stage and also were later intensively involved with the SIF appraisal team of the World Bank (Anek, 2002). Ammar Siamwalla, the Chairperson of SIF's Executive Committee, noted:

At the beginning, the Bank wanted to disburse funds to boost employment in the rural areas while representatives from civil society saw this fund as a significant channel to foster community strength and strengthen social capital in the country at the grassroots level. (SOFO, 20002a: 24)

Civil society representatives held several negotiations with the Bank decision-makers to convince the Bank to channel the fund direct to communities (Interview Ng1). In the end, it became the first fund that bypassed the bureaucracy and was channelled directly to the poor in their communities. A commitment for four-year loans by the Bank ensured the continuity of SIF.

Once the Fund had been set up, Anek was appointed Executive Director of SIF. The fund was managed by the Social Fund Office (SOFO) under the responsibility of the GSB. Paiboon was the Director of GSB at that time, although later he resigned from the GSB and was appointed as the Chairperson of CODI but remained on the SIF's Executive Committee. The Bank reported that the GSB had been selected because of 'its relative independence, management capacities, experience in financial intermediation, and new mandate to serve as the *people's*

bank' (World Bank, 1998: 9). But in fact, it was a proposal put forward by the alliance because Paiboon was the Director of the GSB. This was done because the alliance thought it would ease cooperation in fund disbursement and ensured that they would have some degree of control over its operations (Interview, Ng1). In so doing, Paiboon and Anek became prime architects and implementers of SIF (Juree, 2003).

Some evidence showed that SIF was an NGO-dominated organisation. Its Executive Committee was designed to have five community leaders from various regions of Thailand as members in addition to two later-appointed senior staff of CODI. The rest of the sixteen members consisted of two people from the GSB, one from the media, and the other four from relevant government agencies.¹ Staff members who worked on approving local projects were representatives of NGOs rather than government officials (Interview Ng1). Community projects under SIF were proposed and prepared by local community organisations under the guidelines provided by SOFO, classified into five menus.² The guiding principle of such menus was that SIF would facilitate the provision of public goods by allowing the communities to take the initiative (Ammar and Srawooth, 2000). Communities learned to identify their needs and develop solutions rather than allowing government agencies to direct them as had happened in the past.

¹ The other members were 1) the Chairperson of the Committee; 2) the Director of the GSB as a Vice-Chairperson; 3) the Chairperson of CODI as a Vice-Chairperson; 4) the Deputy Director of the GSB; 6) the Manager of CODI; 7) a representative from the media; 8) a representative from the Bureau of Public Debt Management, Ministry of Finance (MoF); 9) a representative from the Bureau of Fiscal Management, MoF; 10) representatives from the Local Administration Department and the Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior; and 11) the Executive Director of SOFO.

² They were: (1) capacity and learning development in community occupation and community economic development; (2) community social welfare and safety; (3) restoration, protection, management, and promotion of culture, environment, and natural resources; and (4) community capacity in building and networking. The fifth menu, immediate community welfare for vulnerable groups accessed through community organisation networks, was introduced later in May 1999. While Menu I to IV emphasised investments to enhance the capability of community organisations, Menu V was designed to enhance the capability of community organisation networks in order to transfer the payment and to provide welfare for vulnerable groups, such as AIDS patients, tribal peoples, slum dwellers, the elderly, and the disabled.

The impact of SIF was considerable. It supported 7,874 subprojects and reached about 10 percent of villages throughout the country, it created employment for 59,284 individuals, and it benefited over 13 million people, including the poor, unemployed, children, the elderly, and the disabled (World Bank, 2005). It enhanced the capacities of over 300 community network organisations, helped communities develop skills in project planning and management, and mobilised thousands of volunteers to help those affected by the crisis. One former SIF officer took the view that *'SIF became a major resource to propel the community empowerment agenda and develop a large number of social activists who learned how to manage a large fund and build locally-based networks'* (Interview Ng1). SIF became a good learning experience for all parties concerned, and especially a training platform for many social activists who later moved to work with CODI or the VURF scheme (SOFO, 2002).

Further, lessons learned from SIF have been incorporated into policy initiatives, particularly in the Ninth NESDP and TRT's policies (Anek, 2002). Many community enterprise projects under Menu 1 were successful and provided a good input into the One-Sub-district-One-Product Scheme. Many communities benefiting from the fund allocated a portion of their profits to the establishment of community welfare funds. Community network organisations continued to operate revolving funds with monies disbursed originally through Menu 5. SOFO supported the NESDB in the drafting process of the Ninth NESDP and incorporated its experience in promoting the development of community master plans in 2,000 sub-districts across the country into this Plan. This idea of the community master plan has been continued by the NCPE (see Chapter 6).

Although SIF was a very important instrument that the alliance used to propel its agenda, SIF had a limited project life and finally ended in October 2002. The alliance expected to guarantee the continuity of community empowerment momentum by institutionalising a more permanent organisation. CODI was the achievement of this attempt. In fact, an attempt of setting up an organisation that was managed by NGO people and continually supported community development

was initiated in 1994 (CODI, 2002). Between 1995 and 2000, eight regional and national seminars/workshops were organised with participants from government, rural and urban communities, NGOs, academics, and experts to discuss a proposal to set up a public organisation to promote and to support community development and finance in both rural and urban areas. Paiboon led the committee that organised the meetings (Interview Ng4). Finally, the cabinet approved a merger between the Urban Community Development Office and the Rural Development Fund to become CODI in 2000. CODI has its own legal entity as a public organisation, something which provided CODI with greater flexibility, wider linkages, and new possibilities for supporting collaboration between rural and urban communities (Somsook, 2003).

Beyond supporting community organisations, one of the main objectives of CODI was to coordinate efforts of civil society groups and their partners (CODI, 2002). CODI was expected to be a key institution bridging the gap between government and civil society organisations. CODI's Board included representatives from government and community organisations. The eleven members of the Board included the Chairperson, four representatives from government agencies related to rural and urban development, three community organisation representatives, two specialists, and the Director of CODI. The influence of the alliance was strengthened when Paiboon resigned from GSB and became the first Chairperson of CODI, and many community leaders who had emerged from SIF became parts of CODI's network at the local level. It was likely that the *'establishment of CODI became a key instrument of the alliance in building up a stronger civic sector and empowering the community in the long run'* (Interview Ng7). CODI's annual reports clearly indicate that CODI has closely cooperated with LDI and SIF in many activities (CODI, 2002). For example, it worked with SIF in promoting a pilot project for *pracharat* (see below) in four provinces in the Southern part of Thailand. It collaborated with both the SIF and LDI in the *palang pandin* movement (see below) by proposing policies to political parties during the 2001 national election campaigning. Following the closure of SIF, CODI tried to build on the momentum of SIF. It set up a network of community-level activists to

develop regional plans and to provide help to weaker communities in their dealings with government and other agencies. Many members of the operational staff from SIF joined CODI after SIF was terminated (Interview Ng1).

The alliance not only used anti-poverty policy to institutionalise its agenda, it also attempted to reframe the relationship between the state and society in the governing process. Alliance advocates did not think that either the state or business was in opposition to the community development. Prawase (1997) believed that the state and business should cooperate in solving social problems, including poverty. He initiated a structure for deliberation that brought various groups under the rubric of what he termed *benjaphaki* or a partnership of five parties including state officials, NGOs, the private sector, academics, and people's organisations. A significant practice of this idea was the establishment of *prachakom*³ (provincial level public assemblies) in many provinces during the Eighth NESDP drafting process. They were so successful that many of these continued to be promoted after the completion of the process. *Prachakom* can be described as an assembly with the purpose of formulating development plans for the province (NESDB, 1997). This structure aimed to institutionalise an initiative platform for state-civil dialogue and collaboration, in which each party discussed the development issues related to their local conditions and searched for solutions. This concept was later explained by an NESDB policy officer:

Prawase attempted to institutionalise state-civil partnership mechanisms at the local level through his prachakom initiative. Moreover, he moved to the policy level by connecting with several high-level bureaucrats, especially pro-community senior officials in the NESDB, and convinced them to support the community empowerment agenda. He also linked us [the NESDB] with LDI through this prachakom structure. (Interview Go8)

³ In general, *prachakom* is an assembly through which representatives of local residents can monitor and make proposals to provincial administrations. However, it remains informal entity. Its status and membership requirements are not defined by law. There were created through the desire of local people to directly influence the local administration's decision-making process through channels outside of the elected provincial assemblies.

LDI advanced this state-civil partnership mechanism. Poldej said that ‘LDI can work with any government, any political party, or any group because we do not take sides. If the job fits our mandate, we will cooperate’ (Pimjai, 2001: 29). This position allowed some degree of collaboration with government agencies to promote community empowerment. It enabled LDI to reach extensive networks of civil society and grassroots organisations while maintaining good relationships with policy-makers in the bureaucracy. Further, LDI secured a number of contracts from government agencies and channelled funds to assist the mobilisation of popular input to shape policy direction more towards community empowerment. LDI described itself as achieving a significant role assisting the NESDB in mobilising knowledge and experience from communities to the development of NESDP (LDI, 1997). LDI applied the *prachakom* structure when it helped the NESDB organise consultation meetings for the Eighth NESDP drafting process. Since then, LDI has received more funding from government agencies to implement projects aimed at strengthening provincial, sub-district civic, and community organisations (Pimjai, 2001)⁴.

The discourse of state-society collaboration was also evident during the SIF period. Juree (2003) argued that SIF represented a successful case of state-society cooperation. It typified multi-party partnership with co-operation between villagers, state officials, NGOs, local leaders, and academics. The scheme in fact was designed, managed, and operationalised by social activists and NGO people with the cooperation and endorsement of government officials. The project proposals were solicited directly from communities and funding was dispersed directly to communities. In the final stage, the management of SIF tried to promote state-society collaboration through an idea dubbed *pracharat* (civil-state) (SOFO, 2003; Anek, 2002). The concept of *pracharat* indicated a collaboration of

⁴ In 1998, the NESDB contracted LDI to pilot *prachakom* at the district level in two provinces. In 1999, it received another contract to develop provincial civic and community assemblies in 14 provinces. Later in 2000, it was contracted to develop *prachakom* in four provinces in the southern part of Thailand. Further, NSPC contracted LDI to conduct pilot projects supporting local communities establishing *prachakom* in every province (World Bank, 2001). In 2001, the NESDB produced an evaluation of the Eighth NESDP with particular attention to the progress of *prachakom* formation and found a positive assessment of the instrumentality that it achieved (NESDB, 2000).

representatives from the politics sector, the bureaucracy, civil society, and communities, all who work together in a committee structure at all levels, from national to provincial and from district to village (SOFO, 2002a). *Pracharat* provided communities with ‘social space’ to negotiate and collaborate with the state on issues related to their own lives. *Pracharat* became an extended version of *prchakom*, in a broader structure.

In 2000, Prawase and LDI, by linking up with other NGOs and senior figures in society, began to launch a social campaign called *palang pandin* (literally means forces of the land) – a joining of different social forces to solve the country’s problems – to mobilise public concern and convince the government to pay serious attention to social reforms, particularly the poverty reduction agenda (Nipon *et.al*, 2002). The timing of the launch was critical because the NESDB was about to start a drafting process for the Ninth NESDP and more importantly, year 2001 was the time when a general election would take place. The alliance wanted the new government to take poverty alleviation seriously and to vigorously implement it. Prawase propagated the idea that state and society needed to cooperate to mobilise *palang pandin* and work together to solve the poverty problem. He argued that collaboration between different partners needed to be fostered in order to coordinate the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of each one in areas beyond the reach of any one partner (Prawase, 1998). His proposal of *palang pandin* was ‘nothing other than the extension of institutionalised state-society partnership’ (Connors, 2001: 21). LDI repeated the idea in workshops and seminars it organised across the country to ‘mobilise popular support that state and society needed to team up as *pracharat* to strengthen each other in alleviating poverty’ (LDI, 2000: 5). In fact, this strategy aimed to open a possibility that the new government would form a national poverty reduction strategy and institutionalise state-society partnership in implementing such anti-poverty policy.

The idea attracted the TRT party during the electioneering period. The TRT appeared receptive to the *palang pandin* campaign and pledged many poverty alleviation programmes. A LDI senior official said:

Some members of our executive committee were invited to take part in policy discussions with the TRT, and Prawase occasionally spoke at TRT seminars. It was a good sign of societal sector and political party linkage which we hoped it would be developed to become a true state-civil partnership. Some LDI staff, especially Poldej, had been intensively involved in pioneering and managing the VURF policy. (Interview Ng8)

In fact, prior to the election, the TRT held numerous meetings with NGOs and interest groups and developed significant links with them both on the basis of electoral pledges and personal linkages (Connors, 2001). When the TRT came into power, a unit called *Pracharat Network Coordination Unit* (PNCU) was established under the VURF Office. The unit aimed to coordinate state and civil partnership to promote community development at the local level. It was believed that this structure would encourage smooth cooperation between the state and society in an equal manner (SOFO, 2002). The unit was initiated by Poldej, and he acted as the Head of the unit for two years.

5. Conclusion

During the period between 1997 and 2001, we have observed that the idea of community governance and partnership was notably influential in the Thailand's anti-poverty policy-making process. The discourse of community empowerment came to shape development policy and led to an emerging new form of state-society partnership. We saw that societal actors played a crucial role in influencing and shaping a national policy agenda grounded on poverty alleviation issues. The alliance, mostly influential social activists informally organised in a network to advocate for the community governance agenda, had access to core national policy-making mechanisms and influenced key policy-makers to support and assist their project.

The crisis weakened the business sector's interests that had dominated the development agenda during the boom period. In this aspect, the crisis drove away other competing interests from accessing policy-making and made more room for societal actors to enter into and play an influential role in this policy arena. At the same time, the crisis weakened the state's capacity to handle the social impacts of the crisis. While the crisis demanded the state tackle the problems, the state lacked the capacity to do it alone. This necessitated that it to seek more cooperation with societal actors and adopt a different policy agenda. In other words, the state was less powerful in dominating the policy arena and managing society. These constraints demanded the state seek new strategies to steer society. This also indicated that the state was more dependent on the support of societal actors and implied some degree of growing interdependence between the state and society in policy-making.

Under such circumstances, the alliance was able to organise and manipulate resources to promote their idea of community empowerment and partnership to core policy-makers in the national planning agency. The alliance guided the planning agency towards a focus on empowering communities as an important means of alleviating poverty. Community disempowerment was interpreted by the alliance as a fundamental cause of poverty. In other words, the alliance developed solutions, advocated them, and then tried to take advantage of political receptivity to package solutions to the problem.

Although the power to set priorities and define national development goals as well as to make the final policy decision was still in the hands of the NESDB, societal actors became actively involved and were able to manage the process of policy formulation. To some extent, they not only provided inputs but also shaped the content of policy though manipulating the consultation process. It seemed that the consultation process had some influence over the mindsets of NESDB senior officials. The consultation process guided them to favour pro-community governance. The alliance was able to grasp opportunities emerging from the crisis to propel its agenda. Through the NSPC, the alliance again proposed its agenda as

a solution to the consequences of the crisis, and especially attached it to issues of poverty alleviation.

Further, the crisis drove international development agencies to promote the community-based scheme in response to consequences of the crisis. The alliance took this opportunity and pressed home their agenda, although this process involved some negotiation. Funds borrowed from the Bank by the Thai government were used to support community development through SIF. The alliance was also able to institutionalise the community empowerment agenda, which can be seen in the cases of SIF and CODI. Apart from these attempts, the alliance advocated a new cooperative structure to bridge the gap between state and societal actors and hopefully to bring them into a partnership-type working relationship. Cooperative arrangements for policy formulation and implementation at various levels involving different parties were developed under the rubrics of *pracharat* and *prachakom*.

However, the extent to which such a concept is practical in real political life is still in question. One academic gave an interesting critique:

Prawase's idea is so idyllic and too idealistic. His idea is based on Buddhist philosophy emphasising harmony and non-violence. This might not be sensible in real political life, which is full of conflict. For those communities that received a negative impact from government projects such as a dam or those who lost their rights to access natural resources, would such people be able to easily sit down at the meeting table and cooperate with government officials in harmony? Their problems are different and need a different political approach. They have to negotiate, pressurise, and advocate, aiming to reframe power arrangements with the state. Merely dialogue under the rubric of pracharat would surely be insufficient. (Interview Ac3)

Further, the effectiveness of such a partnership structure was also questioned because of both successful and failed cases. Critics noted that although the state-civil partnership promoted by *prachakom* had achieved a certain level of success in terms of providing forums for a multiplicity of stakeholders, it was unsuccessful in terms of developing the processes of participatory planning. In many cases, the middle class, bureaucrats, and academics were predominant in the

prachakom and its process with a small number of NGOs and grassroots community organisations taking part (Ratana, 1999). Moreover, Ratana (1999) argues that the high expectations behind the formation of *prachakom* had so far failed to make them genuinely participatory, with equal status for each participant. Many *prachakom* were dominated by state officials as many members did not represent any community organisation. *Prachakom* initiated by the government tended to result in government officials being engaged in co-optation and setting the agenda for civil society. The adoption of the *prachakom* structure and community empowerment agenda by the state, while it might be seen as a victory for communitarian advocates, was more likely to end up as state manipulation.

The observation of this criticism could be interpreted to mean that the new configuration of state-society partnership led to an emergence of a new state form in Thailand. The community empowerment movement enabled this change and triggered a transformed state apparatus to maintain its control and indeed to facilitate a new form of society penetration in the name of partnership. The next chapter examines cases of the VURF and the Poverty Registration Scheme adopted by the new TRT government, which took power in 2001. It also examines if these cases can be criticised on this basis.

Chapter 6

State and Societal Actors after 2001

1. Introduction

From mid 1998 onwards, the impact of the crisis spread through Thailand's rural areas. Poverty incidence in rural areas increased sharply from 14.9 percent of the total population in 1996 to 17.2 in 1998, and reached 21.5 in 1999 (Table 5). A sharp increase in poverty incidence could also be observed in all regions of Thailand (Table 6). The government was blamed for helping business and the rich too much rather than the poor (Pasuk and Baker, 2002; Phitthaya, 1998; Yuk, 1998). Against this backdrop, the TRT party was established and positioned itself as an alternative to the ruling conservative government of that time. During the electioneering, the TRT declared its principal policies as those based on a pro-poor, pro-rural platform. Some of these policies became a means that not only helped the TRT to win the election but also, as this research found out, a strategy that the state utilised to recover its power over other actors in the anti-poverty policy-making and to reframe the way society was governed. It also reshaped the nature of the relationship between state and societal actors to some extent. Furthermore, the government later developed a new initiative, called the Poverty Registration Scheme, which allowed the state to monopolise the policy-making process and exercise a greater degree of influence over other societal policy actors. Partnership governance as promoted by the state was used as a strategy to co-opt other actors into supporting its development agenda.

This chapter examines the above issues by looking at the main poverty alleviation projects under the TRT government with a focus on the VURF and Poverty Registration Scheme. Key findings are organised along the themes of policy agenda setting and execution. The first two sections consider the way that the policy agenda was reframed and resultant implications for the state-society relations. The first section discusses the adoption of the poverty alleviation agenda that the TRT government took and its implications. The second section addresses

recent developments in the anti-poverty scheme and the way the poor have been redefined. The next two sections examine the way these policies were executed and governed. Governing by partnership was acclaimed as being fully supported by all concerned parties, but this chapter examines how it has actually been practised. The examination is placed in the context of the VURF and the execution of the NCPE.

Table 6: Poverty in Thailand by region, 1988-2002

Year	Poverty incidence by region				
	North	Northeast	Central	South	Bangkok and vicinity
1988	32.0	48.4	26.6	32.5	6.1
1990	23.2	43.1	22.3	27.6	3.5
1992	22.6	39.9	13.3	19.7	3.5
1994	13.2	28.6	9.2	17.3	0.9
1996	11.2	19.4	6.3	11.5	0.6
1998	9.1	23.2	7.0	14.8	0.6
1999	10.6	30.8	6.8	15.7	0.2
2000	12.2	28.1	5.4	11.0	0.4
2001	10.6	24.5	4.6	13.5	0.8
2002	9.8	18.9	4.3	8.7	1.4
Poverty share (2000)	17.8	60.6	8.3	11.9	0.6
Population share (2000)	18.8	34.2	23.3	13.3	10.4

Source: Development Evaluation Division, NESDB¹; data from 1962-1986 are summarised in Medhi (1993); and the last two rows are calculated by Warr (2005).

2. Internalising the agenda, reinterpreting poverty

With the TRT's landslide victory in the 2001 election, a special credit went to pro-poor, rural-based policies mainly aimed at attacking poverty in rural areas. Although the TRT espoused the principle of rural uplift as one pillar of its later acclaimed *dual track plus* policy, it initially had no concrete pro-poor programme. Therefore, the party set up a team to formulate a comprehensive anti-poverty policy paper for the party² by a process of extensive consultation with grassroots

¹ NESDB calculated the figures based upon household incomes data collected in the SES. SES is the only data available covering an extended time period, since 1962.

² I have read the official draft of this policy paper (TRT, no date). It was a very comprehensive one covering all major aspects of agricultural policy with a focus on rural areas. The policy addressed issues related to the poor in rural areas and proposed ways to solve the problems comprehensively.

people in rural areas. This was also a response to the demand raised by the pro-community alliance for making anti-poverty policy a priority. A senior member of the TRT recalled:

During the years 1998 and 1999, the team travelled across the country. We organised numerous meetings and seminars, and met many key community leaders, local NGOs, academics, and government officials. We wanted to hear their voices to form the party's policy... Some pro-community NGO leaders contributed their ideas. We also consulted with senior NGO people such as Prawase, Anek, and some people from LDI. (Interview L2)

It seemed that societal actors provided some inputs into the party's policy formulation. However, what was actually executed was not as much as expected. When the TRT won the election, very few policies were selected from the paper for implementation. Some additional policies were hand-picked if they looked promising for winning popularity. The same informant continued:

The TRT was not yet in government when we drafted the policy paper. So we included all policies we believed necessary to help the rural poor. But when the government was formed, the premier selected only the debt moratorium and one-tambon [sub-district] one-product policies for implementation...after the party won the election and the government was formed, no one was interested in our paper anymore...the premier adopted some policies proposed by others if they could reach broader groups of the electorate such as one-million-baht fund [VURF] proposed by the Deputy Prime Minister. This policy had been modified from his successful former party's policy in 1975.³ Rural people highly favoured this policy and his party won the election that year. So it was very attractive and assured the party of popular support. (Interview L2)

Such policies became a 'cornerstone' of the party's pro-poor project. The government 'repackaged' the project and claimed it as a new solution to poverty alleviation by developing a new discourse to justify its policy position. It argued that poverty was all about the 'lack of capital' and 'lack of opportunity', which could be alleviated if the poor found ways to 'reduce their expenses, increase their

³ This meant to be the 'tambon (sub-district) revolving fund scheme' launched by the Social Action Party government in 1975. Morell and Chai-Anan (1981) view this scheme as more about a political incentive than an economic one. The Social Action Party doubled its seats in the subsequent election after campaigning on a platform of extending the scheme.

incomes, and broaden more of their opportunities in life'. This became the motto of the government's anti-poverty project (Nichapha, 2003). Later this approach was acknowledged by government officials, as one NCPE senior official explained:

Surely, there was logic behind these policies. First, the three-year debt moratorium aimed to relieve the debt burden of the farmers and gave them a certain grace period to improve their productivity and boost their incomes without an interest commitment. VURF provided one million baht to each village across the country as a loan facility available for individuals and households. People could borrow for investment or for supplementary vocations. This aimed at helping them increase their incomes. Concurrently with VURF, the one-tambon-one-product scheme enabled communities to market products developed based on their traditional indigenous expertise and local know-how. This helped them raise their income level and gave them more opportunities in life. All of these attempts aimed at strengthening communities and helping them to escape poverty. (Interview Go2)

The above explanation seemingly suggested that the government employed a monetary approach to poverty alleviation. The language of pro-community is also reflected in the case of VURF, which claimed to directly strengthen the community for long-term poverty alleviation. In VURF's policy paper, it claimed that the revolving fund was intended to 'solve the problem of poverty of the majority in rural areas, to reduce the rural-urban gap, and encourage people to be more self-dependent', and it also aimed to 'promote local community capacity in fund management, stimulate the grassroots economy, and empower rural and urban communities' (VURFO, 2001: 11). The revolving fund was believed to be a key mechanism to empower communities in a sustainable fashion, as argued by a VURF executive:

The fund should be used as a key mechanism to rebuild the community. Community has been broken off because the adults leave their hometown to work in the cities for more money. When the community has a fund, it can be used for job creation activities, and these people can now stay to work in their hometown, with no need to leave their community anymore. The fund will allow them to discuss with each other how to manage the money. They will have to set up their own committee and come up with their own solutions. We will not intervene. This should make them more self-dependent and strengthen the social bonds of the community...Because it is a revolving fund, they have to

repay the loan with little interest, so the money will not be lost but will stay within the community. They own the fund, not us. You see that we expect the fund to be with them permanently. (Interview Go7)

Up to this point, it seemed that the TRT government had adopted poverty alleviation and community empowerment into its main policy agenda. Nonetheless, this should not be seen as a celebration for communitarian advocacy. The above quotes reflected how the government might try to reinterpret poverty and offer different solutions to the problem, including an attempt to promote community empowerment. These policy measures still reflect very old-fashioned thinking – giving the poor some money and the state remains their patron – though in different forms. VURF was evidence of this framework. The explanation could be simply read in a way that the poor had the capacity but lacked the opportunity because they had inadequate funds. Thus, government was seen as a patron that was constrained to help them by providing monies such as VURF. This type of relationship arrangement assumed that once the poor could access a source of capital, they would know how to make use of it to increase their income. This was a new explanation for a very old-aged approach or like ‘old wine in new bottles’. This criticism is echoed in the concerns of some academics:

Government still held the same answer; it made the poor richer so poverty would be eliminated. Instead of claiming that the government gave monies, it claimed to give opportunities, not monies...I think this is just some new discourse, a new interpretation to explain an old framework, an old approach. (Interview Ac4)

Poverty is not only about a lack of money but about a lack of knowledge, rights, power, lands, and so on, but government did not do anything about such issues. The poor generally do not realise this; they just feel comfortable when the government gives them some money without requiring any effort from them. Some even think that it is free money given by the premier! (Interview Ac1)

Upon a more extended analysis, this reinterpretation of the anti-poverty approach had some political implications. Interpreting the poverty problem in this way provided the opportunity for the state’s involvement under its claim of helping the poor and capacitating the community. The process of internalising the agenda –

transferring the agenda of societal actors to become that of the government – gave opportunity for the state to recover its influence over the management of resource allocation and, to some extent, over society. Instead of using SIF (which was managed by NGOs) to channel the fund, the government decided to establish a new agency in parallel to SIF to manage the fund by itself. Later the government decided to terminate loans on SIF borrowed from the World Bank. This meant that now the state began to pull resources back into its own hands rather than channel them through civil society agencies as had happened previously. The state now solidified its resources through this consolidation process. This attempt could also be viewed as the state beginning to make the role of an agent that served as an intermediary between the state and the grassroots to be less important or even irrelevant. This, in essence, demoted the role of NGOs to a position of lesser importance or lesser relevance, allowing the government to bypass them. In order to fully achieve this, the state successfully assimilated key personnel of societal actors through VURF. When the VURF Office was set up, some key NGO people were invited to help with management (including Poldej from LDI). In this way, one prominent NGO leader commented that the policy internalisation strategy of the government jeopardised the bargaining power of societal actors:

The government was able to acquire knowledge gained by SIF as well as its key NGO personnel who came to work for VURF. This strategy undermined our bargaining power because we now lost our 'prime' agenda and initiatives in advocating poverty alleviation as well as our know-how and network. (Interview Ng1)

Furthermore, as government directed money and programmes downward directly to villages, such kind of scheme did not truly strengthen communities but rather made them more dependent on state support. Some NGO leaders even argued that:

The provision of top-down money could tear the community apart and initiate some conflict within the community when people 'fought' over the distribution of money. The practice of easy handouts by the government could jeopardise a community's financial self-discipline and its learning process, and thereby weaken the community's self-reliance. (Interview Ng2)

Instead of weakening the state's power, the adoption of the anti-poverty and community empowerment agenda by the state allowed it to reinterpret the agenda and use it to recuperate its role and power in welfare provision to the grassroots. Later in 2003, the government initiated another anti-poverty project, and this also seemed even more to increase the state's power over policy-making instead of empowering society.

3. Reframing the agenda, redefining the poor

The NESDB (2003) considered that one critical problem of approaching the poor in Thailand was the lack of a complete poverty database and poverty map. The NESBD proposed to the government that this was one of the reasons why the government was unable to address the poor effectively. Therefore, two national meetings on poverty alleviation were organised in October and November 2003. Following the last meeting, the government launched its nationwide Poverty Registration Scheme. The Scheme encouraged people who needed assistance from the government to report and identify their problems according to the categories pre-identified by the government, as shown in Table 7. It began with the pilot in 8 provinces in late 2003 and executed the programme nationwide during the first quarter of 2004.⁴ Communities took part in the review stage when the District Office passed on details of the registered people to the village where they were from and asked the village assembly to verify the details. The verified information was sent to NCPE, which then proceeded with assistance to those registered individually. At the end of September 2004, 8,258,275 people had registered (13.15 percent of the total population) and 12,198,333 problem cases⁵ had been reported (Table 7). Information identified three major difficulties of the poor: personal debt, lack of agricultural land, and lack of housing. These three problems accounted for 86 percent of the total problems.

⁴ Whereas this was the main registration period, people could still register after March, but the number of newly registered people was minimal.

⁵ The number of cases exceeded the number of registered people because one registered person could report more than one problem.

Table 7: Numbers of cases classified by categorised problems

Problems	Numbers	Percentage
Personal indebtedness	4,680,832	38.37
Lack of agricultural lands	3,968,119	32.53
Lack of housing	1,892,131	15.51
Student unemployment	240,345	1.97
Frauds	82,720	0.68
Illegal occupations	7,546	0.06
Homelessness	5,064	0.04
Other problems	1,321,576	10.83
Total	12,198,333	100.00

Source: National Centre for Poverty Eradication, minutes of executive committee meeting, 20th September, 2004

Several key officials who were involved in the management of this Scheme argued that this was a remarkable initiative in approaching the poor and poverty in Thailand. First, it was considered the first time that people could advise the state on who were considered ‘the poor’ as opposed to previous approaches, when the poor were determined centrally by the bureaucracy. One senior official from the Ministry of Interior explained:

We let people voice their problems and difficulties by telling us what their needs were. We directly received requests from the people and responded to them. This was what we should have done before: listening to their needs and helping to direct them to what they wanted. This was truly an ‘outside-in’ and people-centred approach to poverty eradication. This is opposition to the ‘inside-out’ approach in which government thought for people and imposed what the government deemed the people wanted. (Interview Go4)

Second, this approach helped the government know which individuals must be targeted for specific services as opposed to the previous community approach, which made the poor less distinct. Another official from the same ministry commented:

This was a shift from focusing on geography, community, or household to concentrate on individual poverty. In this way, we knew exactly who were in need individually... This sounded reasonable to me because numerous difficulties that people faced were rather problems of personal circumstance. Attempting to empower the community would not be enough to solve their individual problems. (Interview Go6)

In spite of the above appreciation from government officials, the Scheme could be critically viewed by societal actors as a means to generate popular support from the poor and maintain a dependent structure between the state and the people. Some others commented that this individualistic approach would diminish the sense of collective effort of people in the community who were working together to solve their problems. This would threaten an attempt to capacitate the community to be more self-reliant and independent from the domination of the state. Such concerns were expressed in several interviews.

It was too simple to define the poor in terms of these 6-7 problems. It's incomplete definitely...Government has not yet done anything with broader structural causes of poverty like the issues of rights or access to natural resources... it just offered another political promise to the electorate, blinded them with the false impression that the government is going to solve their indebtedness or housing problems and so on. Our [senate] committee believed it was just another political plot aimed at generating political support. (Interview L1)

The government still views helping the poor as a type of charitable work. I meant the government is acting like a charity, in which someone who is in a higher authority [government] gives help to receivers at the bottom [the poor]... This contrasts the principal foundation of community empowerment, which is to build up from the bottom, to empower from the bottom upwards. (Interview Ng3)

One point that is worth addressing here was that this Poverty Registration Scheme could also be perceived as another project in which government aimed to bypass any intermediary between the state and people and to replace it with a direct linkage from the government down to the grassroots on an individual basis. It could make people become more dependent on state patronage rather than on community support, according to one academic's comment:

The Scheme undermined the community effort where people helped each other to solve their problems. People are now focusing on help from the government as they have registered. It could make people think that their problems could be resolved by the 'helping-hands' of the government and prevent them from seeking support from the community. (Interview Ac1)

The origin of the Scheme is worth considering. Instead of developing it by a rational and scientific policy analysis, it was initiated on an impulse of the premier's in one meeting. One officer of the Ministry of Interior who managed a unit of NCPE recalled:

The Prime Minister assigned us to organise a workshop on 1st October 2003 with ministers and senior officials from many ministries. We proposed the workshop focus on five problems.⁶ The main focus was on agricultural land and the registration initially aimed to get information on the demand-side of lands. During the discussion, the issue of personal debts and housing came up and the premier caught it, so it became seven problems... No, no analysis, just inspiration from the discussion... (Interview Go4)

Two interesting points can be seen in this response. First, none of the representatives from the non-state sector participated in this meeting (OPSI, 2003). The policy was developed solely by the state and was imposed upon society without any input from societal actors. Participation of non-state actors only came at the implementation stage. Second, the language of poverty was redefined again and was broadened to cover other problems concerning the poor apart from community empowerment and income poverty issues as earlier defined. In fact, it might not be right to define the poor as only those who had these seven problems and came to register because no one could ensure that the registration had covered all people in need, and certainly the notion of poverty was much broader than these seven aspects, as highlighted by several scholars (see Kakwani and Medhi, 1998; UNDP International Poverty Centre, 2006).

These seven categories of poverty also established an entitlement for those who were eligible for help from government and allowed it to consider the non-registered as non-beneficiaries. This categorisation of the poor limited the number of issues that the government would target. It narrowed its focus to problems regarding the poor in several defined areas and in fact only three major problems – indebtedness, land, and housing. The government had no need to invest its

⁶ These were: a lack of agriculture land, homelessness, illegal occupation, student unemployment, and frauds.

energy in other problems or other groups since the Scheme provided clearly targeted groups and problems to be tackled. Further, the language of definition and the naming of the policy problems played a significant part in defining who should take responsibility for resolving the problems. Once the problem shifted from collective solutions (as community empowerment did) to personal resolution (the registered poor), the role of community and non-state actors became less important, and the burden was transferred to the state and bureaucracy for deliverance. Categorising and naming policy problems became a critical means which the government used to shape and prioritise what it wanted to do, and this Scheme introduced evidence of when the government manoeuvred this strategy to impose its power over society by determining the policy agenda for other actors to follow. Based on this perspective, the Scheme could be interpreted as a new strategy for social manipulation imposed by the state.

The final observation was that this Scheme offered the TRT a means to manage society by focusing on the 8.2 million registered poor. Government promised to find and redistribute unused lands, to restructure debts through the state banking systems, and to provide low-cost housing (OPSI, 2003). Through these measures, government could exercise some manipulative influence over society and the registered poor in particular through the use of resources (budget and government officials) for remunerative sanctions in exchange for their political support (their votes). Once the process of solving the defined problems had been initiated, the government introduced an implicit condition for the poor to support the TRT in exchange for their needs of land, housing, and debt restructuring to be fulfilled. This could be viewed as a strategy to tie people to the party, as one NGO leader observed:

8 million registered poor meant 8 million votes in the coming election. Registration allowed the government to know who they were, where they were, and what they needed. If government could satisfy their needs and maintain their hope for help, no wonder it could win the election. It might be too difficult to search for the real poor who were suffering from deprivation, but it was much easier to manage these 8 million people. (Interview Ng5)

The process should demand long-term commitment. A reliance on the promise of rewards as an instrument of influence could be effective only as long as there were regular pay-outs of such rewards, otherwise the conformity would not continue. Therefore a stable structure of implementation mechanisms needed to be established so the process of poverty problem solving could be pushed forward though institutionalising a new agency – the NCPE. Section 5 examines the operation of this agency in detail.

4. Instituting hierarchical control, initiating a state-centred network

By the end of June 2004, about 74,907 funds were established across the country, which was about 99.15 percent of the target (Table 8) (VURFO, 2004). The budget for this project was targeted at 75,501 million baht, which surpassed any previous attempt to provide funding for local communities and no NGO could match this resource, so certainly it had the potential to have an enormous impact. Notably, all resources *'came only from the government budget, with no contribution from the private sector or civil society'* (Interview Go7).

Table 8: Number of village and urban revolving funds as of June 2004

Categories	Target	Achievement	Percentage of target
Village areas	71,495	71,478	99.96
Urban areas	4,006	3,429	84.87
- <i>Municipalities</i>	2,564	2,507	97.62
- <i>Bangkok</i>	1,442	922	62.63
Total	75,501	74,907	99.15

Source: VURFO (2004)

Even though the government claimed that the fund aimed to foster community strength and enhance the capacity to be self-reliant, in reality, it seemed to have had a negative impact on the community empowerment movement. It seemed that this policy did not genuinely strengthen community power but rather made communities more dependent on state provision and support. It deepened the role

of the state as a 'grand patron' over the people and founded a new structure of control over society.

The government did not start VURF by gradually disbursing monies first to villages that had the capacity and experience to manage funds or micro credit before, which would ascertain that they were able to manage monies effectively. Instead, the same amount of one million baht was distributed to each village equally, irrespective of size, need, and ability of the community to manage the fund. One academic commented insightfully that the government should '*have tried to pilot the scheme to see how it worked first, but the pledge was implemented across the board regardless of the capability of the community in order to win electoral popularity*' (Interview Ac2). This kind of approach also had the potential to jeopardise the community empowering process as reflected in the experiences of some senior NGO leaders:

A large sum of money given to the villages potentially tore the community apart and raised conflicts during the loan allocation process when not all members of the village received money... I have learned some families now do not talk to one another because one family got funding while another failed to do so. They used to be good neighbours to one another. (Interview Ac4)

It commonly takes five years for a typical village credit fund to accumulate assets of one million baht with the members learning through the process. They learn to work together, to help each other, to change their lifestyles, and to save money for the benefit of the community. But this practice of easy handouts by the government has jeopardised the community's financial self-discipline and therefore weakened community self-reliance. Villagers feel it is easier to wait for funding from the government than trying to build it themselves. (Interview Ng2)

Although VURF was grounded on SIF's basic principle in the sense that the fund was managed by a village committee set up by members of that village rather than imposed by any government agency, there were some key differences. At the policy level, the fund was managed by the VURF Board, the majority of whose members were the executives from government departments and agencies. At least 15 of VURF's 26 Board members and 21 out of 31 members of its Operation

Support Subcommittee were government officials (VURFO, 2001). This was just initial evidence showing that the fund management was dominated by state actors with little involvement from non-state actors. This also showed that it was used to instil some degree of hierarchical control from the centre.

At the operational level, the community had a certain level of freedom in managing the fund, including the freedom to select village committee members, the freedom to determine the rate of loan interest, the freedom to allocate funds to each borrower, the freedom to monitor and investigating repayment, and the freedom to utilise benefits gained from the interest and repayment. However, such freedom still needed to *'operate under a broad framework and guidance defined by the VURF Board,'* confirmed by a VURF senior manager (Interview Go7). The VURF Ordinance defined strict and specific 'rules of the game' that each village committee needed to follow (VURFO, 2001). It outlined the procedures by which village committee members were selected and the composition of the committee, accounting and reporting system that would be monitored by the VURF Office, the period and procedure of loan repayment that each village must be complied with, and fund disbursement procedures that villages were to use. This meant the state exercised an extensive degree of hierarchical control over the operation of each village committee.

Another key difference was based on the fact that VURF was a loan (revolving fund), not a grant like SIF. The fund needed to be repaid within a year by those who had borrowed it. The government came to monitor the repayment record strictly and used it as a key indicator of success while paying less attention to the process whereby the fund was allocated and used, or the results achieved. Such a monitoring system created a long-term financial commitment by the people to the state, which was the 'true creditor' of the money.

Furthermore, the VURF Office had set up sub-committees at the provincial and district level to regulate and supervise the operation of village funds to ensure that they were all working consistent with the Ordinance. Notably, a provincial

committee consisted of 25 members, with at least 15 of those members coming from government departments and agencies, while only 5 were from NGOs operating in that province (VURFO, 2001). These 5 non-governmental members were mandatory but selected and appointed as appropriate by the provincial governor. Under the rhetoric of empowering the poor and community, as one respondent commented, the state *'seemed to have shifted its role from operator to regulator and given communities more room to work on their own initiative, but in reality, it still exercised a certain degree of control and regulation over society under this scheme'* (Interview Ng3).

Now we turn to consider the role of the pro-community alliance in this policy. Poldej was invited to help manage VURF because one senior executive of VURF was his university friend. Prawase and Paiboon were also involved as advisors after the establishment of VURF. In fact, the alliance intentionally aimed at using VURF as a key instrument to serve its purpose in reaching all communities across the country. One LDI officer disclosed this hidden agenda:

We wanted to use VURF as another platform to propel our agenda because the scheme aimed to reach all villages across Thailand. This was a great opportunity for us to disseminate our agenda and promote local development by using the government's functionaries and resources as we did with SIF and in the Eighth Plan. (Interview Ng8)

The alliance attempted to integrate the notion dubbed *pracharat* (see Chapter 5) into VURF and implement it by establishing a unit under VURF's office entitled *Pracharat* Network Coordination Unit (PNCU). Poldej was appointed as its first director. At the unit's inauguration, a workshop was held to raise the banner of the civil-state partnership approach of governance consisting of four parties: politicians, bureaucrats, community representatives, and civil society people (PNCU, 2001). The premier's speech given in that workshop reflected this theme of partnership:

This government aims to reduce the expenses of the poor and to give them more opportunity in life to access funding and knowledge, so they can think together and work to build their communities... in doing so, I

urge all four parties to work together and to support one another... the government will retreat and let the people at the front work. We would only want to be a supporter, not the chief anymore... (PNCU, 2001: 10-14).

As the government seemed to accept his proposal, Poldej deployed a similar establishment at a lower level of governing arrangement by setting up the *Prachakom* Coordination Hub at the provincial level and linked his LDI network with these Hubs. The Hubs were actually created with the intention that *'non-governmental people would have a social space exchange dialogue with government officials at the local level. They could voice their concerns and if possible influence the development direction of their community'* (Interview Ng9). Poldej channelled VURF's budget to support the work of this Hub in each province (Interview Ng8). In other words, he was able to siphon financial resources from VURF to support LDI work at the provincial level. Although such a structure was laid down at the local level in many provinces across the country, the extent to which a 'true' partnership has been practised is yet to be systematically assessed. One academic who served on the Board of the NESDB and worked extensively with NGO commented that:

In my experience, I think civil-state partnership is just lip-service from the government. Some officials might understand and be open to this idea, but most of the rest, the majority, particularly in rural areas, had not understood... even some members of national boards on which I served still think that participation from the bottom is unnecessary. If we had a good government, we should let it do what it saw as appropriate... they still view the state as 'daddy knows best'. (Interview Ac2)

However, Poldej's work did not last long, and he withdrew from this position after two years of service. The government appointed a new director, who was *'working closely with Poldej when he directed the unit'* (Interview Ng8) to take over the leadership. He was believed to be a person from the TRT who was commissioned to turn PNCU to serve the political purposes of the party. One LDI who used to work with this person commented:

I believe the TRT wanted to build up its network based on many village funds across the country, so he came to develop and extend the network of those people who were involved and who supported the VURF scheme, something which could be used for political campaigns and electoral mobilisation. It was easy for him to build on what Poldej had done before. (Interview Ng8)

Interestingly, this comment is aligned with the direction that VURF recently announced. Networking among village funds within a sub-district recently began to become a key approach promoted by the VURFO. In 2003, the Handbook of Sub-district Level Networking for the Village and Urban Revolving Fund was launched, and the approach was claimed to be a key strategy to sustain VURF in the long-run (VURFO, 2003). A VURF manager explained:

Networking should benefit members of each village fund since they can exchange experience and knowledge, share resources, learn about good practices from other communities, and cooperate to initiate joint community enterprises. The joining-up of financial resources across villages in the same sub-district is aimed at initiating community financial institutions such as credit unions or community banking systems. This was intended to lay down a foundation to sustain community funds in the long-run. (Interview Go7)

The VURFO aimed at establishing 8,550 networks during the 2005 fiscal year and provided seed funding of 113 million baht to support networking activities (VURFO, 2004a). This direction could be considered a new strategy whereby the state initiated state-centred networks via VURF to extend and deepen its patron-client relationship with communities. Up to this point, we might conclude that the partnership structure adopted by the state and societal actors was based on different motivations. Societal actors wanted a structure to give them an opportunity to influence policy and channel some government resources to serve their agenda. But from the government's perspective, one senior LDI officer admitted:

We later found out that the TRT government wanted to co-opt key civil society figureheads and their local networks to VURF. The government wanted to reach communities but had no knowledge or networks to implement such types of cross-country local development schemes. Co-

opting the established NGO network would be a short-cut to acquiring such knowledge and networks. (Interview Ng9)

With such dissimilar motives, how effective this structure was in building partnership should be questioned. The next section considers the Poverty Registration Scheme and examines if different or similar interactions are to be found.

5. Remaking state-society partnership, reinstating state-directed governance

NCPE was established in November 2003 as a national policy agency to ‘oversee and manage the process of solving problems related to poverty’ and to ‘focus on the problems and registered poor identified in the Poverty Registration Scheme during its first four years’ (NCPE, 2004: 5). This meant now that ‘*all business about poverty eradication had been moved from the NESDB to NCPE*’ (Interview Go8). The centre was directed by the Deputy Prime Minister and administrated under the Prime Minister’s Office. NCPE aimed to promote cross-agency and cross-sector collaboration to tackle the poverty problem. A key management officer of the NCPE expressed a view of the collaboration:

The concept of joined-up initiative was adopted here. Yes, it is a form of partnership. It was not only a joining of various related governmental agencies but also a joining of the public, private and civil society sectors. (Interview Go2)

In fact, societal actors were involved in the Scheme since the beginning stage of NCPE’s formation and played an important role in its initiation. It began when Prawase, Paiboon, and Poldej held a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Office of the Narcotics Control Commission (ONCC) to find ways to sustain the success of the government’s anti-drug campaign. A senior executive of CODI recalled:

We think if people remained poor, the drug problem would never be eliminated. Building upon a successful collaboration between LDI and ONCC during the anti-drug campaign one year back, Poldej proposed that the same approach should be applied to the anti-poverty scheme. They accepted it and agreed to apply the same implementing structure used by the anti-drug campaign to the Poverty Registration Scheme. CODI joined because Paiboon was the Chair of CODI at that time. (Interview Ng6)

The result of the discussion was the formation of NCPE with a joint secretariat of five core agencies – the NESDB, ONCC, CODI, Office of the Permanent Secretary, and Department of Provincial Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. Several subcommittees were set up, and one of them was the Subcommittee of the Community Plan for Poverty Alleviation, which was managed by the alliance (see below). It seemed that the alliance had room to move again under the NCPE, particularly to propel the community empowerment agenda. It seemed that a partnership initiative between the state and society was established under this new rubric. Even NCPE's top executive claimed that *'this is the first time that public, private, and civil society sectors have worked together in unity, full collaboration, and equal status'* (Interview Go1). But this research found this expectation to be too optimistic.

The organisational arrangement of NCPE showed that the constituent members were skewed in favour of participants from government agencies. The core executive committee of NCPE consisted of ministers and permanent secretaries from a number of ministries and government agencies, with representatives from selected business and civil society organisations (see Appendix 4). The main responsibilities of this executive committee were to formulate policies, strategies, and measures for poverty alleviation, as well as to monitor and evaluate government policies on issues related to poverty reduction (NCPE, 2004). So the committee was the highest level policy-making body of the NCPE. However, members from government agencies outnumbered those from non-state sectors. Out of 54 members, only 5 were from business and 7 from civil society; the rest were from government agencies. When I asked how these non-state members were selected, one senior NCPE staff member responded:

We selected organisations that were accepted by the public and government agencies. These people had worked or had been working with various government agencies for several years. We worked with LDI in the anti-drug campaign. CODI was well-known as was its Chair [Paiboon]... we knew they could work well with us. We wanted to encourage sustained collaboration based on settled relationships.
(Interview Go2)

This meant non-state members in NCPE were hand-picked by the government based on past connections rather than other explicit criteria such as their capacity to reach communities. This thus *'automatically excluded many other NGOs that had not yet worked with these five core secretarial agencies but had been working extensively with communities across the country'* (Interview Ng2). Participation of non-state sector members was far from genuinely open participation. A similar criticism could be made of the constituents of key subcommittees under NCPE. Eleven subcommittees were established to take charge of various issues related to the seven problems defined in the Scheme (Table 9). Amongst these eleven subcommittees, four of them had no member from the non-state sector but were all government officials, and the other four had government officials accounting for eighty percent of the members. Even in the Community Plan Subcommittee, a majority of whose members should have come from the civil society sector or community leaders so it could support and cooperate well with the community, government officials were double the number of members from civil society.

Based on observations made in several meetings of NCPE's executive committee and subcommittees I attended, representatives from private business began to reduce their participation shortly after the first few months. The situation turned out to be that only representatives from government and civil society still participated in NCPE. This even weakened the proportion of non-state actors in committees. In many meetings, representatives from government agencies dominated the discussion as they constituted the majority of the members and left very little room for civil society participants to express their concerns. The minutes of several meetings indicate that issues concerning the work of civil

society were only occasionally addressed. One NCPE officer explained the reason to me:

...for civil society people, we gave them full freedom to work in the Community Plan Subcommittee. It was more related to their interest than to other work. That was why you did not see their issues raised frequently... (Interview Go3)

I now turn to consider this subcommittee. The Community Plan Subcommittee was the only subcommittee chaired and run by societal actors, in particular the pro-community alliance. Prawase was the Chair, Paiboon was the Vice-chair, and Poldej was the Secretary of the subcommittee. At first, this subcommittee seemed to maintain some degree of freedom in pursuing the community empowerment agenda via the promotion of community plans as a novel instrument. The committee organised several open workshops and forums to mobilise public support for their agenda within the framework of NCPE and finally drafted the subcommittee's plan for the years 2004-2006 budget approval from NCPE. The result was this:

The plan was not approved, but the budget and our agenda was transferred to be under the management of another newly established committee, the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee (CSCS), without any notice or consultation with Prawase or Poldej. We have never been informed of the reason! (Interview Ng9)

The establishment of CSCS was 'an attempt from CODI to find policy 'space' for civil society to voice and influence the implementation process of the Poverty Registration Scheme' (Interview Ng5). Paiboon was officially appointed to chair this subcommittee but he assigned one of CODI's Deputy Directors to oversee the subcommittee's daily operations. The disapproval and transfer of the budget was interpreted as 'an attempt to break us [the alliance] up by creating conflict between LDI and CODI' (Interview Ng9). Someone hinted that the government used the new PNCU director of VURF to instrumentally intervene and break up the alliance. This new director was involved in both subcommittees. He was believed to be a person who operated 'behind the scenes' to turn down the plan and budget of the Community Plan Subcommittee and negotiate for the budget to

be transferred to support CSCS, which *'he has been closely working with'* (Interview Ng9). Now the work of CSCS was *'under close surveillance of the government though this person'* (Interview Ng9). As a result, the work of the Community Plan Subcommittee was on hold while Prawase and Poldej decided to refuse their involvement in NCPE. One of their officers expressed their feelings:

...the government was not sincere about working with this subcommittee. It seemed that the government still wanted to manage everything and retain its control over our operations. This could be viewed as state-guided partnership instead of true partnership... now we realised that the state had manipulated all things. We were invited to join just for their credibility, to make it look as if they were working with other partners apart from government agencies... When we became stronger and could threaten their work, then we would be cut off. (Interview Ng9)

This message reflected a similar concern expressed by one academic who participated in NCPE from the beginning:

Government was so smart to work with some senior NGO figures to give the impression that it was working with the grassroots. When such NGOs began to do something beyond the scope that government wanted, or were capable of challenging or counterbalancing its power, the government would try to rule them out. This was the meaning of partnership for the government. (Interview Ac1)

This seemed to be in contrast to an objective defined in the NCPE policy paper which was to *'seek cooperation from the private, non-governmental and civil society sectors in participating and supporting the work of poverty alleviation'* (NCPE, 2004: 7). Government agencies still remained the key executors of the Scheme while the non-state actors were left only to *'participate, support, or cooperate with the government as requested or allowed to'* (Interview Ac1). It was not only at the subcommittee level that non-state actors appeared to have very little room to act; similar conditions seemed to apply with the implementation of this Scheme.

The operations of the eleven subcommittees were also dependent on NCPE's executive arms at the provincial and district level. NCPE provincial and district

centres were established by using the provincial and district offices under the management of the Ministry of Interior. These provincial and district centres coordinated vertically and horizontally with related agencies. Vertical coordination worked along hierarchical lines of command from central ministries to provincial and down to district ministerial offices. Horizontal coordination meant coordinating different but related government and non-governmental agencies at the provincial and district level. CSCS was responsible for identifying civil society representatives to be involved in both NCPE provincial and district centres in each province and district. The implementation structure is illustrated in Figure 4. This multi-level partnership was statutorily instituted by the Prime Minister's Directive (NCPE, 2004). It was clarified by a senior NCPE officer:

The emphasis here was on new forms of coordination at different tiers of governance – national, provincial and local authorities – linked to cross-cutting organisational structures and the participation of NGOs based on mutual goals and trust. This aimed to promote flexible forms of collaboration and more synergy. (Interview Go2)

However, one interesting point to address here is that the constituent of NCPE provincial and district centres reflected a similar structure to that of the NCPE executive committee, most of whose members were from provincial and district government agencies (NCPE, 2004: 17-21). Participation of representatives from civil society or community leaders was *'subject to the discretion of each Provincial Governor and Chief District Officer; they would be invited to join only if needed'* (Interview Go4). Such multi-level statutory partnerships were still impeded by bureaucratic hierarchical structures and the power struggle between state and non-governmental actors remained.

To find out how the Scheme really operated in practice, a visit was made to one District Office, which was recommended by one NCPE manager as the most successful case of implementing the Scheme at the district level. Although what happened in this district could not be generalised to others, it reflected what was happening on the ground when the Scheme was implemented. I found that the involvement of non-state actors such as banks, colleges, local business, and

community leaders in this district centre was neither the result of horizontal coordinating structure as the central ministry had indicated nor the work of CSCS. The Chief District Officer told me that he *'had not ever heard or been informed about the work of CSCS or ever been contacted from this subcommittee before'* (Interview Go5). Instead, the success of its implementation was due to his leadership and personal good relationships with local businesses in the district, which helped smooth the coordination among various governmental agencies and the participation of businesses in the district. I also found that community leaders and representatives did not have much of a role in the process of implementation, which could be due to the nature of the problems and hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy, as the Chief District Officer commented,

The [top three] problems were too big and more complicated than the ability of the community to be involved and somewhat unrelated to the community⁷ ...I needed to get it done quickly, this is what the ministry wanted. Why should I consult the community if I already knew what I had to do and I could already connect to all concerned parties to solve the problems? (Interview Go5)

This quotation highlights a possible tension between the statutory partnership and the more directive, hierarchical forms of governance. It also suggests tensions within the government's agenda. Although the government might have had ambitions towards governance systems based on partnerships and collaboration, they were more likely to develop at the top policy-decision level in the centre. At the operational level in the province or district, there was a political imperative to achieve 'quick delivery' results and to do so government officials turned to more familiar recipes to exert greater leverage by using hierarchical mechanisms of the bureaucratic machinery. This case shows that, at the operational level, government agencies became the leading agents in the implementation of the Scheme while the involvement of civil society was very limited. The partnership failed to be established in practice.

⁷ He gave an example: the related stakeholders in solving the indebtedness problem that are classified as government agencies would include the police, revenue officers, and government banks because they were related to the debt restructuring process.

6. Conclusion

After the new government came to power in 2001, the landscape of state-society relations in anti-poverty policy governance changed considerably. The research found that the state began to recover its powerful position in policy-making through controlling the agenda and resources, realigning the network or partnership mode of governing to support its interest, and later attempting to exercise its power to dominate and penetrate society to some extent.

The research found that the pro-community alliance was still the only group of non-state actors that can access the anti-poverty policy arena. Their involvement was again at the discretion of the state as it gave preference to this group and excluded other interest groups. It seems that anti-poverty policy-making was never opened up to many organised groups competing to influence the agenda. This policy area seems to remain under the state's domination, either by the government or the bureaucracy (the NESDB). Only if the state allowed it could other interests then become involved.

The motivation of societal actors (the alliance) to involve in the policy-making process remained similar to the pre-2001 period, which was to shape the policy agenda and use the state's resources to propel their interest. However, this time the interest was focused not on the bureaucracy but on the government. The TRT government had internalised the poverty alleviation and community empowerment agenda advocated by societal actors into its anti-poverty policy platform. But the motive for accepting the agenda was different from the previous period. As has been examined in this chapter, the motivation was to bring the state back into a powerful position in policy-making process and, at a later stage, to undermine the role and influence of civil society in the policy process.

The state came to hold a central and largely autonomous position (from other influences) in policy agenda selection although some inputs were provided by some societal actors. The decision to select any policy to implement was

principally in the government's hands. It seemed that societal actors had little bargaining power over decisions on framing the agenda. The policy problem was reinterpreted and redefined in a way to serve political purposes, and this allowed the state to exercise some degree of control and manipulation over society. The state was able to set the 'rules of the game' using its power to define poverty and redefine the poor, thereby setting the agenda for the rest of society to follow.

Another reason the state was able to recuperate its power was that the state regained control over all resources in policy execution. Funding to communities was channelled by VURF, which was under the full control of the government, unlike the SIF where NGO people dominated its management. Execution of the Poverty Registration Scheme was mainly carried out by government officials and government budget. As the government disbursed money and programmes downward directly into villages through VURF, and as the problems of the poor and grassroots were undertaken individually by the Scheme, these moves undermined the role of NGOs that served as intermediaries between the state and the rural people. Government believed that it had more to offer in bridging the gap between the state and society. The Prime Minister once said:

NGOs are social groups that help bridge the gap between the government and the people. If such a gap were to no longer exist, the role of NGOs would be automatically diminished and foreign donors would not need to fund them any more. (The Nation, 10 May, 2003)

Although the state and societal actors both acclaimed state-society partnership as a governing mode in anti-poverty policy, the nature of policy governing turned out to be a process of state-led governance. The participants had different motives for engaging in the partnership. Societal actors attempted to use their version of the partnership structure to institutionalise a platform to influence policy and siphon resources to support their work. The government craftily employed the partnership strategy to co-opt societal actors and build on their network and knowledge to incorporate the grassroots into a newly formed state-centred network. The partnership approach as a mode of governance was used to complement the hierarchically based mode. Further, some difficulties in the

positioning of local partnerships within central government policy agendas were observed during field visits. Problems were created by the attempt to impose policy from above for quick solutions as opposed to encouraging diversity and allowing horizontal relationships to develop in the partnerships.


The changes signalled a new era of state-led governance in social policy-making. The next chapter considers if a similar orientation could be observed in the relationship between the Thai state and globalised forces in anti-poverty policy-making after the crisis began and once the new government came to power in 2001.

Table 9: Summary of subcommittees under the NCPE

Subcommittee for	Chairperson	Secretarial agency	Constituency of members
Employment promotion	Deputy Prime Minister	Ministry of Labour	All (26) were from governmental agencies
Natural resources allocation	Deputy Prime Minister	Prime Minister's Office	All (19) were from governmental agencies
Debt restructuring	Deputy Prime Minister	Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance	17 from governmental agencies, 1 from the private sector, 1 from LDI
Studies on the structure of the economy, education, laws, and ordinances	Deputy Prime Minister	Office of the Council of State	18 from governmental agencies, 2 from the private sector
Community plan	Dr Prawase Wasi	Local Development Institute	15 from governmental agencies, 6 from civil society
Housing	Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	National Housing Authority	11 were from governmental agencies, 1 from the private sector, 2 from civil society
Plan and budget	Secretary General of NCPE	Bureau of Budget and CODI	18 from governmental agencies, 2 from civil society
Agricultural lands allocation	Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Agricultural Land Reform Office	All (15) were from governmental agencies
Water resources allocation	Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	Department of Water Resources, Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment	All (19) were from governmental agencies
Civil society coordination and support centre	Chair person of CODI	Community Organisations Development Institute	17 were from civil society, 1 from a governmental agency
Academic affairs	Academic	Thailand Research Fund and National Human Rights Commission	12 were from civil society, 2 from a governmental agency

Source: Information as of December 2004, collated by author.

Figure 4: Coordinating mechanism of NCPE at different levels



Chapter 7

State and Globalised Forces

1. Introduction

One area of debate that this research examines is the nexus between globalisation and domestic governance in the policy-making process (see Chapter 2). This research is particularly concerned with the interaction between globalised forces and domestic institutions in the governing process. This chapter investigates the role that international policy actors play in domestic policy-making and evaluates the extent to which they might shape national policies. It also considers whether the Thai state has lost its autonomy over domestic policy-making due to the pressure of external global forces or if it still has the capacity to negotiate its place under the new conditions of governance. This chapter therefore investigates the dynamic relationship between international organisations and the Thai state by focusing on the anti-poverty policy process after the 1997 financial crisis.

The first section introduces the involvement of international policy actors in anti-poverty policy initiatives since the crisis. The subsequent sections focus on the World Bank as an illustrative and specific example of how the interaction between the Thai state and international policy players evolved. It outlines the initial involvement of the Bank in alleviating the impact of crisis upon the poor and the Bank's reorientation to focus on a community empowerment approach. The following section considers how the Bank changed its engagement in Thailand by proclaiming a partnership approach and the subsequent response of the Thai state. Next, it examines one recent case of a partnership programme for poverty analysis and monitoring. The final section concludes with some discussions about these developments.

2. Involvement of international agencies after the crisis

Although there are numerous international governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in poverty alleviation activities in Thailand, by confining this research to anti-poverty policies formulated by the NESDB and those adopted by governments after the crisis, this research finds that international non-governmental agencies have not played a significant role in national policy-making. As one NESDB official commented, *'International agencies were actively involved in the anti-poverty policy after the crisis, but most of them were international governmental organisations while the role of international NGOs became very limited at the policy level'* (Interview Go9). One academic who worked with some international NGOs observed: *'I think, not many international NGOs would position themselves strongly with the anti-poverty agenda because this agenda is rather broad and too vague somewhat... I think they would focus on issues such as childcare, HIV/AIDS, or human rights, those issues which present obvious target beneficiaries and are easy for fundraising'* (Interview Ac2). This assertion became quite clear when I interviewed several senior government officials and officers of the World Bank and UN. All of them confirmed that the international NGOs did not take a central part in the policy-making process. The reason could be that *'their resources, particularly finance, are so limited compared with international governmental agencies, so they have less power in advocacy'* (Interview Go3). This research therefore focuses on international governmental agencies in order to better understand the role of globalised forces in the poverty alleviation policy process.

In Thailand, international governmental organisations consist of the UN agencies¹, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). However, the involvement of UN agencies in Thailand's national anti-poverty policy-making declined after the crisis began to subside, whereas the ADB and IOM did not

appear to have any significant influence from the beginning. The World Bank remains an active and influential player in the development of national anti-poverty policies. A senior official from the Poverty Reduction Policy Unit of the NESDB expressed his view:

International agencies turned their emphasis to poverty reduction promptly when the crisis hit Thailand. For instance, the World Bank implemented the Social Investment Project (SIP) and later worked closely with us to develop CDP-PAM. ADB offered help, but nothing has achieved any considerable progress. For UN agencies... as I remembered, they took an active part at the beginning of the crisis, but their involvement has become minimal over the past few years. They are not having much influence over us in the development of the national anti-poverty policy. (Interview Go8)

His observation about the engagement and decline of the UN's role in anti-poverty policy-making was reaffirmed by views of UN senior officials as noted here:

At the onset of the crisis, all UN agencies undertook several short-term measures in response to the crisis. A number of studies and discussion sessions/meetings were conducted by several UN agencies such as the ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO, which provided analyses and technical inputs for the government. Apart from this, I think most UN agencies allocated their budget to support projects that responded to the crisis. The UNDP worked with the World Bank in the SIP. But since our funding was so minimal, we could contribute only our support to some project management aspects...well, in recent years, we were under budget constraints, so the funding to support Thailand had been reduced so much. We even had to lay off some staff... (Interview Io4)

...The Thailand-UNCAP launched in 1997 was another vehicle through which UN agencies provided collective response to the crisis. The Poverty Strategies Initiatives was created under the Thailand-UNCAP in collaboration with the FAO, ILO, UNDP, and NESDB to provide intermediate and long-term measures to alleviate impacts of the crisis. But this has slowed down and declined... (Interview Io5)

The decline of UN involvement in anti-poverty policy was due to several reasons, as reflected in the views of former and current senior UN officers:

¹ The UN system in Thailand is large and complex. It consists of over 28 specialised UN agencies or affiliated projects and organisations of which the majority have an Asia-Pacific regional or sub-regional focus and are based in Bangkok (UNCT, 2005).

There was a change in the Resident Representative [RR] of UNDP, who was also the Resident Coordinator of the UN system in Thailand. The new RR was interested in governance reform, not poverty... So for the UNDP, the poverty reduction focus was toned down... Another thing, the UNDP was in a situation of identity crisis at the global level. We specialised in fund management, but when the fund began to be reduced, this role became less significant... We did not have any specific agenda like other UN agencies such as the UNICEF had for children, the UNIFEM had for women, or the ILO had for labour. At one point, we thought we should focus on people-centred development, but later the World Bank moved to this area with a large chunk of funding backing it up. We finally found our way with a focus on MDGs. Poverty reduction was just one of the goals. So now we no longer focus on poverty but on MDGs. (Interview 103)

...All in all, the Thai government managed to recover from the crisis on its own. Further, Thailand developed into a middle-income country status. The government desired to become a donor country assisting the poorer countries within and outside our region through its 'Forward Engagement' foreign policy, so Thailand is consolidating her position as an emerging donor... Thailand is no longer a poor country from the view of UN agencies. The relationship between Thailand and the UN must change from that of donor-receiver to partners in development. So now we cannot work on the poverty agenda directly as in the past because Thailand now can stand on her own without any help from the UN. Thus, we must now find other approaches to working with the government. (Interview 104)

These two interviews reflect the evolving relationship between Thailand and international agencies. While the involvement of UN agencies in the national anti-poverty policy with the NESDB has faded and the UN country programme for Thailand has become more financially modest (UNCT, 2002), the World Bank has remained actively engaged via the NESDB. The rest of this chapter will focus on the relationship between the Bank and the Thai state since the 1997 crisis. In order to trace the dynamic interaction between these two agents, it investigates how the Bank responded to the crisis, how it worked with the Thai government, which policies it employed, why it took such action, and how the Thai state acted in response.

3. Initial engagement: Promoting community governance

During the early stages of the 1997 crisis, the IMF became the most influential international organisation in shaping Thailand's policy agenda. With foreign reserves exhausted by mid-1997, the Thai government inevitably had to call for help from the IMF. This situation allowed the IMF to take control of Thailand's economic policy-making through its negotiation of Thailand's Letters of Intent. The policy package consisted of a macro plan adapted from the IMF's long record of bailouts in Latin America². However, the underlying causes of the financial crises in Latin America were very different from those in Thailand which meant that, ultimately, the IMF plan for Thailand did not work. There were extensive social consequences³ as a result of this IMF package.

Although the IMF took over an economic policy legacy laid down by the World Bank, the Bank was initially involved in the recovery process by promoting liberalisation and regulatory reform in Thailand's financial restructuring. The Bank's immediate policies and programmes after the crisis were driven by its economic liberal orthodoxy of pressing the Thai government to continue and extend its liberalisation process (Robinson *et al.*, 2002). However, as the crisis deepened, there were rapidly increasing fears about the emergence of social conflict resulting from the negative impact of reform measures as were happening in Indonesia. Accordingly, the Bank recognised that it should assist the Thai government in alleviating negative social impacts of the crisis (Nabi and Shivakumar, 2001). The IMF then took a lead role in setting the reform agenda through the negotiation of Letters of Intent, whereas the Bank attended more to social impacts. As such, the Bank began to emphasise the idea of social safety

² They were to raise taxes (value added tax from 7 to 10 percent); to cut government spending by 20 percent; to implement tight monetary policy and high interest rates; to increase access for foreign investors, starting with banking sector; to privatise key sectors, including energy, transportation, utilities, and communications; to promote legal reforms on bankruptcy and foreclosure; and to enhance transparency in many ways.

³ Discussions of the effects of the IMF's packages have been discussed elsewhere such as in Hewison (2005) and Robinson *et al.* (2002). For a full account of the aftermath of the policy package adopted by the Thai government during the period, see Pasuk and Baker (2000) in Chapter 3 and Pasuk and Baker (2002) in Chapter 5.

nets for those who had been disadvantaged by liberalised markets, especially the poor (Hewison, 2002).

In 1998, the Bank developed a social safety net programme entitled the Social Investment Project (SIP) to help reduce the social consequences caused by the crisis and also to support the reform agenda of decentralisation and community-based development initiated by Thailand-UNCAP (World Bank, 1998). The Bank and other donor agencies⁴ supported the project, estimated at a total cost of US\$418.49 million, but the Bank was the main contributor. The project's first priority was to 'respond to the social impacts of the crisis through the rapid generation of employment opportunities and the provision of essential social services to the unemployed and the poor.' The second priority aimed to 'support bottom-up service delivery through financing locally-identified and managed development initiatives... promoting decentralisation, local capacity building, and community development' (World Bank, 1998: 3). These priorities could be seen to reflect the Bank's important reorientation towards supporting local communities as a means of helping the poor in Thailand after several decades of macro economic growth focus.

To achieve its dual objectives, SIP scheme had two channels of implementation (World Bank, 1998). The first channel was social investment through various ministerial programmes to support existing short-term government programmes over a period of approximately 28 months⁵. This component aimed at providing jobs and basic social services to the unemployed and poor through short-term

⁴ Other donors are the United Nations Development Programme, the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund of Japan, and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid).

⁵ The Channel 1 component constituting US\$ 244.35 million included: (a) the development of a public assistance low income Health Card Scheme and a community-based AIDS programme by the Ministry of Public Health; (b) small-weirs construction and village road construction by the Ministry of Interior; (c) a programme for rural industrial development by the Ministry of Industry; (d) a small scale infrastructure programme, a occupational and vocational training programme, and a school renovation programme by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration; (e) a training/interpretation programme, a tourism sites employment programme and a park and recreational sites improvement programme by the Tourism Authority of Thailand; (f) the rehabilitation of small-scale labour-intensive irrigation schemes by the Royal Irrigation Department of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives; and (g) several job training programmes by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

interventions. It utilised existing government capacities to deliver activities to the target population over a short timeframe. The second channel, allocated US\$174.14 million, was a long-term component. It was geared towards social investment through community development funds, which provided grant and loan financing for locally generated projects through the Regional Urban Development Fund (RUDF) and Social Investment Fund (SIF). This second channel presented a preliminary step towards the promotion of community governance in which financial resources were channelled to support community-based projects directly rather than channelling the financial resources through the bureaucracy as usual. It was expected that the Fund would encourage communities to initiate and implement their own projects with support funded by SIF. A total of US\$132.57 million was allocated to SIF. Details of SIF were discussed in Chapter 5, but it is important to note here that the Bank's reorientation towards a community-based focus was not initiated by the Bank alone but rather by its negotiation with domestic social forces. NGOs that pursued community empowerment initiatives used this opportunity to channel resources towards their agendas. A SIF manager, who was a senior NGO person reflected:

At first, the Bank wanted to channel the whole lot of funds through government agencies. But we, some of the senior NGOs and academics, approached the Bank and 'sold' our idea of using this opportunity to strengthen the poor and local communities. We were afraid that the funds would not fully reach the poor due to corruption in the bureaucratic system, so we convinced the Bank to try a new approach... It was hard... the Bank seemed reluctant to try it... so it involved several discussions, but finally the Bank accepted our proposal... But in the process of implementation, it was difficult to make the Bank fully accept our approach. The Bank still intervened and very often exercised strict control over the disbursement procedures. We needed about a year of negotiation and discussion to adjust our process and make the Bank understand our way. (Interview Ng1)

His reflection supports an observation that the Bank attempted to retain some control over the Fund, even though the major institutional and implementation arrangements of SIP, claimed by the Bank, were handed over to the Thai government. Executing agencies for the Channel 1 programme were government ministries or government agencies, while the GSB was an executing agency for

the Channel 2 programme. The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was set up to carry out day-to-day coordination with the Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in each implementing agency. PCU also had to oversee the overall Project's finance, accounting, and procurement. PCU was attached to the Ministry of Finance. The PCU prepared monitoring reports on project implementation for the Project Director, who in turn reported to the Policy Steering Committee (PSC) and the Bank. The PSC set policies, approved any major changes in Project's objectives or components, and oversaw the Project's implementation process.

However, when looking at these arrangements in detail, the Bank's intervention was still considerable in many ways (World Bank, 1998). First, the composition and staffing of the PSC, PCU, and PIUs was subject to the Bank's approval. Second, the roles, responsibilities, and skills of the Project Director, PIU Directors, and SIF and RUDF Assistant Executive Directors were specified by the Bank. Candidates selected for such positions were subject to the Bank's approval. Further, no modification was made to their roles and responsibilities without the Bank's approval. Third, loan payments were separated into several instalments and were approved by the Bank if certain conditions and progress were satisfactorily achieved at each stage of the Project. The Bank and Thai government agreed to specific significant activities and progress, and the Thai government was bonded to achieve them. Even the Bank itself claimed later that, after the Project started, its supervision was 'continuous and intensive' (World Bank, 2005: 15). Supervision missions that included staff with social fund experience were conducted regularly. The Bank's field-based staff provided day-to-day procurement and financial management support to the PCU and PIUs.

Therefore, the 1997 crisis gave an opportunity for the Bank to move forward into new national policy areas which would not have been politically feasible during the boom years. Although the Bank's engagement in domestic policy-making increased sharply during the crisis, especially through the SIP that 'came after a decade of very minimal Bank engagement in Thailand' (World Bank, 2005: 3), the relationship between the Bank and Thailand began to readjust after the crisis.

4. Realigning towards a partnership mode of governance

In 1998, the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) assessed the assistance given to Thailand up to the 1997 crisis and reported its findings in *Thailand—Country Assistance Evaluation* (OED, 2000). The report was presented to the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) as background information for the new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)⁶ for 1999. The Bank's view was that, after the economy had recovered from the second oil shock in early 1980s and private capital started pouring into the country, the Thai authorities 'felt that they could do without the Bank's policy advice' (OED, 2000: 19). The Bank went on to argue that between 1994 and 1996, the share of private creditors rose to 88 percent while that of the Bank fell to 1.2 percent. In addition, the overall share of the Bank's budget allocated to Thailand was low. For the 1997 fiscal year, it amounted to US\$3 million against a norm of US\$5.6 million. The report emphasised that during the pre-crisis period, the Bank 'had no policy leverage from its lending' (OED 2000: 16). The Bank asserted that Thailand had developed from a low-income to a middle-income country and that over time it had reduced its reliance on the Bank's assistance. This situation meant that its mode of engagement with Thailand needed to be changed as was echoed in a comment from a Bank officer in Thailand:

Although the Bank's role increased sharply during the crisis, it did not mean our engagement would last for long. We thought that if the Bank wanted to maintain its involvement in Thailand, it needed to reconsider its relationship with Thailand... an important reason the Bank still wants to retain influence in Thailand is the Bangkok Country Office is a regional hub supporting the Bank's programmes in the Greater Mekong Sub-region⁷ ... (Interview Iol)

⁶ The Bank prepares its CAS to delineate selective programmes for Bank Group's support in a country's development strategy for poverty reduction as based on the Bank Group's comparative advantage in the context of other donor activities (World Bank, 2005a). CAS includes a comprehensive diagnosis of the development challenges facing the country, key areas where the Bank Group's assistance can have the biggest impact on poverty reduction, support of the Bank to the country, and the framework of targets and indicators to monitor the implementation process. The Bank usually claims that CAS is developed in consultation with country authorities, civil society organizations, development partners, and other stakeholders.

⁷ This includes Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Mongolia.

CODE's response was to recommend that the Bank should:

...try to develop new products, and more carefully articulated strategies geared towards countries which are on the verge of graduation... the Bank should be selective and focus its interventions in areas where there was a strong support for reforms, and needed to work in close association with Thai counterparts... (OED, 2000: 37)

The OED's report then closed with a very interesting paragraph:

Thailand may need considerable assistance from the Bank now. But it requested limited assistance during the ten years preceding the crisis and the same situation may prevail when the crisis is over. The case of Thailand...applies to other countries that gain substantial access to international capital markets. How should the Bank deal with such countries? (OED, 2000: 25)

In other words, the case of Thailand pushed the Bank to seek alternative strategies of engaging with middle-income countries. Following this report, the Development Committee reviewed the Bank's role and instruments in supporting country development in low- and middle-income countries. The Bank decided to continue its role in helping poverty reduction in middle-income countries. A task force was created to consider how the Bank could best respond to the needs of those middle-income countries. Because of the diversity in middle-income countries, the task force recommended the use of the CAS process to customise the Bank support programme for each country (Development Committee, 2001).

This sign of change again became evident in 2002. The Bank's internal Quality Assurance Group reviewed the Bank's analytical and advisory services in Thailand for its 1999-2001 CAS⁸ and identified some important systemic lessons

⁸ This CAS, developed at the height of the crisis, was built around three critical elements: renewing the country's competitiveness, improving governance, and ensuring a more equitable distribution of the benefits of growth. In line with Thailand's Eighth Plan, this CAS pursued several objectives (World Bank, 1999). First, to renew Thailand's competitiveness, the Bank supported the building of a sound financial sector and the enhancement of effective government capacity to set rules for the market. The aim of these policies was to further improve Thailand's economic interests, improve the quality of its workforce, remove export infrastructure bottlenecks, and to provide an effective framework for corporate restructuring. Second, to improve governance, the Bank supported efforts to improve macroeconomic management to achieve economic stability and strengthen public administrative, legal, and regulatory frameworks, which would in turn

for future engagement of the Bank. One example of a lesson learned was that the analytical and advisory programme must be 'selective, well-focused, and driven by client ownership with medium-term engagement' (World Bank 2002: 13). The change was instituted in the process of formulating the new CAS in 2003 when the partnership approach was implemented. However, before the new CAS was formed and in addition to an internal awareness of the need for change within the Bank, there was a change in the Thai government in 2001. The new government came to power with a new policy agenda and measures. The Thai state under the new government seemed to reorient its relationship with external actors and tried to minimise their engagement (see interviews with the Prime Minister in Pran, 2004; Bangkok Post, 28 August 2003; The Nation, 29 May 2003).

The TRT government made the state central to poverty alleviation programmes which was an approach fundamentally rejected by the Bank. The new government not only presented a new anti-poverty policy approach as a specific countermove to the Bank's approach but also announced a new policy toward its relationship with external assistance. The government explicitly stated its decision to reduce its reliance on external assistance. During the last CAS, the Bank's lending to Thailand between 1998 and 2000 was planned at US\$3.4 billion but actual lending amounted US\$ 2.1 billion, even less than the Bank's projection in the worst case scenario. The Bank delivered no new projects between October 1999 and 2002. This decline in demand for Bank's lending was due largely to the government's emphasis on managing public debt and reducing external financing (World Bank, 2002). This direction was further emphasised when the TRT government came to power in 2001. The new government appeared uninterested in the economic policies of the former government and equally uninterested in the IMF's and the Bank's advice. Following the 2001 election, the Bank representatives met with the Prime Minister and other leading party executives in March 2001. The result was not entirely satisfactory, with the Bank indicating no more than a broad agreement with the government's policies (World Bank, 2001).

ensure a fair competition. Third, to share growth and ensure a better quality of life, the Bank supported efforts to mitigate social costs of adjustment, to empower local communities, to reform social security system, and to preserve the natural environment.

In 2002, there was a major turning point when the government started to reconsider its policy towards external assistance. The Bank's SIF was terminated in late 2002 when the government decided not to seek additional Bank finances for this kind of programme because local development initiatives across the country were supported through the VURF policy. In early 2003, the Prime Minister declared that Thailand was becoming a non aid-recipient country and that it would pursue a Forward Engagement foreign policy, which essentially meant that Thailand was aiming to become an emerging donor country (Thaksin, 2003). In July 2003, the government managed to repay all debts owed to the IMF, which freed it from all conditions attached to loans borrowed since the beginning of the crisis. Following a cabinet meeting on 29th November 2003, the government came up with a resolution that Thailand would no longer receive any foreign aid and loans from other international organisations or countries except when there were no attached conditionalities that could disadvantage or treat Thailand as an unequal partner (SOC, 2003). One Bank officer commented on this change, stating:

Not only was this a shift in Thailand's status towards a middle-income country status, this change in the government's position towards external assistance also forced us to find alternative means of engaging with Thailand if we were still to remain active in our involvement... in the old days we gave loans but because of the new approach we relied more on knowledge sharing and technical assistance... if the government would not 'buy' our proposals, our attempt would have become ineffective... we needed to do something that supports the government... (Interview Io1)

An initial change in the Bank's approach was observed in the process of developing the new CAS. The Bank spent time from February 2001 to October 2002 – nearly 18 months – on a consultation process seeking to establish what role the Bank should play in post-crisis Thailand (World Bank, 2003a). In 2001, the Bank organised consultative meetings with civil society representatives⁹ while

⁹ They included (1) meeting with civil society representatives in the Southern region in February; (2) meeting with eight international NGO representatives in February; (3) meeting with civil society representatives in the Northern region in March; and (4) meeting between key civil society representatives and the Bank's Regional Vice President in March.

in 2002, the Bank conducted workshops and discussions with a wide range of stakeholders.¹⁰ One emerging theme was the need for the Bank to place a greater emphasis on knowledge provision and transfer, catalysing and bridging the development process, as well as capacity building and learning. Added to this, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council was concerned with the unequal status in the relationship and suggested a change in the title of CAS from *assistance* to *partnership*.¹¹ The Bank claimed that this process made the Bank reorient its outlook and position towards a partnership. The Bank noted that, in light of feedback from the government, the CAS for the fiscal year 2003-2005 was entitled *Thailand-World Bank Group Partnership for Development*, which reflected the changing nature of the Bank's engagement in Thailand. The Bank went on to claim that the relationship between Thailand and the Bank Group has progressed 'from primarily a borrower-lender relationship toward a true development partnership' (World Bank, 2002: 26).

The Bank subsequently concluded that its engagement in Thailand should comprise of two complementary levels (World Bank, 2002). The first level would be to monitor and diagnose Thailand's performance and key development challenges across all areas of the national agenda. The Bank's four monitor series – Economic, Social, Environment, and Country Dialogue – were produced for this purpose. Here, the Bank tried to institute systematic means of influence through the 'dialogue' approach (Burden, 1998), which implicitly intended to foster a political climate conducive to its interest. One of the earliest Thailand Social Monitor Reports was entitled *Poverty and Public Policy* (World Bank, 2001a).

¹⁰ They were (1) meeting with the Government Advisory Working Group, some 25 working-level representatives from various government agencies who interact regularly with the Bank, in April, June and September; (2) several meetings with the Minister of Finance and senior policy makers from key agencies such as the Fiscal Policy Office, the Public Debt Management Office, and the NESDB; (3) meeting with representatives of key donor agencies including the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and AusAid in March; (4) several meetings and workshops with private sector representatives; (5) meeting with parliamentarians in October; (6) meeting with the National Economic and Social Advisory Council in July; (7) meeting with key leaders of national civil society organizations in March; and (8) meeting with local civil society organizations and community leaders in the Northeastern region in July.

¹¹ I happened to be in a meeting between the Bank and Advisory Council where this issue was raised.

The impact of such serial reports in providing inputs into anti-poverty policy formulation was questioned as one NESDB officer commented:

These international organisations offered some study grants or provided international experts to support us in the areas where we needed help. But when we made policy, we did it on our own. They did not have authority over our policy. We used our database, and we set our own agendas. Some agendas were from the government, some were from our previous studies within the NESDB... OK, the Bank's reports offered some thoughts on current issues, but the policy-making was more of our own business... (Interview Go10)

The second level was in-depth implementation support in a few critical areas, including poverty alleviation, as identified and agreed with the government. The Country Development Partnership (CDP), launched in 2000, was a new instrument developed to help the Bank remain engaged in Thailand's policy-making process. The Bank claimed that the CDP was 'a cornerstone of the Bank's implementation support to Thailand' (World Bank, 2002: 26). The criteria of engagement at this level were made explicit, as 'it engaged only in areas where there is an explicit request and upfront agreement with the government as evidenced by an exchange of letters of support and the scale of resources committed... and only if the government has developed a clear and specific programme linked to outcomes...' (World Bank, 2002: 27).

Such orientations exemplified a shift in the Bank's role in Thailand away from policy intervention and more towards diagnosing and monitoring Thailand's performance. Accordingly, implementation support was limited to only the selected critical issues of Thailand's overall national development agenda. The Bank believed that this kind of partnership was 'seen by all stakeholders in Thailand as the most effective means for the Bank Group to help accelerate growth and reduce poverty' (World Bank, 2002: 26). The next section investigates in detail the case of the CDP for Poverty Analysis and Monitoring (CDP-PAM) to assess how the new instrument helped the Bank to remain engaged with Thailand.

5. Investigating partnership: The case of CDP-PAM

CDP is a three-year integrated framework for action in key areas of the country's development agenda (World Bank, 2004). It specifies objectives and action programmes and also identifies the technical assistance needed to support the programme. It is an agreement between the government, the Bank, and other partners to work together on specific challenges identified by the government in its development agenda. As a CDP project officer explained:

Generally, each CDP is developed by the government, with support from other partners [including the Bank] as requested. CDP is executed in partnership with local stakeholders. Some might need technical assistance and capacity building support from external partners...the Bank is only one partner among many and may take the lead on a limited number of issues as requested from the government in an area where the Bank has comparative advantage in being a partner. The Bank's engagement in each CDP can be different. It can take the form of analytical and advisory activities, technical assistance, donor coordination, or investment projects. At the moment there is no other country that works with the Bank through the CDP except Thailand. The Bank developed this instrument for the work between the Bank and Thailand specifically. The Bank has a plan to apply the CDP instrument to work with the Malaysian government as well. (Interview Io2)

This in-depth investigation of CDP-PAM focuses on two critical aspects: project formulation and governing structure. The project was initiated by the Bank as the same officer recalled:

When the crisis hit Thailand, the poverty problem was highlighted and brought to the top of the national policy agenda. Poverty alleviation was emphasised as the prime national agenda. This issue reached our attention while we were seeking for an area of collaboration after SIF; plus this area fall into our expertise... so based on a long-standing relationship with the NESDB, we then approached the NESDB to initiate the project. (Interview Io2)

The development of CDP-PAM took place in October 2001 when the first preparatory mission with experts from the Bank was conducted to establish a partnership with the NESDB, some other government agencies, and local academic institutes (PCU, 2003). CDP-PAM was developed at the time when the

NESDB was formulating the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) aimed at operationalising the poverty alleviation strategy defined in the Ninth NESDP (NESDB, 2002a). One Bank project officer noted that:

The Bank decided to support this PRS, which was formulated by the NESDB, and to use it as a basis for developing CDP-PAM... in some countries we have supported the government in drafting the PRS as a condition for loans. But in Thailand's case, the NESDB had developed its own PRS already, so we used it as a basis for future collaboration...
(Interview Io1)

During the preparation stage, the NESDB and the Bank collaborated closely and finally launched CDP-PAM in May 2002. Following that, the NESDB discussed with the Bank to establish the framework for collaboration with CDP-PAM. The framework determined the scope, area, and activities being pursued by all participating agencies in CDP-PAM. It was finally concluded that activities to be supported under CDP-PAM would be approved if they met two criteria (NESDB, 2004: 4). First, they had to be identified by the government as priority areas with a reform agenda in the poverty reduction area, and second, they must complement the expertise and ongoing work programmes of other development partners. The activities of the CDP-PAM in the first phase are listed in Table 10. A NESDB official commented on the development of the project priorities: *'Four themes were defined by us, based on the expertise of the NESDB and with some consultation with the Bank, to support the poverty alleviation agenda. Therefore, most of the themes focused on analytical work instead of operations at the ground level'* (Interview Go9). This statement again shows that the NESDB was able to set and control the agenda it wanted to pursue, not only in its broad agenda but also in its framework for collaboration.

Although CDP was believed to function as 'a vehicle for engaging civil society, private sector, and other partners in policy design, implementation, and monitoring process' (World Bank, 2003: 3), no evidence confirmed that either civil society or the private sector was involved in the project design. Instead, given that CDP-PAM was meant to operationalise the PRS drafted by the NESDB, this statement seems to suggest that the Bank has followed a policy

agenda defined by the Thai government and that the NESDB appeared to be a core decision-maker in the project formulation. However, its governing structure requires further investigation. CDP-PAM employed a relatively complex governing structure with at least three levels of governance: the Steering Committee (SC), the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), and operating agencies (NESDB, 2004).

Table 10: Activities under CDP-PAM

Themes	Activities	Agencies*
Poverty database development	1. Poverty mapping	TDRI, NESDB, NSO, WB
	2. Panel data for Socio-economic Survey	NSO, WB, NESDB
	3. Poverty database development for poverty research phase II	NESDB, MOI, KKU, NSO
	4. Factor analysis	NESDB
Measurement and analysis of poverty, inequality, and vulnerability	5. Review of poverty line methodology	NESDB, UNESCAP, UNDP
	6. Income distribution in Thailand	NESDB
	7. Gender and poverty	NESDB
Development of poverty reduction strategies	8. Empirical study on poverty	TDRI, NESDB
	9. Preparation for community plan development	NESDB
	10. Piloting one stop services in communities	NESDB
Poverty monitoring and evaluation	11. National Millennium Development Goals Report	NESDB, UNDP, WB

*The first name was meant to be the lead agency in each activity.

Source: NESDB (2003)

KKU: Khon Kaen University

MOI: Ministry of Interior

NSO: National Statistical Office

TDRI: Thailand Development Research Institute

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCAP: United Nations for Economic and Social Cooperation for Asia Pacific

WB: World Bank

At the policy level, the SC was established to ensure successful implementation of CDP-PAM and its consistency with the government's overall poverty reduction framework. During the first phase of its operation, the committee consisted of twelve representatives. All members of the SC were from relevant departments within the NESDB with no representatives from the Bank, other donors, or civil society (PCU, 2003). During the second phase, some other related government agencies were included. However, the NESDB retained its share of representatives, as did donors and civil society who continued to have no representatives at all. There are now eight members on the committee:

- 1) The Deputy General-Secretary of the NESDB as the Chair;
- 2) Director, the Macro Economic Planning Office, the NESDB;
- 3) Director, the Quality of Life and Social Development Office, the NESDB;
- 4) Director, the Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office, the NESDB;
- 5) Director, the Social and Economic Statistics Office, the National Statistical Office;
- 6) Director, the Planning and Strategy Office, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security;
- 7) CDP-PAM Project Director; and
- 8) CDP-PAM Project Manager.

The committee had a mandate for the following specific tasks (NESDB, 2004):

- Reviewing the objectives and activities under CDP-PAM to ensure its consistency with the government's overall poverty alleviation policies;
- Providing guidance and suggestions regarding the implementation of CDP-PAM; and
- Approving terms of reference for all activities under CDP-PAM as proposed by the PCU.

The SC played a dominant role in approving activities, and this mandate validated that CDP-PAM was endorsed as a NESDB-driven agenda. The function of the SC showed that the NESDB exercised full authority over decision-making with little input from the Bank. One employee of the Bank said that *'the composition of the committee both in the first and second phase was determined by the NESDB without the Bank's involvement'* (Interview Io2) while another officer explained:

The committee meets monthly or bi-monthly, subject to meeting agendas. I, as a representative from the World Bank, have been invited to attend every meeting but as an observer who has no legitimate mandate in making any decision, although the Chair asks my opinion sometimes. (Interview Io1)

At the management level, PCU was set up to support and be responsible for all CDP-PAM management and finance issues (PCU, 2003). The PCU was under the close supervision of the SC to ensure transparency of CDP-PAM management. The PCU consisted of 5 members: Project Director, Project Manager, Project Advisor, Project Coordinator, and Finance Officer. A member of the PCU said that *'only the Director and Advisor were from the NESDB; the rest were recruited from the outside'* (Interview Io2). The PCU managed logistical work for the NESDB in implementing and overseeing day-to-day progress of the project. Specific roles of PCU were as follows (PCU, 2003):

- Providing technical assistance to all partners under CDP-PAM, in collaboration with the Bank and the NESDB, in the project development process ranging from setting objectives, approaches, outputs, and action plans;
- Serving as a core centre for coordinating between the NESDB, the Bank, and all partners to strengthen the cooperation and smooth the process of implementation;
- Assisting the NESDB in managing all financial issues;
- Assisting partners in drafting the terms of reference of each activity to assure that they were consistent with the framework of CDP-PAM; and

- Organising necessary discussion forums, workshops, and a series of Steering Committee meetings to ensure smoothness and transparency in CDP-PAM implementation.

The PCU coordinated with each sub-project manager, who in turn was responsible for executing each activity under CDP-PAM. Each activity was accountable to the PCU in that its executing agency had to submit a progress report every month. The PCU used the reports as an instrument to monitor the progress and financial disbursements for each activity. In addition, the PCU organised a mid-term review every six months and produced a CDP-PAM annual report as an additional monitoring system.

At the operational level, CDP-PAM claimed that it ‘encouraged partnership with all stakeholders to enhance the implementation of poverty alleviation’ (NESDB, 2004: 5). A list of partners in the project is presented in Table 10. While other agencies were involved in some activities, the NESDB retained its role as a focal agency and maintained some level of control over other participating agencies. The role of the Bank in some activities was about supporting experts as external consultants. According to one of the PCU members:

Each partner needed to submit a proposal of what it planned to do and get it approved from the SC. This was to ensure that all activities met the grand framework... most of these partners were in the circle of the NESDB's network... those who used to work with the NESDB before... and were approached purposively at the early stage when CDP-PAM requested proposal submission. The process was not open for public consultation or in a competitive fashion as it was in SIF... (Interview 102)

From the analysis of CDP-PAM's governing structure, it could be suggested that the government agencies, the NESDB in particular, have played a significant role in the governing process of CDP-PAM since the beginning of the project and in its implementation through all three levels of governance. International agencies, or the Bank in particular, maintained involvement but with only marginal

influence on the project development and day-to-day activities. Other domestic non-state actors, especially civil society, had no involvement in the CDP-PAM.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the debate concerning the nexus between globalisation and domestic policy-making process. It has focused on the dynamic interactions between the Thai state and international agencies in domestic policy governance. The work and role of the World Bank in relation to the Thai state in anti-poverty policy was used as a case for investigation. It is clear that the Bank's mode of engagement with Thailand changed after the crisis, yet the partnership governance was the Bank's strategy to maintain its influence in Thailand.

Once Thailand became more engaged with the global market and was able to access trans-national capital, the influence of the Bank in domestic policy formulation began to decline although its legacy in national development planning remained to some extent. However, when the crisis hit Thailand, the Thai state lost its capacity to manage impacts of the crisis by itself alone and thus needed to request help from international organisations. The Bank's role and intervention became much more prominent but nonetheless to some extent it reoriented its focus to give greater emphasis to a social policy agenda to address poverty and the poor (social safety net). SIP allowed the Bank to retain its active involvement during the crisis. At this stage, it might appear that the Bank promoted community governance in Thailand via SIF, but the idea had originally been proposed by societal actors, particularly communitarian advocates. SIF was delivered through a newly established executing agency instead of relying on the bureaucratic system as had been done previously. However, the Bank exercised its extensive control over the operation of these agencies. The Bank further maintained its supervision and control through its power to approve key decisions of SIF. The relationship between the Thai state and international players during this time could be viewed as a case of the state lacking the capacity to manage its domestic affairs (such as the crisis), with globalised forces in a position to exercise power over the

domestic policy agenda, thereby intervening in the country's internal matters via conditions attached to financial assistance. By providing the necessary financial resources during a time of crisis, globalised actors were in a strong bargaining position in negotiations with domestic players. Key policy decisions remained in the hands of international players with some inputs from other actors.

Following the crisis, the Bank began to re-appraise its work in Thailand and realised that the way it worked with the Thai government needed to change. As Thailand moved in the direction of becoming a middle-income country requiring less external assistance, the Bank had to reframe the type of assistance it gave Thailand. Another factor was the new government that came to power in 2001. This new government was uncomfortable with international agencies' involvement in domestic affairs. The government later promulgated its non aid-recipient position and announced a policy oriented towards less dependence on external assistance. Such changes in the Thai state's policy position pressured the Bank to readjust its strategy in order to remain engaged with Thailand, as portrayed in the most recent CAS development process and the development of the CDP initiative. Two variables that help in explaining the nature of the relationship between domestic institutions and external globalised actors are the degree of state capacity and its policy towards external assistance.

At this stage, it is observed that once Thailand began to recover from the crisis and was able to regain its capacity to manage its own state of affairs, it then started to negotiate its place and position against external intervention. This reorientation indicates that international actors do not always determine the shape or outcomes of domestic policy agenda or its content, and that states can still retain a considerable degree of control over their domestic affairs. The degree of intervention of globalised forces over domestic policy-making is contingent on the state's capacity to manage its own domestic affairs as well as its policy towards external involvement via instruments of loans and other types of assistance. The level of country development is another important factor. Once a country moves from low-income to middle-income, it naturally implies that a country begins to

be more dependent on its own financial capacity and needs less financial assistance from international agencies. With less dependence on financial support, the channels that international agencies can use to intervene in domestic situations become more limited. If the international agency needs to retain its involvement, new instruments have to be developed. In Thailand's case, partnership governance was employed as a new strategy that the Bank used to help remain engaged with Thailand. However, its role in the partnership was not necessarily prominent.

CDP-PAM is a case confirming that once the state has changed its position and has some confidence in its capacity to manage its own affairs; the state can manoeuvre, operate, and negotiate its place within the globalised milieu. The case reflects that the state still has the capacity to manage or even resist the influence of globalised forces. Although the origination of CDP-PAM was claimed to be initiated by the Bank instead of requested from the government, its early development stage was significantly influenced by the NESDB. CDP-PAM was formed to support the poverty reduction strategy of the Thai government. In fact, the NESDB could control and make decisions regarding project objectives and frames of collaboration between the Bank and government agencies. Further, contrary to what happened in SIF, the governing structure and daily operation of CDP-PAM was under the full control of the NESDB through the establishment of the SC and the operation of PCU with very limited inputs from the Bank. Although the Bank attempted to initiate a 'policy dialogue' through a series of Social and Economic Monitor Reports to influence policy-making in Thailand, these efforts appeared to have minimal impact on decision-making of the NESDB. Notably, the way that CDP-PAM was delivered favoured hierarchical governing structures rather than partnership governance. The participating agencies were selected by the NESDB with no civil society involvement. In this case, bureaucracy was an executing agent of state policy and power appeared to be concentrated in its hands.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main findings of this research in light of some existing theories and debates about governance and policy-making reviewed in Chapter 2. This research aims to contribute to our understanding of Thailand's governance configuration and its implications for the formulation and delivery of anti-poverty policy since the 1997 financial crisis. It qualitatively explores issues and tensions that have arisen in the process of governing.

This research contributes to at least three major areas of scholarly debate. First, it contributes to studies of Thailand's governance and policy-making after the 1997 crisis, an area which remains under-explored. The research investigates the interplay between the Thai state, societal players and international actors at the policy-making level, something which has not yet been thoroughly examined. It focuses on social policy, which is less researched than economic policy. Therefore this research offers an important angle that helps in understanding Thailand's governance. The role and influence of external forces are also seriously examined in this study; this helps to capture the full ramifications of Thai governance in the anti-poverty policy process. Second, this research contributes to a growing body of empirical work on governance and policy studies literature by providing some evidence of governance change in the context of developing countries. Third, the research contributes to debates about the role of the state in the context of globalisation, and it illustrates how the state has responded to external forces. This chapter is structured along these three themes of contribution.

2. Thailand's governance configuration since 1997

Emerging themes from the research findings suggest some dynamic patterns in the relationship between various actors involved in the governance of anti-poverty

policy since the 1997 crisis. These changing relationships became more evident when observed over the extended duration between 1997 and 2005, with a change of government in 2001 appearing to be a turning point. The changes produced different effects on the process of policy-making. This section uses three key parameters mentioned in Chapter 2 – actors, processes, and modes of governing – to exemplify the evolution of Thailand's governance configuration.

2.1 Actors

After the crisis, it was observed that the capacity of the Thai state to steer society was weakened. The government was subject to serious budget cuts due to effects of the crisis. Accessing Thailand's core policy-making agency became less competitive because the crisis had weakened some of the strong, influential business interests which used to dominate Thailand's development agendas. This situation offered a wider 'social space' for societal actors to gain more access and involvement in the anti-poverty policy-making process. However, the participation was not an open process, but was biased in favour of insider groups connected to key policy-makers in the central policy planning agency and government. Participation was entirely subject to the discretion of the state that decided who would be allowed to participate. Therefore, only a few societal actors were still able to achieve access. A major state actor was the NESDB, a planning agency in this policy area. The NESDB selected only those societal actors who were believed to have some expertise or resources to help the state alleviate impacts of the crisis, especially the problem of poverty emergencies. A network of communitarian advocates was selected to take part in the process of drafting the national development plan and in this way, the advocates could gain influence over policy decisions and implementation. When the state set up NSPC, the same group of advocates remained involved. As for globalised actors, only the World Bank managed to have a prominent role in this policy area. The Bank reoriented its role to a position of actively supporting the poor. This permitted the Bank to access this policy arena. International NGOs, trans-national corporations, and

media did not have any involvement in national policy-making, nor did other government agencies or state actors.

After the government changed in 2001, the state, or the TRT government in particular, managed to attain a strong position in governing the process of anti-poverty policy-making. Since the TRT came with a strong pro-poor policy platform and the determination to implement it, the role of the NESDB in making poverty alleviation policy soon began to diminish and the TRT government took over the main role of governing anti-poverty policy. New executive agencies, including the VURFO and NCPE, were established under the Prime Minister's Office to take charge of anti-poverty initiatives in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior. Given this change within state actors, the poverty alleviation policy arena was still far from fully open to a broader participation by societal actors. Instead, the change reflected the capacity of the government to mould this policy arena and play a decisive role in choosing societal actors. Government held the power to determine which appropriate societal actors would be involved in its policy initiatives and which would not be. As a result, no new actor entered into the policy-making process, but only the same group of societal actors involved in the policy prior to 2001 was selected because of their connections with some key policy-makers. This group was held up by the government as representatives of the civil society sector. Notably, the involvement of these societal actors was perceived to be an essential condition legitimising the state and allowing it to retain its strong arm governing practices. The state could thereby claim to have non-state players participating in policy decision-making. The Bank managed to retain its engagement in this policy arena, but its role became insignificant with very little leverage over policy negotiation. There was still no significant involvement of any international NGO, trans-national corporation, parliamentary, media or domestic business player.

2.2 Governing processes

Prior to 2001, the Thai state primarily depended on support from societal and globalised actors to establish its policy agenda, to define its priorities, to mobilise resources, and to implement action. Decision-making was assumed to be contingent on support from non-state actors in both the formation and implementation of policy. The principal style of decision-making was based on a participatory approach when inputs from society were needed.

State agenda setting decisions during this period reflected the interests of societal and globalised actors to a greater extent. Although the final decisions were laid upon policy-makers in the NESDB, societal actors offered much input to the formation process of the Eighth and Ninth NESDPs, and were able to influence the thinking of NESDP policy-makers. An alliance of communitarian advocates, based on its networks and expertise in the community empowerment approach to poverty alleviation, was able to mainstream its agenda into these NESDPs through manipulating the NESDP's drafting process. Later this alliance worked with the government in NSPC and instrumentally made use of this committee to support its purpose by connecting poverty alleviation measures with the community empowerment agenda. In this way the advocates raised their pro-community agenda as a top policy priority. They smartly captured the anti-poverty agenda and interpreted the policy problem in a way that served their community empowerment agenda.

The globalised actors were in a strong bargaining position in negotiations with domestic players due to their position as a major source of financial support during the crisis. However, in the area of anti-poverty policy, they did not initially have their own particular policy platform. Once they had decided to readjust some of their agendas toward the mitigation of the crisis and its effects on the poor, as well as to find a means by which to remain engaged in Thailand, the idea of promoting grassroots development through the investment fund was introduced. This idea matched what societal actors had advocated, so the agenda of both

parties converged through the community empowerment approach, particularly in the case of the World Bank's SIF. In this way, the Bank used anti-poverty policy as a platform for engagement in Thailand.

The Thai state was also dependent on the support of non-state actors to implement policy. The Thai state depended on financial resources from the Bank in the government's crisis relief programme, which was evident in Channel 1 of the SIP scheme. At the same time, the state also depended on the networks and capacity of societal actors in its implementation of community empowerment programmes for poverty alleviation at the street-level. The interdependency between societal and globalised actors in the case of SIF could also be observed. It also appeared that the Bank relied on societal actors to implement its crisis mitigation programme, while societal actors depended on financial support from the Bank. However, while the SIF project was implemented by NGO people with Bank funding, it was observed that the Bank attempted to exercise some degree of control over the project's resources and closely monitored its progress. It must be noted that societal actors achieved the institutionalisation of a permanent agency to ensure a continuity of financial support from the government's budget. SIF and CODI were evidence of this achievement. In particular, CODI assured that societal actors could continuously use this agency to propel their community empowerment agenda.

It was clear that the economic crisis forced the Thai state to be less self-reliant and more inclined to operate through non-state actors and other forms of public-private joint action. With its limited capacity to provide resources, particularly financial resources, the state sought to play a coordinating role, bringing together resources from non-state actors at little direct cost to the public budget. However, involving non-state actors in the poverty alleviation programme did not mean that the Thai state lost its ability to control the process of policy-making and service delivery activities. Instead the Thai state was able to maintain its services to the poor even under severe budget constraints by a means of readjusting its governing strategies.

When the new government came to power, the Thai state began to be strengthened and became a dominant player in the governing process. Although societal actors provided some inputs at the initial stage when TRT first began to develop its anti-poverty policy, later decisions appeared to be largely determined by the TRT government while the role of the bureaucracy in policy decision-making began to deteriorate. Later, in the case of the Poverty Registration Scheme, the Thai state managed to take full control of redefining the anti-poverty agenda in terms of the state's view on social needs. Then it imposed its agenda intrusively onto society without society being accorded an opportunity to participate. This decision-making process was relatively decisive and made entirely by the state with no significant input from non-state actors. The role and influence of globalised actors were sharply diminished, especially when the TRT government did not need financial assistance from them. This condition forced globalised actors to search for a new strategy to retain their engagement in the policy-making process. The World Bank found a way to cooperate with the NESDB by means of CDP-PAM, but it had to follow the agenda defined by the Thai state. Its leverage on policy-making became minimal.

The Thai state took an active role in driving policy implementation. The new executive agencies, including the VURFO and NCPE, were established to serve this purpose. This situation provided little room for societal or globalised actors to influence or become involved in the policy implementation process. Instead of depending upon other actors to implement the anti-poverty scheme as was the case prior to 2001, the Thai state relied mostly on direct provision and policy instruments that allowed the state to independently implement policies itself. In the case of VURF, the TRT government decided to direct a significant proportion of its resources from the government budget straight to the poor. Any intermediary non-state agent was bypassed including those societal actors who had formerly dominated SIF. In the case of NCPE, through which an individualistic approach to poverty was implemented, the poor received direct support from the state. Although the state co-opted societal actors at the very early

stages of implementation, this research observed an attempt made by the state to undermine the role and involvement of societal actors at the later stages. The post-2001 era witnessed the capacity of the Thai state to exercise a considerable degree of control over society in this area of social policy.

2.3 Modes of governing

Prior to 2001, communitarian governance had become the main mode of governing, an approach that was strongly promoted by all actors who participated in poverty alleviation policy. The Thai state accepted this mode of governing because it perceived this mode as appropriate for mitigating poverty in the long run. In contrast, societal actors pursued this mode because they believed it was an alternative approach to the national development trajectory and this mode had the potential to reduce the state's power. They held this mode of governance as having the potential to allow communities to begin to lead their own development process at the grassroots level. Globalised actors pursued this governing mode because they viewed communitarian governance as a channel to access the social policy terrain and to remain engaged in Thailand's policy-making.

Later, institutionalised cooperative arrangements for policy formulation and implementation between the state and society were promoted by societal actors under the rubric of state-civil partnerships. Societal actors wanted to use this type of institutionalised structure to influence policy-making at all levels of governance in Thailand: from the national to the local level. They attempted to reframe the relationship between the state and society as well as to equalise power disparity between both of them through this partnership initiative. Globalised actors, particularly the Bank, also advocated partnership governance through CDP-PAM. This instrument allowed the Bank to remain engaged in anti-poverty policy-making. The momentum of the partnership governance was carried forward to the time when the new government came to power, when again it was pursued by different actors with different rationales.

During the TRT administration, partnership was used by the state as a strategy to co-opt and assimilate the networks and knowledge of the communitarian advocates. Societal actors directed their efforts toward institutionalising the state-civil partnership structure because this would allow them to have a formal channel through which to participate in policy decisions and implementation at different levels of governance. This partnership governance also gave societal actors an opportunity to access and legitimately use government resources to propel their agenda. This rationale was reflected in the cases of PNCU and CSCS. Globalised actors used partnership as a strategy only to help them retain their engagement in Thailand's policy-making and to conduct some activities with the government, although their role and influence eventually declined considerably. The CDP-PAM showed that the Thai state had become the key player in this partnership structure while the Bank had only to follow and support the implementation strategies defined by the Thai state.

Notably, the recent attempt of government to institutionalise a state-society partnership in the Poverty Registration Scheme has highlighted that the partnership between the state and society in this Scheme was achieved only in form rather than in essence. The implementation of the Scheme emphasised a possible tension between a statutory partnership encouraged by the state under the NCPE organisation and a more directive, hierarchical form of governance under the bureaucratic structure. It is also doubtful if the government attempted to break up the communitarian alliance, and aimed to undermine the role and power of societal actors by co-opting them under this state-instituted partnership. In this way, state transformation in pursuing partnership governance could be interpreted as a state strategy to maintain its power.

Changes in the configuration of Thai governance since 1997 are summarised in Table 11.

Table 11: Key features of Thailand's governance since the 1997 crisis

	Pre-2001	Post-2001
Key actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The NESDB in cooperation with societal actors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government and its new agencies established to take charge of policy initiatives.
State capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak due to the impact of the crisis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recovered its capacity by the process of 'regaining' resources under the guise of crisis recovery.
Societal capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possessed networks and expertise of community empowerment to poverty alleviation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undermined by the state Access to government resources was cut off.
Agenda setting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remained as the state's decision but more contingent on support from non-state actors. Was influenced mostly by societal actors and globalised forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State independently set priorities and determined agendas. Problems were reframed and redefined by the state with little involvement by other sectors.
Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dependent on support from non-state actors. Cooperation between state and non-state actors. Operations left to non-state actors. Globalised forces retained some degree of control. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State co-opted societal actors. State steered the process. State directly supported the poor and their communities. State-directed, state-initiated partnerships.
Modes of governing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communitarian. Partnership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hierarchy. Partnership.

According to the above discussions, instead of the Thai state turning into a weak and less powerful actor in shaping policy and service delivery as indicated in recent studies (see Chapter 2), it was observed that the Thai state was able to use different governing approaches and strategies to maintain its power to steer society, to influence other actors, and ultimately to align all other non-state actors with its purposes, at least in the case of anti-poverty policy. The governance configuration of Thailand's anti-poverty policy appeared to shift from what could be called a *society-guided, state-governed governance* toward a *state-guided, state-governed governance*. In the former configuration, the role of societal actors and globalised actors was prominent in guiding and shaping the policy decision-

making process. The intervention of society in policy implementation was also noticeably essential. The state was very much dependent on the support of other non-state actors. However, this did not mean that the power of the state was diminished; instead, it readjusted itself to fit with new policy conditions. The state's adoption of the communitarian and partnership governance approach became its strategy to maintain its role in steering society, or in other words, to retain its power to govern. In the later configuration, the state was able to exercise its power over the policy agenda setting and to regain its control over resource distribution in order to manage policy implementation. In this configuration, the state attained its full capacity and power to govern. Since 2001, the state has had a substantial capacity to use government apparatus to steer society. It guided policy formation and directed policy execution with neither the direct support nor the significant involvement of other actors.

3. Governance and policy-making

3.1 Governance as a process

This research found that a more dynamic perspective examining governance as a process to be very useful. Although institutional arrangements remain important when studying governance because they determine what roles the state can actually play in governance (Kato, 1996; Peter, 1999), thinking about governance from a process perspective is even more important because governance is not only about structures but more about the interactions among actors or institutions (Kooiman, 2003; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Investigating governance by focusing only on institutional arrangements tends to provide only snapshots of the relevant institutional structures and a partial view of the interactive nature of governance. It is likely to obscure the full manifestation of interactions among concerned institutions or actors in the production of governing outcomes. Therefore, an alternative assumption is that governance is a dynamic process of interactions amongst various domestic and external actors. Furthermore, examining governance through the lens of process could help to address changes occurring

over time and in different degrees. Using this approach to investigate the case of Thai governance confirms the usefulness and importance of perceiving governance as a process whereby changes in state-society relationship can be identified and explained.

The process of steering and coordinating are two dominant dynamic perspectives in the current literature (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The concept of governance as steering is at the heart of much of the current literature on governance (Pierre, 2000). Some even argue that it is central to most theories of governance (Kooiman, 1993, 2000). From this perspective, states are still capable to steer society, although now their authority is less based on legal power, and more on its control over critical resources. In another perspective, governance sometimes refers to the coordination of a sector in society such as the economy or industry (Hollingsworth *et al.*, 1994; Gamble, 2000). It could also refer to a social coordination and interaction between both public and private institutions organised into networks to deliver and respond to social needs (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Marsh, 1998). In any of these perspectives, governance is considered in a dynamic manner. This process approach seeks to reveal how actors, both state and non-state, control governing activities and produce desired outcomes (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

3.2 Politics in governance

The concept of governance often relies upon the concept of 'co-governance' (Kooiman, 2003), which could be expressed in the forms of collaboration, co-operation, partnerships, or network modes of governing (Kooiman, 2003, Rhodes, 2000). However, one could question how 'co-governance' would be achieved if the participants held different interests and motives in joining the various modes of 'co-governance'? Do differences in interest and motives have the potential for raising conflict among them? What needs to be taken into account is the nature of politics in the governing process. Politics is all about contradictory and conflicting

interests, a reality which might seem to be based on a different assumption than the assumptions in the 'co-governance' proposal.

Based on findings of this research, power disparity between the Thai state, societal actors, and globalised actors could be observed. At different points in time, each one holds incompatible resources and thus has incompatible power to influence or shape policy. With different levels of leverage, the bargaining power of each actor would be unequal, and policy-decisions would tend to favour those with stronger power. In this manner, partnerships do not necessarily mean a balance of power amongst the different actors in the partnership arrangement. As well, multi-party involvement in partnership governance does not necessarily mean the power is equally distributed or shared among all players. Furthermore, this research found governance to be a political relationship, whereas the interactions of each actor were driven by its own interests. Each actor had different objectives or goals, and each one tended to pursue an achievement of its goals. This nature of relationship caused any form of 'co-governance' to be difficult to achieve. This very nature of politics became a cause that prevented partnerships in the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy from functioning successfully.

Another related issue is that the emphasis on partnerships in governance theory tends to ignore the continuing role of bureaucratic hierarchy. Public-private partnership arrangements typically assume a limited role of the hierarchical structure in bureaucracy. This tends to lead to ignorance of the interplay and tension between hierarchical structure and partnership arrangement. As illustrated in this research, partnership governance might take place in the shadow of hierarchical organisation. In general, a partnership would include representatives from different government agencies and non-state sectors. If interactions among members across state-society sectors happen more frequently than interactions within the same sector in the process of conducting governance activities, the hierarchical structure may not have much influence. This condition often occurs when the state is weak. In the opposite way, if the governing process demands

more interactions among representatives from government agencies than interactions between state and non-state participants in the governing process, the hierarchy is likely to play a major role in the process, and partnership might not be effective in practice. Partnership structure in implementing the Poverty Registration Scheme via the government bureaucracy was a case which resulted in no collaboration between state and non-state actors at the street-level implementation stage.

3.3 Policy as a platform of governing interactions

Many leading scholars in the field of public policy conceptualise policy as a product of a rational process of searching and analysing information to achieve optimum solutions for social problems. The policy process is usually perceived as a sequence of various stages: problem identification and agenda formation, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation (Anderson, 2000; Hogwood and Gunn, 1991; MacRae and Wilde, 1979; Quade, 1989). What this research found was that policy was not a product of such a rational process; instead, policy could be viewed as an arena of governing arrangement whereby various actors used policy as a platform to pursue their own agendas and interests.

In the case of pre-2001 Thailand, poverty alleviation policy was pursued by communitarian advocates to advance their community empowerment agenda as well as to offer them a 'social space' to participate in decision-making and to access government resources. For state actors, particularly the government and NESDB, anti-poverty policy was used to tackle the impacts of the crisis and to address the poor, a strategy which certainly yielded much meaning to their political future. But for the Bank, this policy area gave it a 'ticket' to engage in this social policy area as well as to propel its neo-liberal reform agendas by addressing the needs of those who had been disadvantaged by a liberalised market. After 2001, while societal actors still pursued the anti-poverty agenda to maintain some institutionalised channels in which to participate in policy-decision

and to guarantee access to government resources, the government devised policy to serve its political purposes. The TRT government used this policy as an instrument to gain popular support and to reach out to a broader electorate, as well as to use it as a means for social intervention and manipulation. For globalised actors, the anti-poverty programme provided a platform for the Bank to remain engaged in Thailand's policy-making.

The case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy shows that policy can become a platform for interactions, in which negotiations or competitions amongst different interests exist. These interactions produce policy that is biased towards powerful actors who hold a stronger bargaining position. In other words, policy has been a result of competition among different constellations of power in domestic politics, and it represents the interests of a dominant force who sets the agenda and manipulates the mode of policy delivery. Therefore, it is vital to examine governance arrangements within specific policy contexts since the pattern of interactions is likely to vary across policy areas.

3.4 Governance in the context of developing countries

The contemporary forms of governance advocated in the West promote a new process of governing arrangement through market, community, or self-organising/inter-organisational networks characterised by 'interdependence, resource exchange, and significant autonomy from the state' (Rhodes, 1997: 14). However, while this may provide an appropriate basis for theorising about change in western governance, it is doubtful how relevant this model is outside of the specific Anglo-centric context, particularly in the context of Asian developing countries, where the legacy of authoritarian or paternalistic, soft-authoritarian governments remains (Beeson, 2001; Polidano, 2001; Tan, 2000). This research suggests that the governing arrangement in developing countries could appear in a different manifestation from the Anglo-American realisation, at least in Thailand's case. Even where political reform has recently occurred, it does not necessarily lead to the expansion or consolidation of an independent non-state

sector (or civil societies particularly) of a sort associated with the forms of governance proposed by scholars in developed countries (*cf.* Connors (1999) and Ji (2002) for Thailand's case).

This research found that the Thai state deliberately readjusted its strategies of engagement in relation to other non-state actors to retain its power over society. It seems to be that the institutionalised legacy of the strong state in Thailand continues to place constraints on possible patterns of 'co-governance' that are predicated upon the existence of fully functioning and independent non-state actors. While not as coercive as it once was, the Thai state appears to be able to manoeuvre society. This strategic manipulation exercised upon non-state sectors is made possible under the post-2001 governance through partnership and community modes of governing. Societal actors are not only frequently co-opted by the state but may to some extent be controlled by it. Such a condition concurs with Clarke's argument (1998) claiming that the political effectiveness of NGOs in developing countries largely dependent positively or negatively upon a state-defined regulatory framework. Considering this issue in the broader context of East Asia, Cheung and Scott (2003) comment that the paternalistic and centralising traditions of Asian states denote that the state is reluctant to devolve power, particularly to non-state institutions or those institutions that the state fails to reach and control in some way. Power to govern remains predominantly in the hands of the state, its bureaucracy, and those institutions it patronises. Their studies report that public sector reforms in Asian societies have become instruments or tactics used by Asian governments to strengthen state capacity. Beeson and Jayasuriya (1998) also argue that the institutional infrastructure that might permit alternative modes of governance, particularly in the form of independent policy networks existing outside of state control, simply does not exist in Asia in the same way that it does in Western Europe. In other words, because states in Asia still generally guard their independence and seek to maintain control over political structures and processes that may impinge on their autonomy, they refuse to accept any notion of 'shared sovereignty' with other non-state actors, as advised in western literature (Beeson, 2001).

The differences in historical development experiences of developing countries in Asia suggest that different natures of the traditional state-society arrangement induce different state roles in the governing process. The form of governing arrangement undertaken in a country would reflect existent, contingent realities of that country. Moreover, the nature of competition among different constellations of power not only makes co-operation difficult, but makes the establishment of governance through independent networks of the sort that occurs in Europe unlikely. This implies that the role of the state in governance is a contextual phenomenon: it could take different forms in different political and institutional contexts, and a state could be either the key, co-ordinating actor or simply one of several powerful players in the process (Pierre, 2000a).

If the governance configuration in each country is contextually sensitive, one might ask how useful the governance framework is when analysing governance in the context of developing countries. This research found that the governance framework as adopted in this research has potential to open up alternative ways of looking at the interactions and linkages between domestic and global actors, as well as the different forms of governing arrangements in the pursuit of collective interest fulfilment. One of the key benefits in employing the governance framework to analyse the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy was that the framework captured the new emerging forms of 'steering' strategies. These strategies seemed to be replacing 'command and control' policy instruments used by the Thai state in the old days. The notion of governance and the framework it offered serves as a useful tool to better understand the changing roles, powers, functions, and activities of the state in both developed and developing societies. However, some propositions of the governance perspective suggested by scholars such as Peters (1998a) or Stoker (1998) could be considered when analysing governance configuration in different contexts while other propositions might be improper. For example, one key proposition of governance promoted in the West is that of governing through networks rather than hierarchy, through partnership rather than control, and through negotiation rather than command. In Asia,

however, most countries started from either a traditional autocratic-paternalistic ruling system or a corporative developmental state, and the legacies of these systems remain in present governing configurations, for example the notion of Javanese kingship authority in Indonesian political culture or the idea of corporatism in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Cheung and Scott, 2003). This means that some propositions need close attention and critical examination when used to analyse governance in developing countries.

4. Governance and globalisation

Some scholars conceived globalisation as an external phenomenon that has been passively received by states, and adopted the logic of the convergence approach into their analysis (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1992; Strange, 1996). They argue that states are gradually ‘hollowing out’ of their locus through the globalisation process, where networks of production, trade, finance, and market bypass the state’s ability to control trans-border movement of these things. National governments have become simple intermediate institutions sandwiched between increasingly powerful local, regional, and global economic mechanisms. States are depicted as being under siege by global capitalism and its institutional allies and inevitably forced to pursue social and economic policies compatible with globalised forces. Some authors argue for the powerful supranational government and non-governmental agencies that can play critical roles in shaping social policy of a country via instruments such as structural adjustment funds, social development assistant programmes, or standard setting (Deacon *et al.*, 1997; Yeates, 2001). In sum, globalisation has been perceived by these scholars as an inevitable force that has eroded the state’s political power, policy autonomy, and its principal role in public policy-making.

The findings of this research contribute to this debate. In Thailand’s anti-poverty policy during the period of study, the capacity of government to manage society had not yet ‘hollowed out.’ Although the intervention of globalised agencies in national anti-poverty policy was clearly observed after the financial crisis, it lasted

only until the new TRT government came into power. Two variables could explain changes in the relationship between domestic state and globalised forces: the degree of state capacity and its policy towards external assistance. Findings of this research indicate that, contrary to the arguments of strong globalists, globalisation and the influence of globalised forces might not necessarily diminish the state's capacity. Instead, globalisation could contribute to the reorientation of the state in the governing process and to the ways the state manages society.

When the capacity of the Thai state to manage domestic affairs was weakened due to the consequences of the financial crisis, the state had to call for financial assistance from international agencies. This condition gave an opportunity for international agencies to shape and influence domestic social policy based on the idea of developing a social safety net for the poor. The Bank implemented SIP to reduce the social consequences caused by the crisis over the short-term. For the longer term, SIP aimed to empower people at the grassroots level through community-based development initiatives. However, soon after the Thai state managed to recover its capacity after the crisis and shortly after it could recuperate from budget constraints; it started to negotiate with international agencies and to realign its policy against external assistance. This reorientation of the Thai state to become not only a non-aid recipient but also an emerging donor pressured the Bank to search for a new strategy to retain its involvement in this policy area. The Thai state became an agenda setter and to some extent was able to pressure the Bank to follow and support its state-defined policies. Within the new partnership framework of CDP-PAM, the Thai state was able to manoeuvre and negotiate its position with the Bank. At this time, the state held the capacity to resist any influence exercised by globalised forces. Although the Bank attempted to initiate a policy dialogue instrument through its social monitor report series, the impact of this instrument was insignificant and yielded no influence on national policy. In this way, the state's capacity and policy reorientation against external forces were the key factors in determining the nature of the relationship between the state and globalised forces.

Furthermore, in the case of SIP, the Bank did not have its own local presence to implement the programme; therefore, it indeed depended on the cooperation and partnership of government agencies to implement its programmes or agreements. On the same basis, the Bank also relied on NGOs to implement the SIF scheme. This structural dependence of international organisations on state and domestic non-state agencies inevitably offered room for national politics to negotiate with globalised forces. This case supports the observation given by some scholars that the impact of globalisation was often greatly overestimated and that the 'hollowed-out state' argument was somewhat flawed (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Holton, 1998; Waters, 2001; Weiss, 1998). States yet have considerable autonomy in how they interpret constraints placed upon them by so-called globalised forces. This research argues that state adaptation, not state retreat, should be the hallmark of globalisation.

Another point to be mentioned here is that public policy could be perceived as an instrument that states use to manage globalisation. Far from surrendering to globalisation, states can pursue a variety of strategies to steer the globalisation process or to manage any influence caused by globalisation at the domestic level (Rieger and Leibfried, 1998). In doing so, states can advance their interests. The case of anti-poverty policy in Thailand might be considered in accordance with this line of analysis. It could be argued that the TRT government's emphasis on anti-poverty policy served the purpose of not only internalising the agenda from societal actors, but also internalising the agenda from the globalised forces. Once the TRT government adopted an agenda which used to be pursued and promoted by the Bank, it narrowed down a range of policy agenda that the Bank could pursue to influence Thailand's domestic policy-making. It also lessened the channels through which international organisations could influence domestic affairs. In this way, adopting anti-poverty policy helped the Thai government to mitigate pressures imposed by international organisations. This strategy also offered political space for the government to manage its own affairs. This example recognised the centrality of state as a key mediator of globalisation. Public policy was used by the state to reinforce its position against globalisation.

The final point drawn from the findings of this research is that the influence of globalised processes is politically negotiated and mediated at the level of national politics through governance arrangements. Globalisation neither produces unitary outcomes nor does it erase local or national differences in public policy (Tickell and Peck, 2003). Specific institutional arrangements between state and non-state actors determine the very nature of policy-making in a country. In other words, the apparently universal imperatives of globalisation are mediated differently in specific national institutional contexts, producing significantly different outcomes (Beeson, 2001). This not only suggests that governments may retain more policy discretion and autonomy than some observers would claim, depending on their capacities, but also the studies about globalisation and public policy thus strongly need to broaden their inquiry by incorporating the dimensions of the governance configuration in their analysis. However, the institutional arrangements in the governing process and the relationships between government, societal actors, and globalised agents vary from country to country depending on the country's social, political, cultural, and historical background. This means that the way which each country experiences globalisation and how each country responds to it can be expected to differ quite significantly. In other words, the study of the relationship between globalisation, governance, and public policy-making has to be concerned with the particular conditions within specific settings.

5. Conclusion

This research offers a contributory perspective of the nexus of governance, policy-making, and globalisation. The research supports a position arguing that the power of states is not yet diminished; on the contrary, the power is being readjusted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of the contemporary governing process. The form and functions of the state have reconstituted as the state seeks coherent strategies for maintaining its influence over domestic policy-making and engaging itself with new policy conditions. Examining the recent development of governance in Thailand's anti-poverty

policy has produced an empirical contribution to the theoretical development and debates in this area of research. Furthermore, the new configuration of governance is uneven, given the socio-political condition of a country, and it is subject to results of the power relationship that the state and other domestic or international non-state policy actors have negotiated. The study of Thai governance has promoted this idea of understanding governance in a specific context by broadening our perspective of governance in a non-western context. It moves away from the Anglo-American governance paradigm by looking at a specific policy in the context of developing countries in the East. Contemporary patterns of governance in Asia tend to be different from those in the Euro-American context, as exemplified in the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy with its specific contingencies. There is no universal model of governance that will be equally applicable or efficacious in all circumstances.

Nonetheless, the notion of governance as an analytical tool has the merit of providing a conceptual framework within which diverse forms of political and economic organisation can be compared and contrasted (Beeson, 2001). This means there is still a need to look at the nexus of governance, policy-making, and globalisation issues in a comparative perspective by analysing different social policies in Thailand, such as health care and education policy. This approach would provide a better understanding of the manifestation of governance and social policy in Thailand. Moreover, comparative cross-country studies would yield a more comprehensive understanding of some of the differences in the nature of state organisations – such as the political system (presidential, parliamentary, or mixed systems), state structure (unitary versus federal), national administrative organisation (centralisation versus decentralisation), or the level of a country's development (developing versus developed) – which would in turn produce particular modes of governing and governance configurations. Cross-country studies would enable us to compare policy outcomes based on a test of a variety of theoretical assumptions about policy-making and governance. Hence these comparative studies should be fully developed in future research to enrich

the understanding of policies and politics in developing societies and how they benefit people's everyday lives.

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Appendix 1: Codes and profiles of the informants


Code	Organisation	Profiles	Date of interview
Go1	The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co-Secretariat, the National Centre for Poverty Eradication	Senior Executive	23 rd Aug, 2004
Go2	The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co-Secretariat, the National Centre for Poverty Eradication	Senior Executive	30 th Aug, 2004
Go3	The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co-Secretariat, the National Centre for Poverty Eradication	Senior Policy Analyst	29 th Jul, 2004
Go4	Office of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication at the Ministry of Interior	Senior Executive	14 th Sep, 2004
Go5	District Office, Muang District, Nakorn Pathom Province	Senior District Officer	23 rd Sep, 2004
Go6	Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior	Senior Executive	3 rd Sep, 2004
Go7	The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund	Senior Executive	9 th Sep, 2004
Go8	Poverty Reduction Policy Unit, Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office, NESDB	Senior Executive	14 th Sep, 2004
Go9	Poverty Eradication and Income Distribution Section, Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office, NESDB	Senior Policy Analyst	27 th Jul, 2004
Go10	Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office, NESDB	Senior Policy Analyst who was one of staff working with the National Centre for Poverty Eradication	28 th Dec, 2004
Go11	Community Economic Development and Income Distribution Office, NESDB	Senior Policy Analyst who was one of staff responsible for a project under CDP-PAM	28 th Dec, 2004

Code	Organisation	Profiles	Date of interview
Go12	The Institute for Good Governance Promotion, Office of the Public Sector Development Commission	Senior Executive	29 th Jul, 2004
L1	The Sanding Committee on Labour and Social Welfare of the Senate	Senior Executive	17 th Sep, 2004
L2	TRT party	Founding executive member	8 th Feb, 2005
Ac1	Thailand Research Fund	Senior Executive	20 th Aug, 2004
Ac2	The Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society, National Institute of Development Administration	Faculty member	9 th Aug, 2004
Ac3	Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University	Faculty member	14 th Feb, 2005
Ac4	Faculty of Social Work and Social Welfare, Hauchiew Chalermprakiet University	Faculty member	23 rd Aug, 2004
Io1	World Bank Office, Bangkok	Project Economist	20 th Aug, 2004
Io2	Project Coordination Unit, Country Development Partnership for Poverty Analysis and Monitoring (CDP-PAM)	Senior Officer	9 th Feb, 2005
Io3	The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)	Former officer but now a consultant	24 th Aug, 2004
Io4	The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)	Senior Executive	24 th Aug, 2004
Io5	The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)	Programme Associate	24 th Aug, 2004
Ng1	The Institute for the Promotion of Local Knowledge Management	Senior Executive	19 th Aug, 2004
Ng2	The Villager Volunteer Association of Thailand	Senior Executive	17 th Sep, 2004
Ng3	The Community Resource Development Institute	Senior Executive	20 th Jan, 2005
Ng4	The Community Organisations Development Institute	Senior Executive	25 th Jan, 2005
Ng5	Knowledge and Information Development Unit, Community Organisation Development Institute	Senior Officer	7 th Sep, 2004

Code	Organisation	Profiles	Date of interview
Ng6	The Community Organisations Development Institute	Senior Officer at the management level	3 rd Aug, 2004
Ng7	Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee	Senior Executive	10 th Feb, 2005
Ng8	The Local Development Institute	Senior Officer	21 st Dec, 2004
Ng9	Local Development Institute	Senior Officer	13 th Sep, 2004

Appendix 2: Research information for the interviewees

UNIVERSITY
of BRISTOL


School for **Policy Studies**

Mr Amornsak Kitthananan
University of Bristol
School for Policy Studies
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Bristol BS8 1TZ England

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Fax: +44 (0)117 954 6756 (UK)
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You are being invited to participate in a doctoral research project being undertaken by Mr Amornsak Kitthananan, entitled 'Governance and policy-making process in Thailand: A study of poverty alleviation policy since 1997'. This document provides you, with the scope and significance of the research, the reason why you have been chosen to participate, and how the study will be used. Please take time to read the following information and do not hesitate to ask the researcher if you have any queries. After reading this document, and if you are willing to participate, please kindly complete the attached reply form and fax to the number given.

What is the scope and significance of the research?

This research is about governance and policy-making in Thailand with a particular focus on a case study of poverty alleviation policy since 1997. The 1997 Asian crisis initiated significant challenges to the Thai socio-political milieu, governance, and policy-making. The issues of governance reform and building better governance have become the prime reform agendas in Thailand since then.

Changes continue to transform Thai governance and policy-making, but the changes that have occurred in Thailand since the 1997 crisis have left an ambiguity and confusion regarding the present nature of governance in Thailand. This research is therefore concerned with exploring governance and the policy process with particular reference to Thailand, and is thus an emerging and highly relevant area of research particularly in the current context of globalisation and

internationalisation and the increasing complexity of the policy arena. This research area is, as yet, underdeveloped. This research will take advantage of the very ambiguity and confusion discussed above, and will critically examine the configuration of the present Thai governance through an investigation of the whole range of institutions and actors involved in the process of governing, as well as the nature of relationships amongst them. It will then go on to consider how this new configuration of governance affects the policy-making process.

Although existing research on policy studies in Thailand has been carried out drawing on various theories and frameworks, it would see that the predominant explanations come from the political economy point of view, and almost all of them have employed theories derived from the contexts of developed countries. This may not apply to the case of developing countries like Thailand. Furthermore, this policy studies literature seems to place little attention on the trans- and supra-national actors, such as the World Bank or multinational companies, who play an important role in the globalised world. Another important point is that almost none of them have comprehended the socio-political changes in Thailand since the 1997 crisis. Thus, there is the need gain on understanding of the contemporary policy-making process in Thailand by employing the governance framework in order to understand the changing nature of state-society relations in policy-making process in Thailand.

Poverty eradication policy is selected for a more specific examination for many reasons. The literature about policy-making in Thailand has been dominated with studies mainly in the area of economic policy-making. Social policy is under-researched and there is certainly a need for a more comprehensive literature to contribute of the field. Further, poverty policy is the prime agenda of government and this policy area reveals significant change in Thai governance in many ways. In pursuing this policy, the government has implemented a major public sector reform plan through which we can observe significant change in the public sector structure and the nature of governing. Finally, in this policy area, non-state actors (the non-governmental and international organisations) have played an important role in shaping policy content and policy-making process which reflects the change in governing nature of Thailand.

What are the anticipated benefits of research?

This research should make a critical contribution to the study of policy studies in general, as well as the progress of governance reform in Thailand in particular. In a practical sense, this research will reflect the contemporary inter-relationship between state and society in Thailand within the context of 1997 Constitution, and it could be seen as an important contribution in assessing the progress of Thailand's political and public sector reform process. In a theoretical sense, the research should develop an analytical framework that identifies the elements that contribute to governance theory. This is expected to be utilised to analyse policy-making processes in other countries. This research should also provide a critical contribution to academic debates in the area of globalisation and the role of the

state in policy-making; as well as the discussion of state-society relations in a globalised world. This research should further add a thoughtful contribution to the discussion about the role of institutions and power relations in the policy process.

What methods will be employed?

This research employs the analysis of reliable secondary data and archives, and in-depth interview with all relevant stakeholders. Secondary data will cover various sources available in both print and on-line. The interview will be conducted with around 20-30 people who were selected purposively. The interview should take about 30-45 minutes and will be tape-recorded for the reason of data analysis. The condition of anonymity and confidentiality will be strictly implemented. The information provided by respondents will be kept anonymous and the information will be collected in such a way that confidentiality can be guaranteed. Data will be stored in such a way as to preclude any unauthorised access. Taped and transcripts will be labeled in ways which confirm anonymity.

Why you are invited?

Around 20-30 interviewees who are responsible or have actively participated in the poverty policy advocacy and development from each of the related organisations are invited to participate in this research. They are purposively chosen because their experiences, knowledge, expertise, and perspectives about the issue are expected to provide invaluable information which will help to contribute to the advancement of knowledge and policy development. Participation is voluntary, you are free to decide whether to be involved in this research. However, the researcher would be extremely grateful if you decide to be interviewed as mentioned above. The researcher guarantees the confidentiality and anonymity of the information provided by you. A list of topics questions that are likely to be covered in the interview is attached with this document.

Research results

The information from the research will be used in a dissertation to fulfil the requirement of Doctor of Social Science (Policy Studies) Degree, University of Bristol, England. Research findings will be prepared for publication in academic journals and reports. Summary of the research will be provided if requested. Future research projects to advance findings found in this dissertation will be pursued.

Appendix 3: Interview guideline

Objectives of research

- 1) to examine the present nature of the governance configuration in Thailand;
- 2) to investigate the way this governance configuration effects the poverty eradication policy-making process
- 3) to analyse the impacts/influences of globalisation upon the configuration of governance and policy process.

Introduction

- Research information
- Tape-recorded
- Confidentiality
- Sign the informed consent form

Background of participant

- How long have you been working for this organisation?
- How long have you been working for this job?
- What are your roles and responsibilities in relation to this policy?
- How have you been involved in the poverty policy?

Situation of poverty

- Situation of poverty in Thailand
- How policy deals with poverty problem
- Effect of government reform plan on poverty reduction plan
- Influence of your organisation on
 - Policy content
 - Policy decision
 - Policy delivery

Actors

- Stakeholders/partners who get involved
 - Formulating
 - Delivering
- Why they were included
- Who has been left out
 - Why
 - How

Nature of governance

- Roles and responsibilities of your organisation
 - Formulation
 - Implementation
- Roles and responsibilities of other organisations
 - Formulation
 - Implementation
- Reliance on other stakeholders
 - Resources
 - Decision
- Who plays the dominant role
 - Civil society
 - International organisations
 - Legislative bodies
 - Government
 - Civil servants
 - Why
 - How
- Who is (are) the key actor(s)
- Do you think the role of the state has changed in any way? If so, why and how?
If not, why?

Modes of governing

- Method government use to get policy delivered
 - Different from NGOs' methods
 - Different from International organisations' methods
- Key mechanism highlighted in poverty reduction policy
 - How the mechanism effected your organisation
- Methods of cooperation with other actors
 - Role of networks
 - Formulating
 - Delivering
 - Role of community
 - Role of market mechanism
- Key bargaining power of your organisation

Policy instrument

- Major resources

Role of idea/discourse

- Who define the problem
- How do you understand the poverty problem

External actors

- Influence of international organisations on policy content
- Involvement of international organisations in policy implementation

Appendix 4:
A list of members of the Executive Committee,
the National Centre for Poverty Eradication

Position	Agency	Sector
1. Prawase Wasi	N/A	Civil society
2. Thanin Jiarawanont	Chareon Pokkapan	Private business
3. Chairat Mapraneat	N/A	Private business
4. Deputy Prime Minister Chawalit Yongjaiyoudh	-	Government
5. Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatosribhitak	-	Government
6. Deputy Prime Minister Jaturon Chaisang	-	Government
7. Minister	Ministry of Defence	Government
8. Minister	Ministry of Finance	Government
9. Minister	Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	Government
10. Minister	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Government
11. Minister	Ministry of Commerce	Government
12. Minister	Ministry of Interior	Government
13. Minister	Ministry of Labour	Government
14. Minister	Ministry of Education	Government
15. Minister	Ministry of Industry	Government
16. Supreme Commander	Supreme Command Headquarters	Government
17. Army Commander-in- Chief	Royal Thai Army	Government
18. Navy Commander-in- Chief	Royal Thai Navy	Government
19. Air Force Commander-in-Chief	Royal Thai Air Force	Government
20. Secretary-General	Internal Security Operations Command	Government

Position	Agency	Sector
21. Permanent Secretary	Prime Minister's Office	Government
22. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Finance	Government
23. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Tourism and Sports	Government
24. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	Government
25. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Government
26. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Commerce	Government
27. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Labour	Government
28. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Education	Government
29. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Health	Government
30. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Industry	Government
31. Budget Director	Bureau of the Budget	Government
32. Secretary-General	National Security Council	Government
33. Secretary-General	National Economic and Social Development Board	Government
34. Deputy Director-General	Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior	Government
35. Deputy Director-General	Department of Lands, Ministry of Interior	Government
36. Deputy Director-General	Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior	Government
37. Bangkok Governor	Bangkok Metropolitan Administration	Government
38. Director General	The Government Saving Bank	Government
39. Managing Director	The Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives	Government
40. Director General	Farmers Rehabilitation and Development Fund Office	Government
41. President	The Thai Bankers' Association	Private business
42. President	The Thai Chamber of Commerce	Private business
43. President	The Federation of Thai Industries	Private business
44. Director	National Village and Urban Revolving Fund Office	Government
45. Director	Thailand Research Fund	Quasi-government
46. Director	Civil Society Development Officer, Local Development Institute	Civil society
47. Director	Thailand Health Fund	Quasi-government

Position	Agency	Sector
48. General Secretary	National Health Security Office	Government
49. Representatives	Four Regional and Bangkok Community Network	Civil society
50. Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Interior	Government
51. Secretary General	The Office of the Narcotics Control Commission	Government
52. Deputy Director- General	Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior	Government
53. Deputy Secretary- General	National Economic and Social Development Board	Government
54. Chair	Community Organisations Development Institute	Civil society

Source: NCPE (2004)